Friday's attack on the Israeli Embassy in Cairo by protestors marching from Tahrir Square and the subsequent harsh security crackdown could become an epic fail for the Egyptian revolution. That's not because Egyptians shouldn't protest against Israel if that's what angers them, and it's not because the incident is likely to escalate to war. It's because the incident could easily become an excuse for the Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) to postpone elections, expand rather than surrender its Emergency Law powers, and avoid the transfer of power to a legitimate civilian government. What's more, these moves might now win applause rather than condemnation among key constituencies: revolutionaries who were already skeptical of elections, liberals worried that Islamists will win, and Americans and others abroad worried about the implications of Egyptian democracy for Israel. 

This would be a terrible mistake. The absence of any legitimate political institutions seven months after Mubarak's fall and the SCAF's arbitrary and unaccountable rule are what created the political vaccuum which has brought Egypt to this edge. Yesterday's chaos should not be taken as a reason to postpone a democratic transition. It should instead be a powerful reminder of the urgency of sticking to the timeline for elections and getting on with the business of building an Egyptian democracy. Those who care about Egypt completing its revolution should now be doubling down on the urgency of a real democratic transition -- not backing away from it. 

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"I have seen no evidence yet in terms of hard changes on the ground that the Syrian government is willing to reform at anything like the speed demanded by the street protestors. If it doesn’t start moving with far greater alacrity, the street will wash them away."

That was the blunt verdict offered by U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford in a wide-ranging telephone interview with Foreign Policy today. Ford sharply criticized the Syrian government's continuing repression against peaceful protestors and called on President Bashar al-Assad to "take the hard decisions" to begin meaningful reforms before it is too late. Not, Ford stressed, because of American concerns but because of the impatience of the Syrian opposition itself. "This is not about Americans, it is about the way the Syrian government mistreats its own people," Ford stressed repeatedly. "This is really about Syrians interacting with other Syrians. I’m a marginal thing on the sidelines. I’m not that important."

Some might disagree. Last Thursday and Friday, Ford made a dramatic visit to the embattled city of Hama to demonstrate the United States' support for peaceful protests and its condemnation of the Syrian government's use of violence. His trip to Hama electrified supporters of the Syrian opposition, and marked a sharp escalation in U.S. efforts to deal with the difficult Syrian stalemate. It also sparked a vicious Syrian response, as government-backed mobs attacked the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, inflicting considerable damage. In a caustic note posted to his Facebook page, Ford called on the Syrian government to "stop beating and shooting peaceful demonstrators." Ford's sharp criticism of the Syrian government's violence against peaceful protestors and detailed outline of multilateral and American diplomatic efforts to pressure the Syrian regime suggest that the recent U.S. rhetorical escalation does mark a new stage in the ongoing crisis.

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The end of the Tunisian story hasn't yet been written. We don't yet know whether the so-called Jasmine Revolution will produce fundamental change or a return to a cosmetically-modified status quo ante, democracy or a newly configured authoritarianism. But most of the policy community has long since moved on to ask whether the Tunisian protests will spread to other Arab countries -- Egypt, of course, but also Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, and almost every place else. Most experts on each individual country can offer powerful, well-reasoned explanations as to why their country won't be next. I'm skeptical too.

But I found it unsatisfying to settle for such skepticism as I watched the massive demonstrations unfold in Egypt on my Twitter feed while moderating a panel discussion on Tunisia yesterday (I plead guilty). As I've been arguing for the last month, something does seem to be happening at a regional level, exposing the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarianism and empowering young populations who suddenly believe that change is possible. There are strong reasons to expect most of these regimes to survive, which we shouldn't ignore in a moment of enthusiasm. But we also shouldn't ignore this unmistakable new energy, the revelation of the crumbling foundations of Arab authoritarian regimes, or the continuing surprises which should keep all analysts humble about what might follow.

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Yesterday I noted the spread of seemingly unrelated protests and clashes through a diverse array of Arab states -- Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt. Last night, protests spread to Algeria, partly in response to rising prices on basic food items but more deeply by the same combination of economic desperation, fury over perceived corruption, and a blocked political order. There's some evidence that Algerians have been carefully watching what is happening in Tunisia, on al-Jazeera and on the internet. Are we seeing the beginnings of the Obama administration equivalent of the 2005 "Arab Spring", when the protests in Beirut captured popular attention and driven in part by newly powerful satellite television images inspired popular mobilization across the region that some hoped might finally break through the stagnation of Arab autocracy? Will social media play the role of al-Jazeera this time? Will the outcome be any different?

