Middle East

This morning I stopped by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for the Washington D.C. launch of the 2009 Arab Human Development Report. Since I have an article coming out in the next day or two about that, I'll refrain from saying anything about it now. Over lunch, I talked at length with Tom Friedman of the New York Times about his recent column from Kandahar, in which he wrote:

All those deployments have left us with a deep cadre of officers with experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, now running both wars — from generals to captains. They know every mistake that has been made, been told every lie, saw their own soldiers killed by stupidity, figured out solutions and built relationships with insurgents, sheikhs and imams on the ground that have given the best of them a granular understanding of the “real” Middle East that would rival any Middle East studies professor.

This is something I've thought about a lot, especially since agreeing to take over as the director of the Middle East Studies program at the Elliott School of International Affairs. Graduate programs in political science and Middle East Studies have already begun to see a steady flow of applicants back from Iraq (including, among many others, my research assistant from last year). I expect that over the next decade, this will turn into a flood as smart, young veterans look to put their experiences into a broader perspective and to apply their hard-won granular knowledge to broader academic and policy problems.  (And not only military veterans -- there are plenty of civilians, contractors, and NGO workers who have worked in Iraq as well.) Most will pursue MA degrees, while some percentage will decide to continue on to a Ph.D. I think this an unequivocally good thing -- and I wonder if people have given serious thought to how it might change the field of Middle East studies.

I've met a lot of these officers over the last few years, and have frequently been deeply impressed with them. A remarkable number of my students at Williams College (and later from George Washington) chose to serve in the military after graduation in the post-9/11 period (and some, like the much-missed Nate Krissoff, didn't make it back). There is absolutely no reason why such officers and soldiers wouldn't choose to pursue advanced degrees, or succeed brilliantly when they do.

When they enter academic programs, these veterans will (and already do) bring a great deal of on-the-ground experience to the classroom and to their research. Many will (and do) enter their programs with far more advanced language skills than did earlier generations of students, although perhaps with more familiarity with colloquial spoken dialects than with Modern Standard Arabic (reversing a common traditional pattern). Their point of reference will be (and is) Iraq and the Gulf, not Israeli-Palestinian affairs, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, or other areas where a great number of current faculty began their encounters with the region. And they will have much greater familiarity and comfort with military and security issues than do many currently in the field.  

I doubt that the main effect will be to push the field to the "right", as I've heard suggested. The officers I've met are all over the map politically and in terms of their intellectual aspirations. Indeed, I'd guess that the bias would be towards pragmatism and empiricism, and against any kind of ideological doctrines. And at any rate, the allegations of the politicization of Middle East Studies -- particularly political science -- have always been wildly exaggerated. How the critics of the "Human Terrain Program" over in Anthropology might react, I admit I don't know...

That's not to say that there might not be depressing misperceptions on both sides. I've had a few soldiers interested in pursuing degrees ask me nervously whether they would be shunned by academics. I would be shocked if any experienced prejudice or bias because of their war service -- certainly not at a place like GWU -- and would be appalled if they did. I certainly hope that such concerns wouldn't stop them from applying. I suppose there's a chance that some faculty might feel threatened by students from such a background -- but those are probably professors who have trouble in other areas as well, frankly. Constructive argument and productive friction between people with very different backgrounds, perspectives and knowledge should enrich and even electrify a well-run classroom, not cause problems. That's a good, not a negative.  

To succeed, of course, this new generation will need to be open to engaging with the academic literature and to learning from faculty and fellow students with very different forms of experience, expertise, and methodological approaches. Academic work is different, with its own rules and norms and expectations. That's true of anyone entering a graduate program, though --  think professionals attending business school -- and certainly isn't unique to veterans. They shouldn't listen too intently to Friedman's flattery!

On balance I think that such an influx will enormously enrich the field, bringing in a new generation of smart, energetic, pragmatic and experienced junior scholars. In political science, it has already begun to galvanize the study of insurgencies and civil wars (see: Small Wars Journal), but that should only be the start. War may have brought them into the field, but I suspect that many will range far more widely once given the chance to explore their intellectual horizons. I'm excited by the possibilities --- and hope that the academic disciplines, university departments, and professional associations are ready to encourage and to nurture their ambitions.

