One moment over the last month when I really regretted my hiatus was when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proposed that the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state in exchange for a two month moratorium on settlements. The blizzard of commentary which followed covered most of the obvious problems with this proposal -- the inequality of the proposed exchange, the novelty of the demand, the implications for Israel's Arab citizens, and so forth. But nobody seemed to pick up on the half-serious suggestion I put out on Twitter: In exchange for a two month settlement moratorium, Abu Mazen could offer to recognize Israel as a Jewish state for two months.

Think about it! It seems fine to me for Israel to bring forward issues that matter to them in the negotiations, even if others object or it doesn't conform with past practice -- that's what negotiations are for. But it would be obviously silly to expect the Palestinians to make a permanent concession on an issue Israel seems to value in exchange for a temporary Israeli concession on a side issue. But a temporary "freeze" on the non-recognition of Israel as a Jewish state in exchange for a temporary "freeze" on settlements? Let the bargaining begin! And it gets better. Abu Mazen could have followed up by offering to extend the recognition as a Jewish state for a longer period if Israel agreed to extend the settlement moratorium for the same time period. And once they get to the final status two-state agreement,  it could be made permanent.

Am I serious? Well, let's just say that we could sure use *some* creative thinking on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and leave it at that. 

While most American eyes today will be on President Obama's anticipated speech on withdrawal from Iraq (about which I'm more optimistic today than I was yesterday, but a bit less than on Wednesday!), the most important news out of the Middle East today may be the announcement in Cairo that Fatah and Hamas have agreed in principle on the formation of a national unity government by the end of March. That should give Hillary Clinton and George Mitchell much to talk about during the secretary's upcoming visit. 

^{Joint Hamas-Fatah press conference in Cairo (source: al-Sharq al-Awsat)}

Such a Palestinian national unity government could offer a viable Palestinian negotiating partner, a way to channel reconstruction aid into Gaza, an end to the endlessly destructive Fatah-Hamas conflict, and even an indirect way for Hamas to honor the Quartet's conditions. The Palestinian reconciliation enjoys the seemingly enthusiastic backing across those old Arab divides -- Syria and Egypt, the Saudis and Qatar.

The details of the proposed "National Accordance" government [al-tawafuq al-watani] remain vague, and everyone expects hard bargaining to come.    The proposed reconciliation is to include rebuilding the PLO, holding new Parliamentary and Presidential elections, and reconstructing the Palestinian security forces. They also agreed yesterday to put an end to hostile media campaigns and to work towards reconciliation.  But the hard choices seem to have been largely deferred to committees, and there are wide gaps in the expectations of the two sides and a lot of mutual resentment and mistrust. But the Arab governments seem keen on reaching agreement before the Doha Arab Summit scheduled for the end of March.

Everyone recognizes that the Cairo agreement is a beginning rather than an end to the political struggles over intra-Palestinian relations -- but it's important to even seen a beginning after many long months of division and conflict.  And the challenges to any kind of peace deal with Israel remain overwhelming, even if the Palestinian reconciliation is achieved.  But it would be a dramatic and important positive development nonetheless, draining the intra-Palestinian political poison and focusing on moving ahead.  I hope that the Obama administration gets behind the moves towards an "accordance government" rather than reverting to the old Bush policies of trying to isolate Hamas.  I think it will. 

In fact, I'd go further.  I think that this dramatic shift in Arab politics from confrontation to reconciliation directly reflects Arab evaluations of the new administration, and the messages they've been receiving from George Mitchell.   And that's all to the good.   The  Arab regional trend towards reconciliation and the abandonment of the "moderate/rejection" discourse is a concrete manifestation of their readiness for "real change" -- which could have positive effects on a whole range of inter-connected regional issues including Iraq and Iran.  Welcoming signals from the U.S. now could go a long way towards making this happen, and could make the Doha summit very interesting indeed. 