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The great debates about Iraq policy which consumed much of the past decade have largely faded from the public arena. The Obama administration has withdrawn more than 100,000 troops from Iraq, while the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the Bush administration in 2008 commits the U.S. to withdrawing the balance of its troops by the end of next year. Iraqi politics muddle along, while the security situation remains roughly stable with periodic spikes of spectacular violence but no signs of a resurgent civil war. But while the U.S. political debate about Iraq has faded, the importance of Iraq to American interests has not. It's therefore rather extraordinary that Congress has moved to cut $500 million from funding for the U.S. civilian mission in Iraq, leaving a shortfall of more than $1 billion.

Yesterday a wide array of Iraq policy analysts of wildly different perspectives converged on an appeal for the United States to remain committed to Iraq politically in order to deliver on a long-term strategic relationship beyond the military mission. I authored an op-ed with John Nagl, my colleague at the Center for a New American Security, arguing for a continued political engagement. Meanwhile, Brookings released a report entitled Unfinished Business, co-authored by Ken Pollack, Raad AlKadiri, Scott Carpenter, Fred Kagan and Sean Kane. There's a striking degree of analytical and policy convergence among people who used to be at sharp odds over Iraq. Nagl and I are colleagues at the Center for a New American Security but we sharply disagreed back in 2007-08 about the appropriate strategy for Iraq, as did many of the people involved in yesterday's Brookings Report. Nagl and I had not read the Brookings report at the time when we wrote the Christian Science Monitor op-ed. That we all converge on a roughly similar position today is significant - a "harmonic convergence" which the authors of the Brookings report nicely recount: "members of our group who had once been ready to do great violence to one another over their differences found themselves in violent agreement over what needed to be done." The conclusion of my piece with Nagl nicely captures this, I hope:

Today, those who backed the 2007 "surge" should be keen to see its gains consolidated, while those who called for withdrawal should be keen to make sure that as it happens, disaster does not follow. And while Iraq certainly needs to step up its political game, the United States must also muster the bipartisan political strength and will to help build a stable Iraq that can be a partner to the United States in a vital -- and deeply troubled -- part of the world. Those who gave their lives for this fight deserve nothing less.

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The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is reportedly set to soon indict several top Hezbollah leaders for the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri. The expected indictments have brought Lebanon to the brink of crisis, while the Obama administration has rushed to express its support for the STL and to deliver an additional $10 million to its investigation. Most of the commentary thus far has focused on the potential impact of its anticipated anti-Hezbollah ruling, whether it might lead to war or how it might affect Hezbollah's participation in the government. But lost in that admittedly quite important shuffle is a more basic question: Does the STL have any credibility at this point? If not, how does that lack of credibility shape the likely political fallout of its indictment? And should the Obama administration really be hitching its wagon to a Bush-era zombie which might drag Lebanon into an unnecessary crisis?

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David Broder has raised some eyebrows with his bizarre Washington Post column arguing "with strong Republican support in Congress for challenging Iran's ambition to become a nuclear power, [Obama] can spend much of 2011 and 2012 orchestrating a showdown with the mullahs. This will help him politically because the opposition party will be urging him on. And as tensions rise and we accelerate preparations for war, the economy will improve." It should only be surprising to those who haven't been paying attention, though. Leaving aside the truly odd ideas about the economy, Broder is actually offering a warmed over, mainstream version of the argument coined in August by former Bush Middle East adviser Elliott Abrams that "the Obama who had struck Iran and destroyed its nuclear program would be a far stronger candidate, and perhaps an unbeatable one." Since then, each time the argument pops up I've tagged it on Twitter with "this idea was stupid enough when Elliott Abrams wrote it in August."