I'd be curious to hear what others have thought or experienced in this area. I'll update and link back to any quality responses I see out there!

^{Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki declaring a great victory.} 

Tomorrow's scheduled U.S. pullback from Iraqi cities has provoked quite a bit of anxious hand-wringing from American analysts and probably premature celebrations from Iraqi officials. While I'm writing about this today because I just can't resist the sweet entreaties of our beloved editorial team, I don't actually think it's that big a deal. American forces have been drawing down in line with the Status of Forces Agreement expectations for months now --- it's not like tomorrow all of the Americans will suddenly click the heels of their ruby slippers and vanish in a puff of smoke. Tomorrow's deadline is far more important symbolically than practically. And here, the Obama administration and General Odierno's team deserve a lot of credit for their careful, rigorous, and publicly affirmed adherence to the agreement.

 It's true that there has been an increase in the number of high-profile, high-casualty attacks over the last few weeks. The thing about spoilers is that they try to spoil. The key questions are whether the attacks trigger sectarian mobilization and security dilemma dynamics, seriously undermine confidence in the state and its ability to provide security, or drive momentum towards wider conflict. There's a lot of anecdotal evidence of mounting popular anxiety, but very little evidence of those kinds of conflict dynamics kicking in. For what it's worth, both Iraqi and American officials seem confident -- and remember when the judgment of the commanders on the ground was supposed to be considered sacred writ?

 I'm not particularly an optimist on these matters, any more than I was in the past -- but I also see a rapidly declining ability or need for the U.S. to manage these issues. I think that there are still very serious issues surrounding the integration of Sunnis into the emerging Iraqi state and political system -- not just the endlessly dragging integration of the Sons of Iraq into the security forces and civil administration, but the selective targeting of key Awakenings leaders and other ongoing complaints. I also think that some amount of the recent uptick in violence is driven by the disenchantment of some of these Awakenings men, either actively or passively. But it seems clear that Maliki has decided that he can get away with selective repression and co-optation of the various Sunni forces, and will only change his approach if he determines that the price is too high. Maybe he's wrong, maybe he's right -- but that's for Iraqis to determine, not Americans.

 Iraqi politics are going to continue to face all kinds of problems, as every analyst under the moon has pointed out. The Arab-Kurd issue, the continuing problems with government capacity, budget problems, and a host of unresolved issues remain. I think that the refugee/IDP issue remains the largest unresolved and virtually untouched issue facing Iraq -- those millions of people uprooted from their homes by force or fear who have few prospects of returning to their original homes, are largely disenfranchised in the emerging Iraqi political system, and who are almost completely unserved by Iraqi state institutions. But slowing down the American drawdown would not materially improve any of these issues. The best thing the U.S. can do is to continue to demonstrate its clear, credible commitment to withdraw on the agreed-upon timeline, and do what it can to help Iraqis adjust to the new realities.

File Photo: AFP/Getty Images

One story in the Middle East that hasn't gotten much attention is the move by many countries in the region to develop their nuclear energy production capacities - an important shift that should impact any analyses that examine broader regional dynamics. Our delegation to the Gulf heard a good bit about this civilian nuclear energy push in the Emirates, and it seems inevitable that the Obama administration will preside over a new expansion of nuclear energy in the Middle East -- even in the oil-rich parts.

Everyone knows about the Iranian nuclear program and the widespread concerns about it - Sandy Spector, a nonproliferation expert who was on the Gulf trip and currently is deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, wrote this excellent piece on Obama's emerging strategy towards Iran and its nuclear program. Clearly, the Iranian nuclear program is one of the leading challenges facing the new administration.

Beyond Iran, there's been a race between the United States, Russia, France, and China to sign nuclear cooperation deals with countries in the Middle East, and all of these efforts could represent important steps to shaping the broader regional economic, political, and security architecture in the region. The history of nuclear programs in the Middle East is a long and complicated one -- much too long for a blog post, and it involves things like President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program that supported early Iranian efforts to develop its civilian nuclear industry.