Ayman al-Zawahiri has finally weighed in on behalf of al-Qaeda over the Gaza crisis, calling it part of the West's war on Islam and calling on Muslims everywhere to attack Western and Israeli targets. He sounds about as happy as I can remember hearing him of late. He probably can't believe his luck.

Israel's assault on Gaza has really created an almost unbelievable no-lose situation for al-Qaeda. If Hamas "wins", then al-Qaeda gets to share in the benefits of the political losses incurred by its Western and Arab enemies (Zawahiri mentions Mubarak and the Saudis in this tape, but not the Jordanians) and can try to take advantage of the political upheavals which could follow. If Hamas "loses", al-Qaeda still wins. It will shed no tears at seeing one of its bitterest and most dangerous rivals take a beating at Israel's hands or losing control of a government that they have consistently decried as illegitimate and misguided. Either way, the Gaza crisis guarantees that a far more radicalized Islamic world will face the incoming Obama administration -- potentially severely blunting the challenge which al-Qaeda clearly felt after the election (hence Zawahiri's attempt to pre-emptively discredit Obama by declaring the attack Obama's "gift" to Muslims).

The way this crisis is playing out shows the bankruptcy and strategic dangers of trying to simply reduce Hamas to part of an undifferentiated "global terrorist front". The Muslim Brotherhood, from whence Hamas evolved twenty years ago, is no friend of the United States or Israel but is nevertheless one of al-Qaeda's fiercest rivals. Zawahiri himself penned one of the most famous anti-Brotherhood tracts, Bitter Harvest. Over the last few years, the doctrinal and political conflict between the Brotherhood and al-Qaeda's salafi-jihadism has become one of the most active fault-lines in Islamist politics. As ‘Abu Qandahar’ wrote on al-Qaeda's key al-Ekhlaas forum in October 2007, the "Islamic world is divided between two projects, jihad and Ikhwan [Brotherhood]."

Hamas enjoys a special place in al-Qaeda's enemies list. Al-Qaeda has long been desperate for a foothold in Palestine, but has been largely kept out because Hamas has the place locked. Jihadist forums bear a deep grudge over Hamas's crackdown on various jihadist groups which have tried to set up shop there (Jaysh al-Islam, et al). In March 2006, Zawahiri denounced Hamas's electoral victory and called on them to reject the democratic trap and pursue armed struggle. In February 2007 he attacked the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas, and in March declared that Hamas had "surrendered most of Palestine to the Jews, sold the Palestinian issue, and sold shari'a in order to retain leadership of the Palestinian government." In June 2007 he called on Hamas to "correct your path." Just last week, the leading Jordanian jihadist theoretician Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi (thanks to Will McCants) complained that "Hamas is misleading Muslims with its glittering slogans, which blind people to their wayward goals and strategies, leading them down the path of criminals... [and] Hamas started the bloodshed in Gaza several weeks ago when it killed members of the Army of Islam organization."

From al-Qaeda's perspective, therefore, Israel's assault on Gaza is an unmitigated blessing. The images flooding the Arab and world media have already discredited moderates, fueled outrage, and pushed the center of political gravity towards more hard-line and radical positions. As in past crises, Islamists of all stripes are outbidding each other, competing to "lead" the popular outrage, while "moderates" are silent or jumping on the bandwagon. Governments are under pressure, most people are glued to al-Jazeera's coverage (and, from what anyone can tell, ignoring stations that don't offer similar coverage), the internet is flooded with horrifying images, and people are angry and mobilized against Israel, the United States, and their own governments. That's the kind of world al-Qaeda likes to see. 

Even if Hamas emerges weakened, as Israeli strategists hope, all the better (from al-Qaeda's point of view, that is). In general, where the MB is strong (Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine for example), AQ has had a hard time finding a point of entry despite serious efforts to do so, while where the MB is weak (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Lebanon) it has had more success. Up to now, AQ-minded groups have had little success in penetrating Gaza, because Hamas had it locked. Now they clearly have high hopes of finding an entree with a radicalized, devastated population and a weakened Hamas.