Broder's column is an interesting study in how really dumb ideas bounce around Washington D.C. Fortunately, it's not an idea that seems to have any support at all in the Obama White House. Unlike Abrams (who it's fair to assume does not wish Obama well in November 2012) and Broder (who... well, it's anyone's guess), the Obama team can see perfectly clearly that the American people have no appetite for a third major war in the Middle East and that launching a war with massive strategic consequences for short-term political gain would be epically irresponsible. They find this argument ridiculous. Even if they were primarily interested in their electoral fortunes in designing Iran policy, they would quickly see that such an Abrams-approved stratagem would wipe out their support on the left and gain absolutely zero votes on the right.

Now, I'm very worried that Obama's Iran strategy will lock the U.S. into ever more hawkish rhetoric which ties their hands and paves the way to future military confrontations. I think that serious people disagree about the likely effectiveness of sanctions or of diplomacy, and that all are struggling to find meaningful off-ramps in the glide towards ever more stringent and militarized regional containment. I worry about a lot on Iran policy. But this isn't one of the things that I worry about. I don't think that anyone in the Obama White House takes remotely seriously the epically bad Abrams-Broder advice to pursue military showdown with Iran for political advantage. This may offer an intriguing window into how Abrams thought about foreign policy in the Bush White House, and a depressing case study in the circulation of ideas in Washington, but it tells us nothing at all about how the Obama administration is thinking about Iran.

Hey all -- sorry to leave you without any blogging for the last month. The beginning of the academic year happened, along with a crush of other deadlines. I'm back. And a lot sure has happened while I've been gone -- Israel and the Palestinians resolved the impasse over a settlement freeze and resumed talks, and… oh wait, that didn't happen. Well, Iraq now has a government… what? Oh, um, well at least we've made progress in our nuclear talks with Iran. Wait, they haven't yet even said whether they'll show up for the talks next month? Hosni Mubarak's still around? Gaza still under blockade? Hamas and Fatah still haven't reconciled? At least the unjustly imprisoned Bahraini internet forum leader Ali Abdulemam has finally been released… oh, that didn't happen either. Okay then.

Now that I'm coming back online, I'm planning to tweak the format here a bit. Since we launched the Middle East Channel in March I've been struggling with the appropriate balance between my personal blog here and the longer essays which we feature over there. I've generally opted to limit myself to the longer essays which could be cross-posted to the Channel, while restricting my short comments to Twitter. But I find that I miss old-school blogging. So I'm going to experiment with going back to posting more of those quick-hitting posts here on my personal blog, while continuing to cross-post longer essays to the Middle East Channel. We'll see how that works out. In the meantime, apologies for my absence and I welcome me back to my blog!

The contours of the response to the Gaza flotilla fiasco are now coming into sharper public view:  the Israeli government will significantly ease the blockade of Gaza in exchange for American support for a whitewash of the investigation of the flotilla incident. As I've said many times on Twitter, this is a good deal. No investigation was ever going to produce anything of any particular value, but easing the blockade of Gaza could have significant positive effects for the people of Gaza, the prospects of Palestinian reconciliation, the peace process, and American credibility in the region. None of those will happen on their own, of course. And nobody is likely to be fully satisfied with the new measures. I've been quite critical of how the Obama team has handled the Israeli-Palestinian track, and particularly the Gaza situation -- and if they had moved strongly to resolve the Gaza blockade a year ago, the issue wouldn't have been there now to exploit. But now, I think they deserve some real credit for nudging Israel towards finally making a move which could over time open up some real new possibilities for progress.

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One year ago today, President Obama delivered a much anticipated speech in Cairo, Egypt in which he pledged "a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect." That new beginning seemed a long time ago this week, as Muslims expressed outrage over America's seeming support for Israel's naval commando attack on an aid convoy headed towards Gaza. It is no accident that the anniversary of Obama's speech has gone virtually unremarked in the Arab media this week, except for a few comments about unmet promises and some juxtaposition of that glorious moment with America's anemic response to Gaza. 

The President's spokesman, Robert Gibbs, told a press conference that he did not believe that the American position would have a great impact on Obama's relations with the Muslim communities of the world. Nothing could be further from the truth. If the Obama administration does not change its cautious approach quickly and forcefully address the blockade of Gaza which is the real heart of this week's scandal, it will confirm the crystallizing narrative of a President which either can not deliver on its promises or did not mean what he said. This would be a sad epitaph for the President's  carefully nurtured outreach to the Muslim world.