The past three years has seen a renewed push for civilian nuclear energy in several corners of the Middle East. A few noteworthy moves and announcements include:

• Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) December 2006 statement on civilian nuclear energy.  After a summit in Riyadh, the six members of the GCC (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates) issued this statement announcing plans to seek nuclear energy technology while repeating the demand to make the entire Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. In 2007, the GCC states asked for the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) help in developing its civilian nuclear capacity, and the IAEA has since said positive things about the prospects for these plans.

• The Bush administration signs nuclear energy cooperation agreements. Throughout 2007 and 2008, the Bush administration signed a number of memos of understanding with Middle East countries, including Jordan (September 2007), Bahrain (March 2008), and Saudi Arabia (May 2008). And earlier this year, in its last week in office, the Bush administration signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United Arab Emirates. 

• Other Middle Eastern countries announce nuclear efforts. Egypt unveiled a plan to develop nuclear power plants and even poor countries like Yemen have said that it wants to develop these capacities. Kuwait formed a nuclear energy commission earlier this month.

• France, Russia, and China get in on the action. France, which has a well-developed civilian nuclear capacity of its own, has worked with a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa to set up efforts to develop civilian nuclear capacities and signed several agreements with countries in the region.  So have Russia and China. 

What's the impetus behind this effort to go nuclear and do it legit? Obviously, the Iranian nuclear program is a key motivation. Countries in the Middle East and in the West are wary of the Iranian nuclear program, and they want to send a signal that pursuing peaceful nuclear energy under the framework of international safeguards is the way to go. There is also the possibility that these states want to develop the technical expertise necessary to develop a nuclear weapon if they perceive it to be necessary.

Second, there are real energy development needs in the medium to long term for many Middle Eastern countries, particularly those like Egypt that have a growing population and few or dwindling oil and gas resources.  Even the oil-rich countries in the GCC are concerned about providing for their energy needs - a lot of power is expended to power air conditioning, desalination plants, and, yes, even indoor ski slopes in the desert. Just this week, the Emirates announced it would join a GCC-wide electricity grid, which is the type of cooperative regional venture U.S. policy should look to support. Still, members of Congress like Rep. Edward Markey wonder why these countries need nuclear power specifically to meet there energy needs when other options like solar power exist.

For the Obama administration, these civilian nuclear programs present both opportunities and risks. The opportunity is to further deepen some alliances with key countries in the region, and do it in a way that shows Iran that there are positive rewards available for operating civil nuclear power under tight international safeguards. The risks are obvious -- many countries (like Pakistan and India) have used civil nuclear assistance as a stepping stone to nuclear weapons programs. And the more fissile material that exists anywhere, the greater the chance there is for it to leak into the hands of terrorist groups, organized crime, or other malicious entities.

President Obama has repeatedly stated a vision for his Middle East policy as one that is integrated -- most recently in his speech last month on Iraq:  "...we can no longer deal with regional challenges in isolation - we need a smarter, more sustainable and comprehensive approach." These civilian nuclear cooperation efforts in the Middle East are one piece of the broader puzzles of both non-proliferation policy and regional strategy, and will require careful management.

By Brian Katulis

“Af-Pak” (or “Pak-Af,” depending on your perspective) has topped the two-month old Obama administration’s national security agenda. This part of the world is bound to get more media attention in the coming weeks with the conclusion of the administration’s policy review and the NATO summit early next month.

In the big debates about U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, one set of questions that shouldn’t be ignored is how to get others around the world to support efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.  The effort to stabilize Afghanistan, after all, is not just about U.S. security - it is about global security. And as I argued in this article for the Middle East Bulletin last week, the countries of the Arab Gulf play a pivotal role in many of the economic, political, and security linkages between the Middle East and South Asia. 

With the Obama administration gearing up for a rollout of a new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, one related question to the issue of broader global support seems important:  Why don’t other Muslim-majority countries play more of a role in Afghanistan?  It’s not that Muslim-majority countries aren’t doing anything at all - but it seems to me that there is room for more to be done, particularly as the effort to stabilize Afghanistan is close to a geographic center of the so-called Muslim world - a bridge between the parts of the Middle East and Asia where the vast majority of Muslims live.

