Very depressing commentary from the Ambassador.

Thanks for the report.

It seems irrational to expect, as Marc Lynch seems to, a party to a war to reveal his end strategy in advance, especially in the Middle East. As social scientists are fond of teaching, uncertainty on the part of the enemy compels caution (c.f. the groundbreaking work of Ithiel de Sola Pool, MIT)

David Sternlight
Los Angeles

Mr. Sternlight-

I suggest that you are reading "strategy" incorrectly.

It does not seem at all irrational, to me, but rather commonplace, that a party to a war should be able to "offer [a] plausible explanation as to how its military campaign [] would achieve its stated goals," which is really the subject of the post, not military strategy.

From the Blitz to the Tokyo firebombings to Gaza today, bombing does not work. There is something of a seductive logic to the notion that by simply killing swathes of people, they will subsequently rise up in fear and demand of their politicians to end the conflict somehow. This was exactly the logic of Coventry, Dresden and Tokyo (which killed more people than the Atomic bomb). However, as each example clearly demonstrates, this logic is hopelessly floored and indeed causes exactly the opposite: the population to come together under their retribution-promising leadership against their clear enemy.

If Israel think, therefore, that they can intimidate, scare and (essentially) bomb the Palestinians into some kind of submission or political acquiescence - as, in the absence of any other appreciable strategy, one might assume - history suggests that this strategy will unequivocally fail.

www.thegulfblog.com

Not being upfront about their aims is not the same as having none. Israel almost certainly has clear aims but prefers ambiguity.

Israel cannot openly say it wants to topple Hamas and replace it with Fatah. In 1982, it could not openly say it wanted to topple the Lebanese government and place Gemayel and the Phalangists in power.

So when people argue "but how will this stop the rockets?" they are assuming Israel really cares about the rockets, when in fact it does not. I'm sure the people in Sderot do, but quite honestly this "war" (more like ghetto uprising) is not for their benefit and indeed they wont benefit from it.

Meridor also cannot say he wants to box Obama into their confrontation with Iran/Hizbollah, the latter of which will certainly be the target of the next government after the elections. (assuming all goes according to plan in Gaza)

This is not to say all their objectives will be met-I think they will not-but they do have clear objectives.

What's the great mystery? After this, there's a good chance that Hamas rockets across the border will cease. Hizbullah has stopped firing rockets from Lebanon, hasn't it?

What if the strategy is to simply contain gaza as much as they can, and respond militarily to gazan attacks? Why isn't that a 'workable' strategy, to respond when attacked? What if the long term goal is simply to maintain the status quo? In some ways, it seems like Israel may have simply given up on a peace process in relation to Gaza, but why isn't that in itself a strategy? It doesn't seem like it would be any more ineffectual than anything else they can try with Hamas.

The Middle East has certain ways of behavior, which existed long before the creation of the State of Israel. Although some are foreign or even antithetical to Western ways, one has to speak the local language to be understood.

One such value is "step on my toes and I'll drop a house on you." The Israelis, after trying Western ways of dialogue with Hamas and the PLO for years without success have finally come to realize that to be understood they must speak "Middle East" to them.

It's no good for Westerners to whine about it. Instead, the West must adapt to local language when dealing with people who seem only to understand that language. Can you say, "shock and awe"? I knew you could.

Maybe somebody could explain what's wrong with what Peterkins is saying. Since the 2006 war Hezbollah has stopped the cross-border provocations that led to the war; the war was an effective deterrent. (And they're disavowing the rockets fired today--they aren't the only ones with Katyushas in Lebanon). How would Israel "degrade Hamas's capabilities" in a war other than by destroying their armaments and infrastructure and killing their fighters? How would Israel "re-establish the credibility of its deterrence" other than by responding to aggression with massive retaliation rather than the concessions Hamas was hoping for? Meridor answered Lynch's question by giving concrete examples of how Israel is doing these things. To some extent the end state doesn't matter in achieving these goals; if Israel just stopped attacking today Hamas would still have a very different expectation of how Qassam attacks would be responded to than it did the week before the war.

I suspect the reason the Israeli ambassador did not give us a strategy is that there simply isn't one that could work.

Several people have mentioned that Hezbollah has stopped its rocket attacks since 2006. Alas, Hamas is far more focused on the destruction of Israel than is Hezbollah. Does anyone really believe that it would decide to stop attacking Israel if Israel's military left? Or is permanent occupation the plan, and how workable would that be? Like I said, there is no rational plan.

A comment by veteran CBS correspondent Bob Simon in a recent interview with Charlie Rose was intriguing: "At dinner in Tel Aviv," he said, "Everything is discussed except politics ... family, friends, theatre, music, Tuscany ... you name it, it's discussed. But not the politics of the situation ... Because they are tired of it? Yes. And because they are in a state of denial. They are living a very good life. The life in Tel Aviv is a good life and they don' want to be bothered with these questions ..." So, just close your eyes and fire, then ...

If you listen to Israeli radio or television, you will notice that the different ministers and officials almost always state different goals for the Gaza operation. There is no coordination as to exactly what they are trying to do, aside from bombing Hamas and the rest of the people there.