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^{Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki declaring a great victory.} 

Tomorrow's scheduled U.S. pullback from Iraqi cities has provoked quite a bit of anxious hand-wringing from American analysts and probably premature celebrations from Iraqi officials. While I'm writing about this today because I just can't resist the sweet entreaties of our beloved editorial team, I don't actually think it's that big a deal. American forces have been drawing down in line with the Status of Forces Agreement expectations for months now --- it's not like tomorrow all of the Americans will suddenly click the heels of their ruby slippers and vanish in a puff of smoke. Tomorrow's deadline is far more important symbolically than practically. And here, the Obama administration and General Odierno's team deserve a lot of credit for their careful, rigorous, and publicly affirmed adherence to the agreement.

 It's true that there has been an increase in the number of high-profile, high-casualty attacks over the last few weeks. The thing about spoilers is that they try to spoil. The key questions are whether the attacks trigger sectarian mobilization and security dilemma dynamics, seriously undermine confidence in the state and its ability to provide security, or drive momentum towards wider conflict. There's a lot of anecdotal evidence of mounting popular anxiety, but very little evidence of those kinds of conflict dynamics kicking in. For what it's worth, both Iraqi and American officials seem confident -- and remember when the judgment of the commanders on the ground was supposed to be considered sacred writ?

 I'm not particularly an optimist on these matters, any more than I was in the past -- but I also see a rapidly declining ability or need for the U.S. to manage these issues. I think that there are still very serious issues surrounding the integration of Sunnis into the emerging Iraqi state and political system -- not just the endlessly dragging integration of the Sons of Iraq into the security forces and civil administration, but the selective targeting of key Awakenings leaders and other ongoing complaints. I also think that some amount of the recent uptick in violence is driven by the disenchantment of some of these Awakenings men, either actively or passively. But it seems clear that Maliki has decided that he can get away with selective repression and co-optation of the various Sunni forces, and will only change his approach if he determines that the price is too high. Maybe he's wrong, maybe he's right -- but that's for Iraqis to determine, not Americans.

 Iraqi politics are going to continue to face all kinds of problems, as every analyst under the moon has pointed out. The Arab-Kurd issue, the continuing problems with government capacity, budget problems, and a host of unresolved issues remain. I think that the refugee/IDP issue remains the largest unresolved and virtually untouched issue facing Iraq -- those millions of people uprooted from their homes by force or fear who have few prospects of returning to their original homes, are largely disenfranchised in the emerging Iraqi political system, and who are almost completely unserved by Iraqi state institutions. But slowing down the American drawdown would not materially improve any of these issues. The best thing the U.S. can do is to continue to demonstrate its clear, credible commitment to withdraw on the agreed-upon timeline, and do what it can to help Iraqis adjust to the new realities.

File Photo: AFP/Getty Images

By Brian Katulis

“Af-Pak” (or “Pak-Af,” depending on your perspective) has topped the two-month old Obama administration’s national security agenda. This part of the world is bound to get more media attention in the coming weeks with the conclusion of the administration’s policy review and the NATO summit early next month.

In the big debates about U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, one set of questions that shouldn’t be ignored is how to get others around the world to support efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.  The effort to stabilize Afghanistan, after all, is not just about U.S. security - it is about global security. And as I argued in this article for the Middle East Bulletin last week, the countries of the Arab Gulf play a pivotal role in many of the economic, political, and security linkages between the Middle East and South Asia. 

With the Obama administration gearing up for a rollout of a new strategy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, one related question to the issue of broader global support seems important:  Why don’t other Muslim-majority countries play more of a role in Afghanistan?  It’s not that Muslim-majority countries aren’t doing anything at all - but it seems to me that there is room for more to be done, particularly as the effort to stabilize Afghanistan is close to a geographic center of the so-called Muslim world - a bridge between the parts of the Middle East and Asia where the vast majority of Muslims live.

One briefing on my trip to the Emirates that stands out is the session the delegation had with the Special Operations Command in the Emirates. Respecting the ground rules of that briefing - clarified at the outset of the meeting by our hosts as on background (meaning I can use the facts but can’t quote the officials) - here’s what I can say about the small Emirati Special Forces units that have operated on the ground in Afghanistan.  