One briefing on my trip to the Emirates that stands out is the session the delegation had with the Special Operations Command in the Emirates. Respecting the ground rules of that briefing - clarified at the outset of the meeting by our hosts as on background (meaning I can use the facts but can’t quote the officials) - here’s what I can say about the small Emirati Special Forces units that have operated on the ground in Afghanistan.  

•    A couple hundred Emirati Special Forces have operated inside of Afghanistan since 2003, and their role wasn’t publicly acknowledged until the spring of 2008, allegedly catching even the Saudis by surprise.  
    
•    These Emirati forces are the only Arab troops on the ground with a full combat mission in Afghanistan - at least publicly acknowledged - and the Emirati forces have seen combat in the volatile south; they also provide support for counterinsurgency activities such as health and education.  (Small numbers of Jordanian forces have played a role in Afghanistan, deploying in 2001 and helping with things such as establishing medical services).  

•    The number one operational challenge is getting intelligence out of U.S. forces, according to one of our briefers - the Australian forces were much better at sharing intel.  There were also complaints voiced that the missions received by this unit as not being as serious as they are capable of conducting.  (“Pissant” was the phrase used by one).  

•    Outside of Afghanistan, Emirati forces have also been engaged in Kuwait in 1990-1991, Somalia in 1993, Kosovo in 1999, and in Lebanon and Iraq in diplomatic protection missions, including an effort to offer protection to the president of Iraq’s interim government.  

This Emirati presence in Afghanistan is really minor in the larger picture of the foreign troop presence in the country (representing far less than 1 percent of the total foreign troop presence). But these forces have some useful language and cultural sensitivity skills that Western troops lack.  And the symbolism is important - and publicly admitting a role in Afghanistan seems like a brave thing to do, especially when one considers other Muslim-majority countries and their stance on Afghanistan. 

Besides the Emirates, Turkey seems to be the only Muslim-majority country with large numbers of troops on the ground. A NATO ally, Turkey has hundreds of troops operating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Of course, having a military presence on the ground isn’t the only way for countries to support the effort to stabilize Afghanistan - although one wonders why countries like Egypt, with nearly half a million active duty military personnel, a country whose regime was the target of some of the same Islamist extremist groups that operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has been the recipient of billions of dollars of U.S. military assistance for the past three decades, doesn’t contribute more to the effort in Afghanistan. 

Part of the answer may lie in public attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan in some of these countries - the effort to stabilize Afghanistan may be deeply unpopular, particularly if it has an American face on it. This World Public Opinion.org poll published in February of this year found that 83 percent of Egyptians supported attacks against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Support for such attacks was varied in other countries (61 percent in Morocco, 29 percent in Pakistan, and 21 percent in Indonesia). 

So sending troops may not be an option for some Muslim-majority countries - the question then should be asked, what more can they do to help contribute to political and economic stability in Afghanistan?  And will more countries be willing to break the taboo against supporting such efforts?

At the very least, perhaps more countries can help cut off the financial links that sustain terrorist networks that operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  There are several instances in which the United States froze the assets of organizations it alleges to have evidence of ties to financing terror networks - such as the Kuwaiti Revival of Islamic Heritage Society - but close allies like Kuwait deny the allegations, and the cases remain unresolved. Cutting off these financial links that support extremist networks could be a key to stability in Afghanistan - when the full history of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008, it will likely reveal the important role in cutting off the financial ties of insurgent and terrorist groups as a key to greater stability.  But doing so in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require more cooperation from more countries around the world - including key Muslim-majority countries.  As the United States commits more resources to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, it should ask its friends if they are willing to do the same.

The Afghanistan war isn’t the Iraq war, of course - the war in Afghanistan enjoyed greater international legitimacy.  And if the Obama administration is committed to using the full range of power - including political and economic power - at America’s disposal - it should ask its friends what they might be willing to do to help another Muslim-majority country seek greater stability and a decent life for their people.  If the small Emirati military can contribute forces to the fight, countries with larger budgets and militaries, as well as leverage to cut off ties to terrorist networks, should be able to do more.

