Bush Administration

Peter Beinart today bravely repeats the emerging would-be conventional wisdom. Rather than simply denounce everything Republican, he argues, Democrats should admit that the "surge" worked and -- uniquely echoing a thousand recent op-eds --  was President Bush's finest moment.  I have a hard time imagining anything as tedious as rehashing those tired debates from the campaign about the "surge" -- perhaps we could have another round of arguments as to whether the surge brigades arriving in the spring of 2007 caused the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in the fall of 2006?  But in the interests of post-partisanship, I am willing to offer an alternative as Bush's finest hour in Iraq:  the Status of Forces Agreement.

Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part. It demonstrated a pragmatism and willingness to put the national interest ahead of partisanship that few of us believed he possessed. It is largely thanks to Bush's acceptance of his own bargaining failure that Barack Obama will inherit a plausible route to successful disengagement from Iraq. 

Conservatives now like to claim the SOFA as a "Bush-negotiated" success. But Bush entered the SOFA negotiations looking for something entirely different than what emerged at the end. The U.S. went into the SOFA talks intent on obtaining legitimacy for a long-term military presence in Iraq once the Security Council mandate ended. When negotiations began, it was widely assumed that Bush would extract from the Iraqis an agreement which made the removal of U.S. troops entirely contingent upon American assessments of conditions on the ground.  There were widespread discussions of permanent U.S. bases and a Korea-style presence for generations, an assumption that the U.S. would retain a free hand in its operations, and an absolute rejection of an Obama-style timeline for withdrawal.

But Iraqi leaders, to most everyone's surprise, took a hard line in the negotiations. Their tough line was encouraged by Iran, no doubt, as stressed by many frustrated American commentators. But it also reflected Iraqi domestic considerations, including several rounds of upcoming elections and an intensely strong popular Iraqi hostility to the U.S. occupation under any name. The Iraqis were also helped by the calender.  As negotiations dragged on, the December 31 deadline loomed large, threatening to leave the U.S. troops without any legal mandate to remain in the country and forcing the hand of American negotiators.  Finally, the Iraqi leaders clearly kept a careful eye on the American Presidential elections and used Obama's stance to strengthen their own hand in negotiations.

And here's where I will offer some sincere praise for Bush and his team. When the Iraqis insisted on an Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal instead of a Bush/McCain- style conditions-based aspirational time frame for U.S. withdrawal, he could have insisted on the latter. This would have fit with his administration's often-repeated preferences. He could have continued to push for this conception closer to the December 31 deadline, playing high-stakes chicken at the expense of American military planning for the coming year and at the risk of the Iraqi political system not having adequate time to ratify the deal.

But he didn't.  To his credit, Bush agreed to the Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal. Granted, he hedged -- he didn't authorize Ambassador Ryan Crocker to sign off on the deal until after the Presidential election (on November 18). But at that point he bowed to the political realities in the U.S. and Iraq and agreed to a SOFA which far more closely matched Obama's avowed vision for Iraq -- withdrawal of U.S. forces in three years, no permanent bases -- than his own. Thanks to this pragmatism, Obama can now work closely with the Iraqi government in managing the drawdown instead of spending his first months in office trying to wriggle out of an unacceptable deal.  And this, I might speculate, is among the reasons why Robert Gates will continue as Secretary of Defense. 

And thus I offer Bush's willingness to sign the SOFA mandating U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and not the surge, as his finest moment in Iraq.  

Photo by Thaier al-Sudani-Pool/Getty Images

John Bolton proposes in today's Washington Post giving up on Palestinian governance and a two-state solution, instead opting for a "three-state approach" in which "Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank in some configuration reverts to Jordanian sovereignty."

If a zombie can be defined as a "reanimated corpse," then Bolton's proposal certainly fits the bill. This concept reappears like clockwork whenever there's an Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Some see it as a magic bullet to negate Palestinian nationalism or at least redirect Palestinian ire towards their new/old Arab rulers. Others just can't imagine the emergence of any Palestinian leadership they find acceptable (probably a safe bet) and prefer the predictable dictatorships to the East and South. Most recently, in October, Israeli Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Giora Eiland's Washington Institute for Near East Policy paper proposed a "trilateral" solution (more discussion here).

Variants on this idea pop up so routinely, in fact, that it might be more concerning if the dog didn't bark. So thanks to Bolton for that. But it's still a terrible idea. Leaving aside all the practical impediments, who wants it (other than Bolton and his pals)?

• Not Jordanians.  Since severing ties with the West Bank in 1988, Jordan  settled on a consensus position for dealing with contentious issues of Jordanian-Palestinian relations:  "Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine". There is no Jordan option because Jordanians of all stripes deeply oppose it and the Hashemites see no benefit in it. King Abdullah has stated repeatedly that "the Jordan option is out of the question." 
• Not Egyptians.  The Mubarak regime has been doing everything possible to separate from Gaza, not to return to it.  As Steve Cook recently pointed out, there is no upside for the Egyptian regime in this crisis. Why would a sclerotic regime obsessed with the "threat" of the Muslim Brotherhood at home and consumed with a difficult transition from an aging President take on responsibility for an enraged and devasted Gaza population which blames Egypt for enforcing the blockade on behalf of Israel? 
• Not Palestinians. It's true that a lot of Palestinians are deeply frustrated with both Fatah and Hamas, and despair of their political institutions.  But that does not mean that they are ready to abandon their national identity or will willingly accede to Egyptian or Jordanian rule. In a public opinion survey in September, two-thirds of Palestinians opposed reunification with Jordan... and it's probably better not to ask Gazans what they think about Egypt these days.  

Bolton acknowledges that neither the Egyptians nor Jordanians are interested, but the opposition of foreigners has rarely been a problem for Bolton (or for neo-conservatives in general, whose misreading of the importance of foreign public opinion has always been one of the more deadly of their numerous Achilles heels). Bolton dismissively suggests that Egypt and Jordan can be persuaded with the offer of "financial and political support from the Arab League and the West."  That rather understates the intense regime survival fears in both countries... and resonates rather too well with the popular Arab complaint that their governments prostitute themselves to the West. 

Watching the walking dead can be fun in George Romero movies or in the Marvel Zombies comic books, but it's less amusing in the midst of a major regional crisis.. especially if it offers any kind of guide to the thinking of the Israeli leadership, the Likud opposition, or to the remnants of the Bush administration. The Jordan option, the Egypt-Gaza option, the "three-state solution" -- these are fantasies which have little to do with the real problems on the ground or feasible solutions to this intractable conflict. Can we just let this idea finally rest in its grave so that more serious options can be considered instead.. and perhaps even liberate some valuable Washington Post op-ed page real-estate?