•    A couple hundred Emirati Special Forces have operated inside of Afghanistan since 2003, and their role wasn’t publicly acknowledged until the spring of 2008, allegedly catching even the Saudis by surprise.  
    
•    These Emirati forces are the only Arab troops on the ground with a full combat mission in Afghanistan - at least publicly acknowledged - and the Emirati forces have seen combat in the volatile south; they also provide support for counterinsurgency activities such as health and education.  (Small numbers of Jordanian forces have played a role in Afghanistan, deploying in 2001 and helping with things such as establishing medical services).  

•    The number one operational challenge is getting intelligence out of U.S. forces, according to one of our briefers - the Australian forces were much better at sharing intel.  There were also complaints voiced that the missions received by this unit as not being as serious as they are capable of conducting.  (“Pissant” was the phrase used by one).  

•    Outside of Afghanistan, Emirati forces have also been engaged in Kuwait in 1990-1991, Somalia in 1993, Kosovo in 1999, and in Lebanon and Iraq in diplomatic protection missions, including an effort to offer protection to the president of Iraq’s interim government.  

This Emirati presence in Afghanistan is really minor in the larger picture of the foreign troop presence in the country (representing far less than 1 percent of the total foreign troop presence). But these forces have some useful language and cultural sensitivity skills that Western troops lack.  And the symbolism is important - and publicly admitting a role in Afghanistan seems like a brave thing to do, especially when one considers other Muslim-majority countries and their stance on Afghanistan. 

Besides the Emirates, Turkey seems to be the only Muslim-majority country with large numbers of troops on the ground. A NATO ally, Turkey has hundreds of troops operating as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Of course, having a military presence on the ground isn’t the only way for countries to support the effort to stabilize Afghanistan - although one wonders why countries like Egypt, with nearly half a million active duty military personnel, a country whose regime was the target of some of the same Islamist extremist groups that operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has been the recipient of billions of dollars of U.S. military assistance for the past three decades, doesn’t contribute more to the effort in Afghanistan. 

Part of the answer may lie in public attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan in some of these countries - the effort to stabilize Afghanistan may be deeply unpopular, particularly if it has an American face on it. This World Public Opinion.org poll published in February of this year found that 83 percent of Egyptians supported attacks against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Support for such attacks was varied in other countries (61 percent in Morocco, 29 percent in Pakistan, and 21 percent in Indonesia). 

So sending troops may not be an option for some Muslim-majority countries - the question then should be asked, what more can they do to help contribute to political and economic stability in Afghanistan?  And will more countries be willing to break the taboo against supporting such efforts?

At the very least, perhaps more countries can help cut off the financial links that sustain terrorist networks that operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  There are several instances in which the United States froze the assets of organizations it alleges to have evidence of ties to financing terror networks - such as the Kuwaiti Revival of Islamic Heritage Society - but close allies like Kuwait deny the allegations, and the cases remain unresolved. Cutting off these financial links that support extremist networks could be a key to stability in Afghanistan - when the full history of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008, it will likely reveal the important role in cutting off the financial ties of insurgent and terrorist groups as a key to greater stability.  But doing so in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require more cooperation from more countries around the world - including key Muslim-majority countries.  As the United States commits more resources to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, it should ask its friends if they are willing to do the same.

The Afghanistan war isn’t the Iraq war, of course - the war in Afghanistan enjoyed greater international legitimacy.  And if the Obama administration is committed to using the full range of power - including political and economic power - at America’s disposal - it should ask its friends what they might be willing to do to help another Muslim-majority country seek greater stability and a decent life for their people.  If the small Emirati military can contribute forces to the fight, countries with larger budgets and militaries, as well as leverage to cut off ties to terrorist networks, should be able to do more.

By Brian Katulis

Thanks to Foreign Policy and my friend Marc for inviting me to guest-blog during my current trip to the Arab Gulf.

I'm in the United Arab Emirates as part of a delegation organized by the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), directed by Jon Alterman (check out the program's excellent reports and note here. The U.S. delegation is in the U.A.E. and Kuwait this week to see how people here are thinking about the global economic meltdown, Iran's evolving role in the region, and the increasing emphasis in U.S. policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan (discussed in that order out here).We're also hearing a good bit on the usual mix of Middle East issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq.