By Brian Katulis

In less than three years, the United Arab Emirates has achieved a remarkable turnaround in its image in the United States. After seeing a proposed 2006 deal that would have given operational control of several U.S. ports to a Dubai-based firm get killed in the face of strong public opposition, the Emirates embarked on a full court press inside the Beltway to change its image.  As a result, when Emirati investors bought a stake in the NASDAQ stock exchange and invested $7.5 billion in the troubled Citigroup in 2007, hardly anyone took notice.

In our discussions on this trip, a common talking point we’ve heard is that the UAE is now the single largest export market for U.S. goods in the Arab world.  One lesser known fact is that good bit of this U.S. export growth to the Emirates comes from rapidly expanding military sales.

The Emirates is a small country about the size of Maine, and it has a total population of nearly 5 million people - about 15 to 20 percent are actually citizens (the rest are guest workers from places like Pakistan, India, and Egypt). The country's small size hasn't prevented it from embarking on a tremendous military buying spree that rivals much larger countries in the region. 

Though the actual numbers are difficult pin down, according to this Congressional Research Service report, the Emirates purchased a total of $11.5 billion in defense sales and services from the United States from 2000-2007. A good chunk of this went to the purchase of the F-16s I discussed in yesterday’s post -- the 80 F-16s along with the more than 60 Mirage 2000 fighters give the Emirates more advanced fighter planes than Iran. 

Egypt, a country with a population of about 80 million, purchased slightly more than the UAE during the same time period, $11. 9 billion.  The Emirates purchased more than Israel and Saudi Arabia, which both came in at a little above $9 billion.

The flow of arms to the country and the region as a whole continues. In the summer of 2007, President Bush announced a series of arms deals in the region totaling at least $20 billion. In late 2008, just before Bush left office, the Emirates announced that it would purchase a $3.3 billion Patriot missile defense system. Last month, the Emirates announced more defense purchases at the IDEX 2009 arms show in Abu Dhabi.

No doubt, the increase in military sales in large part is motivated by regional threat perceptions about Iran. But it is fair to ask in the early months of a new administration the question: how do these increased arms sales to the Emirates and other Middle Eastern countries, combined with what has essentially been a 10-fold increase in the U.S. military presence in the broader Middle East and South Asia since early 2001, add up to a comprehensive strategy for this part of the world? Do all of the pieces fit together?

My discussions on this trip leave me with the distinct impression that there’s a long road ahead in the effort to develop an integrated, coherent regional strategy. As the Obama administration concludes its multiple policy reviews, including an examination of Iran policy and an “Af-Pak” review that is concluding shortly, it has a tough task in making sure all of the different elements of a strategy fit together in this complicated part of the world.

By Brian Katulis

Thanks to Foreign Policy and my friend Marc for inviting me to guest-blog during my current trip to the Arab Gulf.

I'm in the United Arab Emirates as part of a delegation organized by the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), directed by Jon Alterman (check out the program's excellent reports and note here. The U.S. delegation is in the U.A.E. and Kuwait this week to see how people here are thinking about the global economic meltdown, Iran's evolving role in the region, and the increasing emphasis in U.S. policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan (discussed in that order out here).We're also hearing a good bit on the usual mix of Middle East issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq.

Relative to Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict and other things Marc usually writes about on this blog, the U.A.E. is somewhat of a humdrum place to visit from a U.S. foreign policy standpoint. Headlines in local newspapers talk more about other countries in the neighborhood, rather than events at home.
The day of our arrival, the front page of Khaleej Times, which claims to be the number 1 English language daily here, had the following headlines - "Zardari Pondering Way Out of Crisis" (Pakistan), "Sanctions Childish: Iran" (Iran), "Mega-rich Indians Feel the Pain" (India), and "Under Pressure, Switzerland Opens up on Bank Secrecy" (essentially a global finance story), all right above a large color McDonald's print ad for a 14 dirham value meals (Prompting one to wonder: What exactly is the cost-benefit equation of front-page color ads for fast food restaurants?) The big story seems to be the economy and all of the talk of the "Dubai" model for progress.