Al-Qaeda likely can not thank Israel enough for its efforts over the last two weeks. Over the last few years, al-Qaeda has been losing ground with the mainstream Muslim public -- because of its real radicalism and fringe ideology, its killing of so many Muslim innocents in its attacks in Muslim countries, challenges from other Islamist groups and from within its own ranks, an increasingly effective strategic communications campaign by Western and Arab governments, and more. Israel's military assault against Gaza threatens to reverse that trend.

Meanwhile, U.S. public diplomacy (whether in its 1.0 or 2.0 varieties) has been as absent as has been American policy -- a disaster that I'll be picking up in later posts. 

The other day I pointed out the Arab political divisions over the response to Gaza. It might be interesting to show how this plays out in one of the key interpretive struggles in the Arab public sphere (and not only Arab, of course): whether to define the current Israeli attack as against "Gaza" or "Hamas." The stakes are clear. If the attack is defined as against "Gaza", then what follows is solidarity with the Palestinians and demands to stop the killing. If the attack is defined as against "Hamas", then what follows is the division of Arab opinion along sharply polarized lines defined by their views towards the Islamist movement. Who's winning? Thus far, "Gaza" in a landslide... but just as in the 2006 Hezbollah war, the 2008 Iraqi Basra campaign, and all other such battles the interpretive struggle will continue long beyond the hostilities.

The "Hamas" frame is being pushed by Israel, the United States, the Egyptian government, Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas, parts of the Saudi media and generally the familiar quarters of the "official Arab order". While they can't ignore the destruction in Gaza, their focus is primarily on Hamas's "irresponsibility" for breaking the cease-fire, and on its alleged alliances with a variety of enemies of this official order: Iran, Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, here's the lead story on the crisis on the Saudi al-Arabiya right now, showcasing Hamas missiles, not suffering Gazans:

The competing frame focuses on the mass human suffering at the hands of Israeli military assault and the inaction on the part of Arab governments. Thus far, the "Hamas" frame has been absolutely swamped by the "Gaza" frame. The visuals in the Arab media show endless pain, sufffering, and trauma for Gazans of all stripes. Al-Jazeera has taken the lead in pushing the images and the frame, but it is far more pervasive than that -- and extends far, far beyond the "pro-Iran" or "Islamist" forces to which the first camp prefers to assign it. Almost every newspaper features front page images of devastation in Gaza, imagery which overwhelms the carefully calculated political arguments of the official Arab camp. The language of choice throughout the media is "massacre", "slaughter", "assault". Here are just a few examples from today's editions of Jordan's semi-official al-Rai, Lebanon's al-Safir, and the Saudi pan-Arab al-Hayat:

It remains to be seen how much this matters, of course, and skepticism runs deep. Anyone who lived through the fierce protests during the second Intifada in 2000, the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank in 2002, or the invasion of Iraq in 2003 will remember well the rising force of popular protest at those moments, the expectations of dramatic change, the perception of regimes on the brink, the empowered public opinion, the satellite television arguments, the declarations of the final collapse of the Arab official order. And here we still are.

I do think that public opinion matters, at least indirectly in terms of shaping the terms of Arab politics, even if governments don't fall, treaties aren't broken or war declared. A whole industry of 'public diplomacy' and 'wars of ideas' is based on the concern that anti-American attitudes matter, for instance. Here, the anti-Hamas camp has already been forced to bow to this frame rhetorically, with the Mubarak demanding Israel immediately end its "monstrous" assault, and the GCC calling for an immediate end to the violence. The limits of their concessions can be seen in the fact that they continue to blame Hamas for the crisis, though, and refuse to do anything substantive in response (calling for an Arab summitt to eventually be held, or photo opportunities of blood donations don't really count). Their media are trying to portray those governments as acting effectively, but that doesn't seem to be getting much traction with a deeply skeptical and outraged public. If the crisis grinds on, we'll see whether these regimes are forced to start making more concessions to public views --- but most of the real impact will only be felt long-term.

Originally posted on Abu Aardvark.