Relative to Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict and other things Marc usually writes about on this blog, the U.A.E. is somewhat of a humdrum place to visit from a U.S. foreign policy standpoint. Headlines in local newspapers talk more about other countries in the neighborhood, rather than events at home.
The day of our arrival, the front page of Khaleej Times, which claims to be the number 1 English language daily here, had the following headlines - "Zardari Pondering Way Out of Crisis" (Pakistan), "Sanctions Childish: Iran" (Iran), "Mega-rich Indians Feel the Pain" (India), and "Under Pressure, Switzerland Opens up on Bank Secrecy" (essentially a global finance story), all right above a large color McDonald's print ad for a 14 dirham value meals (Prompting one to wonder: What exactly is the cost-benefit equation of front-page color ads for fast food restaurants?) The big story seems to be the economy and all of the talk of the "Dubai" model for progress.

But beneath the surface view of the glitz and glammor of the economic talk lurk some of the most complicated security and economic challenges in the world. By virtue of geography and the country's unique role as a financial, trade, and economic powerhouse and go-between, the UAE finds itself at the center of three top-tier national security concerns for the new Obama administration:

1. Iran. The Persian shadow looms large in the Emirates, with many shades of grey in the bilateral relationship between Iran and the U.A.E. At least 100,000 Iranians live in the U.A.E. - with some estimates ranging two to three times larger than that, and the commercial links between the two countries are substantial.

Yet at the same time, the ruling elite quite clearly expresses a wariness about possible U.S. engagement of Iran shared by other Arab Gulf countries. The U.A.E. maintains no fewer than 80 U.S.-supplied F-16 fighters and receives ongoing training and support from the U.S. Air Force at Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi (where we received briefings earlier today, more about that later this week). The U.A.E. is also the beneficiary of a massive explosion of U.S. foreign military sales, which accelerated in 2007 with the Bush administration's announcement of more arms transfers to the region.

2. "Pak-Af." The hottest topic in U.S. foreign-policy circles in the opening weeks of the Obama administration has been the so-called "Af-Pak" basket of issues - Afghanistan and Pakistan. People here say the U.S. has it backwards and talk about it in reverse order - putting Pakistan in front of Afghanistan as a concern. It makes sense - Pakistan has nuclear weapons and about six times as many people as Afghanistan.

And for the U.A.E., it's only natural to think of it as "Pak-Af," given that hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis live and work in the U.A.E., sending money back to Pakistan in remittances that dwarf any amount the United States might be willing to give to Pakistan in bilateral development assistance. The ruling family in the Emirates has had long-standing ties with the late Pakistani leader Benazir Bhutto and her husband, current President Asif Ali Zardari, and the U.A.E. has become ever more dependent on agriculture in Pakistan for its own food security. Not that Afghanistan doesn't also matter  - the U.A.E. is actually the only Arab country with combat forces on the ground in Afghanistan.

Also prior to 9/11, the U.A.E. was one of the few countries in the world with close ties to the Taliban regime, so presumably those contacts might be useful in any proposed dialogue with Taliban insurgents. Hopefully, the Obama administration team that is reviewing the policy on Pakistan and Afghanistan are talking to people in the Emirates.       

3. The global economic meltdown. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair highlighted the global economic crisis as a national security concern in his "Annual Threat Assessment" testimony to Congress last month, and even oil-rich Abu Dhabi and the financial metropolis of Dubai have been impacted negatively on these dynamics.

With a local population smaller than some neighborhoods in Cairo and Karachi, the U.A.E may not matter hugely on its own, but the perspective it brings from its role in these thress issues could help the new U.S. administration develop an integrated strategy that accounts for the many security, political, and economic linkages that exist between the Middle East and South Asia. 

Brian Katulis is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, where his work focuses on U.S. national security policy with an emphasis on the Middle East, Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Pakistan.

Photo: RABIH MOGHRABI/AFP/Getty Images

By Marc Lynch

I thought Obama's speech on Iraq this afternoon was outstanding.It laid out a powerful rationale for the new policy, sent a very clear signal to Iraqis about American intentions, placed American policy firmly within the context of the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated with the Iraqi government, and embedded the policy effectively into its wider regional context.  I know that some on the left are worried about the 50,000 figure for the residual force and about the timeline, but I think those concerns are overblown.The plan Obama laid out today is entirely consistent with his campaign promises and -- more important -- is the right strategy for today's Iraq.