But beneath the surface view of the glitz and glammor of the economic talk lurk some of the most complicated security and economic challenges in the world. By virtue of geography and the country's unique role as a financial, trade, and economic powerhouse and go-between, the UAE finds itself at the center of three top-tier national security concerns for the new Obama administration:

1. Iran. The Persian shadow looms large in the Emirates, with many shades of grey in the bilateral relationship between Iran and the U.A.E. At least 100,000 Iranians live in the U.A.E. - with some estimates ranging two to three times larger than that, and the commercial links between the two countries are substantial.

Yet at the same time, the ruling elite quite clearly expresses a wariness about possible U.S. engagement of Iran shared by other Arab Gulf countries. The U.A.E. maintains no fewer than 80 U.S.-supplied F-16 fighters and receives ongoing training and support from the U.S. Air Force at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi (where we received briefings earlier today, more about that later this week). The U.A.E. is also the beneficiary of a massive explosion of U.S. foreign military sales, which accelerated in 2007 with the Bush administration's announcement of more arms transfers to the region.

2. "Pak-Af." The hottest topic in U.S. foreign-policy circles in the opening weeks of the Obama administration has been the so-called "Af-Pak" basket of issues - Afghanistan and Pakistan. People here say the U.S. has it backwards and talk about it in reverse order - putting Pakistan in front of Afghanistan as a concern. It makes sense - Pakistan has nuclear weapons and about six times as many people as Afghanistan.

And for the U.A.E., it's only natural to think of it as "Pak-Af," given that hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis live and work in the U.A.E., sending money back to Pakistan in remittances that dwarf any amount the United States might be willing to give to Pakistan in bilateral development assistance. The ruling family in the Emirates has had long-standing ties with the late Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto and her husband, current President Asif Ali Zardari, and the U.A.E. has become ever more dependent on agriculture in Pakistan for its own food security. Not that Afghanistan doesn't also matter  - the U.A.E. is actually the only Arab country with combat forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

Also prior to 9/11, the U.A.E. was one of the few countries in the world with close ties to the Taliban regime, so presumably those contacts might be useful in any proposed dialogue with Taliban insurgents. Hopefully, the Obama administration team that is reviewing the policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan are talking to people in the Emirates.       

3. The global economic meltdown. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair highlighted the global economic crisis as a national security concern in his "Annual Threat Assessment" testimony to Congress last month, and even oil-rich Abu Dhabi and the financial metropolis of Dubai have been impacted negatively on these dynamics.

With a local population smaller than some neighborhoods in Cairo and Karachi, the U.A.E may not matter hugely on its own, but the perspective it brings from its role in these thress issues could help the new U.S. administration develop an integrated strategy that accounts for the many security, political, and economic linkages that exist between the Middle East and South Asia. 

Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy with an emphasis on the Middle East, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Pakistan.

Photo: RABIH MOGHRABI/AFP/Getty Images

By Marc Lynch

This week's virtual book club about Tom Ricks's The Gamble and Obama's Iraq speech have brought out some really good points and arguments here on Foreign Policy.com. I wanted to quickly respond to some of them here as the week wraps up. 

First, my esteemed co-blogger Christian Brose objects to my description of the Obama plan (offered in my response to Dan Drezner) as essentially the same one offered by Obama throughout the campaign except for two extra months. The plan is the same, he concedes, but reality has changed.  That's fair, as far as it goes. Iraq in February 2009 is not the Iraq of spring 2007. But it's still the case that the plan which Obama presented on Friday is in most particulars the same as the one presented throughout 2008, save for those two fateful months added to the timeline for withdrawal of combat brigades.

The most interesting part of the story has to be how the U.S. policy debate evolved over 2007-2008 to make this consensus possible. The rough contours of Obama's plan evolved amidst a healthy, constructive debate over the course of 2007-08 between center-left and center-right pragmatists. Obama's commitment to withdrawal along a fixed timeline moved the debate in both the U.S. and Iraq -- just compare the early Bush positions in the SOFA negotiations in favor of an open-ended, long-term U.S. military presence with the final document's fixed deadline of December 31, 2011 for the departure of U.S. troops. The SOFA (which I have praised Bush for signing) cemented the strategic convergence around a time-line for withdrawal. That, along with his careful consultations with the military at all levels on how to safely implement his commitments, helped ensure the rough consensus we so amazingly saw last week.

