Um, what about those demonstrations over there?

Fri, 01/09/2009 - 2:14pm

David Pollack of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy writes just now that "large public demonstrations have so far failed to materialize in most Arab countries" in response to Gaza. While this may be reassuring to those who hope to minimize the importance of paying attention to Arab public opinion, it simply isn't true.

Just from Arabic press reports today:

And that's not even counting the many protests blocked by security forces across the region, in Cairo and Amman and elsewhere.

Pollack's claim struck me as particularly odd since, just like the vast majority of the Arab TV-viewing public, I've spent the last half hour watching al-Jazeera's reporting and extensive footage of massive protests across the Arab world. I still am... there are a lot of protests and reporting them is a key way that al-Jazeera constructs a narrative of Arab public opinion.

I don't think that protests on the famous "Arab street" are the only meaningful measure of Arab public opinion, nor that they can in and of themselves affect things. Arguments could be made for downplaying their significance: Maybe they are just a way for regimes to let off steam and divert popular anger. Maybe they are staged for the TV cameras. Maybe they substitute for more effective action. Maybe their anger is a cost worth paying for other important policy goals. All arguable -- I would disagree, but the points could be argued. But to deny that they are even happening when they manifestly are seems disinegenuous... and a very poor guide to policy or understanding the stakes of the conflict. 

UPDATE: for updated accounts in Arabic of the "massive" and "unprecedented" protests during Friday's "day of rage" which swept virtually every Arab country (and led to some nasty clashes with heavy security forces in Jordan and Egypt), check out al-Hayat, al-Akhbar, al-Ghad, al-Dustour, al-Mesryoon, al-Khaleej, or even the Saudi al-Sharq al-Awsat (which would probably prefer to ignore them. 



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No protests?

It must be hard to see those protests from a DC think tank office...

blame it on the bubble

I'm wondering if Pollock is oblivious to the protests or if he simply ignored them. Since he bases so many of his arguments on what's going on in the "Arab street," one would think he would actually know what's going on there at the moment. But apparently he missed the memo. Is he not watching what we're all watching and simply claiming that he is? I suppose nothing has changed over there at WINEP. They're still stuck in their bubble to the outside world, even if they pretend to have once lived within it.

flawed logic

I'm also confused (and concerned) as to how Pollock goes from few major street protests and scant support for Hamas to at the end essentially arguing that contrary to common perception, the current conflict is actually stabilizing the region, making it less radicalized, and it is weakening Hamas. Where is his evidence for this? Is this evidence a lack of major street protests that he claims to see?

Pollock then bases his flawed initial argument on being able to say that this crisis has provided a real opportunity "to help achieve an important U.S. objective in the quest for Arab-Israeli peace: to weaken, isolate, and ultimately marginalize Hamas, unless it unexpectedly proves willing to sue for peace."

For how long must the U.S. continue trying to "weaken, isolate, and marginalize" Hamas in the way that it's been trying to? Unfortunately, it doesn't seem that the U.S. and Israel have done a good job of pulling this one off over the past few years. And I'm not sure how the current conflict provides such a great and real opportunity to do so this time around. Then again, Pollock and others have been using similar arguments to support Israeli policies for the past three years. And there are so many successes to speak of....

And how's this for a transnational Islamic sphere

Islamist Indonesian women protesting in front of the Egyptian embassy to voice anger over Egypt's refusal to open the Rafah border.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090109/wl_asia_afp/mideastconflictgazaisraelegyptindonesia_newsmlmmd

Size of demonstrations

I would be wary of taking those numbers seriously. Most news organisations in this part of the world have no notion of how to count crowds. Whenever I go to a protest I find that news reports exaggerate the turnout, generally by a factor of 10. This is especially true of AFP and AP. I wasn't in Alexandria on Friday but no protest in Cairo has exceeded 2,000 people. Maybe disappointing but true.

China and Gaza

The Gaza fighting has only emphasized the gap between local and foreign media reporting of the Middle East - a gap that consequently skews views such as that of David Pollack.

You might be interested to hear how the fighting is being reported in China.

I was recently impressed by Ahmed Mussa, the Palestinian Authority's envoy to Beijing. He was on Xinhua the other night arguing his case and speaking in Chinese.

It's a change. The Palestinian Authority didn't always so effectively lobby Beijing according to Ma Xiaolin, an ex-Xinhua reporter once based in Gaza.

There's also reason for the Palestinian Authority to work harder given a growing pro-Israel lobby evident among local bloggers.

Check out this post for more, http://www.silkroadeconomy.com/2009/01/10/the-gaza-spotlight/

Marc, nice work as always.

Hamas weakening?

To me, the important analytical point in all this is not the size of the demonstrations but Dave Pollock's point that Hamas is being weakened. Krauthammer made the same point in yesterday's Washington Post. I am an agnostic on this question, but I would like to know how we should measure whether Hamas is "weakened" by the Israeli offensive or not. I recall some folks talking during the 2006 war about how Hizballah was really, when you thought hard about it, being weakened. Didn't turn out that way.

I can spin a scenario where Hamas might be weakened down the line -- Palestinian elections in 2009, enough time for the initial "rally-round-Hamas" effect to dissipate, people in Gaza asking whether the Hamas strategy is serving their interests, having an alternative (unlike Shia voters in Lebanon) in Fatah, voting Hamas out. There are a lot of "ifs" in that scenario, to be sure. And the moral issue about whether the hugely disproportionate death tolls on the two sides justify the Israeli action remains on the table. But it could happen. But I could also spin a scenario that works more like Lebanon post-2006 war.

In the end, we can only tell whether Hamas has been "weakened" after the fact, but I think Marc was right in his earlier post -- it is hard to see the Israeli strategy here, if they are not going to occupy Gaza for a long time and physically eliminate the Hamas leadership and infrastructure.

um, what about those demonstrations over... here?

"Tens of thousands" protesting in London and Paris.
And across Europe