Here's what I liked:

• The very clear signal. "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility."Obama stressed repeatedly and clearly that he was bringing the war to an end -- "Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end" -- and that all troops would leave Iraq in accord with the SOFA by December 31, 2011. Everything I've written over the last year has emphasized the importance of the clarity of this signal. This is more important than the specifics of the pace or number of troop withdrawals -- which are better handled by the military commanders and diplomats on the ground -- because it gets to shaping the political calculations of Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors. Obama did this extremely well today, taking pains to reiterate and to flag his signaling so that it could not be misinterpreted.
• Iraqi responsibility. Obama also did an outstanding job of framing the U.S. drawdown in terms of a shift to Iraqi responsibility: "The drawdown of our military should send a clear signal that Iraq’s future is now its own responsibility. The long-term success of the Iraqi nation will depend upon decisions made by Iraq’s leaders and the fortitude of the Iraqi people." This emphasis throughout the speech on the agency of Iraqis deserves particular attention and praise. Gone is the assumption that what happens in Iraq is all about America, that only the force of American will and material commitment matters.The future of Iraq is for Iraqis to decide, not Americans.
• Public diplomacy. Obama's decision to speak directly to the Iraqi people -- and not only to Iraqi leaders -- was brilliantly conceived and executed. His very clear statement that the U.S. had no aspirations on Iraqi territory or resources -- no permanent bases -- was pitch perfect. And I just really liked this frank, direct, respectful talk:

So to the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America’s intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country. We seek a full transition to Iraqi responsibility for the security of your country. And going forward, we can build a lasting relationship founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect as Iraq takes its rightful place in the community of nations."

• Realistic goals. Last September Brian Katulis and I argued that "the United States will have to distinguish between those outcomes that are truly catastrophic and those that are simply suboptimal." Obama did so clearly today: "What we will not do is let the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals." This, combined with the emphasis on Iraqi responsibility, demonstrates a very healthy realism about the enterprise which has too often been lacking from American rhetoric.
• Respecting the SOFA. Obama referred repeatedly to the Status of Forces Agreement, which others have preferred to ignore or wish away.
• Regional context. He correctly placed Iraq within its wider regional context: "America can no longer afford to see Iraq in isolation from other priorities".His commitment to direct engagement with all Iraq's neighbors -- including Syria and Iran, singled out -- and higher expectations for their positive contributions fits well within his strategic vision for the region. With the Arab states unifying their ranks ahead of next month's Doha Summit, and Kuwait's Foreign Minister paying a historic visit to Baghdad today, I expect significant movement here in the near term.
• Refugees. I was heartened to hear Obama put such prominence on the issue of Iraq's displaced and refugees, and to define their plight as both a strategic interest and a moral responsibility for the United States.

No plan is perfect. I would like to have heard more about the pace of troop withdrawals, particularly in the early going. The role of the residual force could have been better explained. But I must say that I am far less concerned about the size of the residual forces than are others on the Left. Such a residual force was always a part of Obama's campaign platform, and -- more importantly -- is perfectly consistent with the Status of Forces Agreement, which does not require U.S. troops to leave until the end of 2011. Their mission will change, and they will play an important role in training and support for the Iraqi government and security forces. Nor am I at all bothered by the two month difference between the campaign promise and the timeline in the speech -- and can't imagine that anybody else is either.

Obama's speech today was all that I had hoped, especially after yesterday's conflicting reports. It very closely follows his campaign commitments.It maintains a clear timeline for withdrawal, and sends the clear, unambiguous signal that Iraqis and the region needed to hear while re-emphasizing America's commitment to engagement with the region. It puts Iraqis first and defines a normal, positive future relationship between governments and peoples. And it does this with a frank recognition of Iraq's continuing fragility and plethora of unresolved political fissures, and the tough road ahead. And most remarkable of all, he may even succeed in commanding a bipartisan and inter-agency consensus in support of this policy at home.

This speech is something for which I and many, many others have been waiting -- and working -- for a long, long time. There's much hard work to come, but the die is cast and the signal is clear.

Photo: MANDEL NGAN/AFP/Getty Images