But all of that just makes it even more amazing to look back to the presidential election campaign, where the intense political rhetoric tended to obscure the emerging policy convergence on Iraq policy. Obama's plan is, as Brose acknowledges, substantially the same as the plan he advocated in the campaign. During the campaign, McCain's people savaged the plan. Now the same people praise it as "an Iraq policy John McCain might have formulated." As a great man once said, you can tell the people you roll with whatever you want, but you and I know what's going on. (That's not aimed at Chris, just to be clear).

Second, Tom Ricks.

Much of what Ricks has said in response to his critics makes sense. I fully agree with his concerns about the long-term success of the surge, the continuing and deep political fragility of Iraq, and the impressiveness of the men who changed U.S. strategy in Iraq. Can things go wrong? Are conditions still fragile? Lord, yes. Will some U.S. commanders on the ground continue to worry that it isn't a good time to remove forces? Probably. But I disagree with his repeated claim that Obama is repeating Bush's mistake of over-optimism, and I think that his cavalier dismissal of the SOFA is dangerously wrong.

Obama's withdrawal plan was never based on unrealistic optimism, but rather on a healthy skepticism about what the U.S. could hope to accomplish, which should be music to the ears of the Tom Ricks who wrote The Gamble. Back during the election season, it was the ones who backed what I take to be Ricks's preferred strategy who tended to offer wildly over-optimistic views of progress in Iraq, the better to vindicate the surge. The people around Obama were far more skeptical and (in my opinion) prudent -- we were far more often criticized as "doom and gloomers" than as wild-eyed optimists. I've seen no evidence that anything has changed with the team now in place. These are tactically conservative, careful people -- if anything, too cautious for my taste.

As for the SOFA, though, we do really disagree. I think Ricks is just wrong, and dangerously so, to dismiss it as not mattering. It matters a lot to Iraqis, it is legally binding on the United States, and the new campaign plan is built around it. If the referendum fails in July -- a real possibility -- all the other plans are off and the U.S. will have to withdraw within a year. Ricks has the right to his perspective on this, and it may reflect what he has heard from many of his military sources, but I think this is a major flaw in his analysis. We shall see.

By the way, let's hear it for all the contributors to FP.com's Iraq week! These are good debates to be having and it's a delight to be part of it. I hope that the seeming bipartisan accord on the withdrawal plan can open the space for constructive policy debates about what is almost certainly going to be a tricky and difficult path out of Iraq.

UPDATE:  Since Peter Feaver has now weighed in, let me add on a quick response to his thoughtful remarks as well.  

First, Feaver argues that "with only minor modifications, his "new strategy" simply codifies the Bush plan and embraces the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by Bush."  This is true only to the extent that Bush moved a long, long way before agreeing to the Status of Forces Agreement in its final format. The final SOFA, with its fixed December 2011 deadline, just looks nothing like the original conception of the long-term U.S. presence in Iraq originally envisioned when the negotiations began.  Bush and his team deserve -- and received, from me at least -- great praise for accepting the new Iraqi and American realities, and signing on to a SOFA which lined up with Obama's stated intentions.  

Second, Feaver worries about the inflexibility of the deadline and worries that it will tie Obama's hands in the event of future problems.  But this isn't a bug, it's a feature. Part of the problem here is that Feaver sees this as primarily directed towards the domestic audience.  But it's also, and I would argue more significantly, directed towards the Iraqis.  Most Iraqis find it very hard to believe that the U.S. will really leave, and need clear, sharp signals to establish that this is in fact the policy. And then down the road there will be all kinds of vested interests in keeping the U.S. in Iraq which will look for ways to force that to happen. Obama's speech (after the long campaign) will now pay very high "audience costs" (to use the IR theory lingo) for revising the policy, which will help to raise the bar for changing the stance quite high and will establish the credibility of the commitment. 

By Marc Lynch

I thought Obama's speech on Iraq this afternoon was outstanding.It laid out a powerful rationale for the new policy, sent a very clear signal to Iraqis about American intentions, placed American policy firmly within the context of the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated with the Iraqi government, and embedded the policy effectively into its wider regional context.  I know that some on the left are worried about the 50,000 figure for the residual force and about the timeline, but I think those concerns are overblown.The plan Obama laid out today is entirely consistent with his campaign promises and -- more important -- is the right strategy for today's Iraq.

Here's what I liked:

• The very clear signal. "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility."Obama stressed repeatedly and clearly that he was bringing the war to an end -- "Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end" -- and that all troops would leave Iraq in accord with the SOFA by December 31, 2011. Everything I've written over the last year has emphasized the importance of the clarity of this signal. This is more important than the specifics of the pace or number of troop withdrawals -- which are better handled by the military commanders and diplomats on the ground -- because it gets to shaping the political calculations of Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors. Obama did this extremely well today, taking pains to reiterate and to flag his signaling so that it could not be misinterpreted.
• Iraqi responsibility. Obama also did an outstanding job of framing the U.S. drawdown in terms of a shift to Iraqi responsibility: "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend upon decisions made by Iraq’s leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people." This emphasis throughout the speech on the agency of Iraqis deserves particular attention and praise. Gone is the assumption that what happens in Iraq is all about America, that only the force of American will and material commitment matters.The future of Iraq is for Iraqis to decide, not Americans.
• Public diplomacy. Obama's decision to speak directly to the Iraqi people -- and not only to Iraqi leaders -- was brilliantly conceived and executed. His very clear statement that the U.S. had no aspirations on Iraqi territory or resources -- no permanent bases -- was pitch perfect. And I just really liked this frank, direct, respectful talk:

So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America’s intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations."

• Realistic goals. Last September Brian Katulis and I argued that "the United States will have to distinguish between those outcomes that are truly catastrophic and those that are simply suboptimal." Obama did so clearly today: "What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals." This, combined with the emphasis on Iraqi responsibility, demonstrates a very healthy realism about the enterprise which has too often been lacking from American rhetoric.
• Respecting the SOFA. Obama referred repeatedly to the Status of Forces Agreement, which others have preferred to ignore or wish away.
• Regional context. He correctly placed Iraq within its wider regional context: "America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities".His commitment to direct engagement with all Iraq's neighbors -- including Syria and Iran, singled out -- and higher expectations for their positive contributions fits well within his strategic vision for the region. With the Arab states unifying their ranks ahead of next month's Doha Summit, and Kuwait's Foreign Minister paying a historic visit to Baghdad today, I expect significant movement here in the near term.
• Refugees. I was heartened to hear Obama put such prominence on the issue of Iraq's displaced and refugees, and to define their plight as both a strategic interest and a moral responsibility for the United States.

No plan is perfect. I would like to have heard more about the pace of troop withdrawals, particularly in the early going. The role of the residual force could have been better explained. But I must say that I am far less concerned about the size of the residual forces than are others on the Left. Such a residual force was always a part of Obama's campaign platform, and -- more importantly -- is perfectly consistent with the Status of Forces Agreement, which does not require U.S. troops to leave until the end of 2011. Their mission will change, and they will play an important role in training and support for the Iraqi government and security forces. Nor am I at all bothered by the two month difference between the campaign promise and the timeline in the speech -- and can't imagine that anybody else is either.

Obama's speech today was all that I had hoped, especially after yesterday's conflicting reports. It very closely follows his campaign commitments.It maintains a clear timeline for withdrawal, and sends the clear, unambiguous signal that Iraqis and the region needed to hear while re-emphasizing America's commitment to engagement with the region. It puts Iraqis first and defines a normal, positive future relationship between governments and peoples. And it does this with a frank recognition of Iraq's continuing fragility and plethora of unresolved political fissures, and the tough road ahead. And most remarkable of all, he may even succeed in commanding a bipartisan and inter-agency consensus in support of this policy at home.

This speech is something for which I and many, many others have been waiting -- and working -- for a long, long time. There's much hard work to come, but the die is cast and the signal is clear.

Photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images