Bush's finest moment on Iraq: SOFA, not the surge

Posted By Marc Lynch Sunday, January 18, 2009 - 12:54 PM Share

Peter Beinart today bravely repeats the emerging would-be conventional wisdom. Rather than simply denounce everything Republican, he argues, Democrats should admit that the "surge" worked and -- uniquely echoing a thousand recent op-eds --  was President Bush's finest moment.  I have a hard time imagining anything as tedious as rehashing those tired debates from the campaign about the "surge" -- perhaps we could have another round of arguments as to whether the surge brigades arriving in the spring of 2007 caused the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in the fall of 2006?  But in the interests of post-partisanship, I am willing to offer an alternative as Bush's finest hour in Iraq:  the Status of Forces Agreement.

Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part. It demonstrated a pragmatism and willingness to put the national interest ahead of partisanship that few of us believed he possessed. It is largely thanks to Bush's acceptance of his own bargaining failure that Barack Obama will inherit a plausible route to successful disengagement from Iraq. 

Conservatives now like to claim the SOFA as a "Bush-negotiated" success. But Bush entered the SOFA negotiations looking for something entirely different than what emerged at the end. The U.S. went into the SOFA talks intent on obtaining legitimacy for a long-term military presence in Iraq once the Security Council mandate ended. When negotiations began, it was widely assumed that Bush would extract from the Iraqis an agreement which made the removal of U.S. troops entirely contingent upon American assessments of conditions on the ground.  There were widespread discussions of permanent U.S. bases and a Korea-style presence for generations, an assumption that the U.S. would retain a free hand in its operations, and an absolute rejection of an Obama-style timeline for withdrawal.

But Iraqi leaders, to most everyone's surprise, took a hard line in the negotiations. Their tough line was encouraged by Iran, no doubt, as stressed by many frustrated American commentators. But it also reflected Iraqi domestic considerations, including several rounds of upcoming elections and an intensely strong popular Iraqi hostility to the U.S. occupation under any name. The Iraqis were also helped by the calender.  As negotiations dragged on, the December 31 deadline loomed large, threatening to leave the U.S. troops without any legal mandate to remain in the country and forcing the hand of American negotiators.  Finally, the Iraqi leaders clearly kept a careful eye on the American Presidential elections and used Obama's stance to strengthen their own hand in negotiations.

And here's where I will offer some sincere praise for Bush and his team. When the Iraqis insisted on an Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal instead of a Bush/McCain- style conditions-based aspirational time frame for U.S. withdrawal, he could have insisted on the latter. This would have fit with his administration's often-repeated preferences. He could have continued to push for this conception closer to the December 31 deadline, playing high-stakes chicken at the expense of American military planning for the coming year and at the risk of the Iraqi political system not having adequate time to ratify the deal.

But he didn't.  To his credit, Bush agreed to the Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal. Granted, he hedged -- he didn't authorize Ambassador Ryan Crocker to sign off on the deal until after the Presidential election (on November 18). But at that point he bowed to the political realities in the U.S. and Iraq and agreed to a SOFA which far more closely matched Obama's avowed vision for Iraq -- withdrawal of U.S. forces in three years, no permanent bases -- than his own. Thanks to this pragmatism, Obama can now work closely with the Iraqi government in managing the drawdown instead of spending his first months in office trying to wriggle out of an unacceptable deal.  And this, I might speculate, is among the reasons why Robert Gates will continue as Secretary of Defense. 

And thus I offer Bush's willingness to sign the SOFA mandating U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and not the surge, as his finest moment in Iraq.  

Photo by Thaier al-Sudani-Pool/Getty Images

EXPLORE:MIDDLE EAST, BUSH ADMINISTRATION, IRAQ
 

DIMITRIJEVIC

2:57 PM ET

January 18, 2009

The SOFA agreement is likely political theater

Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part.

Does anyone really believe that substantial U.S. military and or covert U.S. forces are NOT going to remain in Iraq beyond three years from today? See:

Pentagon report: 90 percent of Iraq Army not self-sufficient

Thursday, 15 Jan 2009

WASHINGTON -- Despite five years of training and equipping, the Iraqi military is still heavily dependent on U.S. operational support.

A Defense Department report said less than 10 percent of Iraq Army battalions were capable of planning and executing counter-insurgency operations. The rest of the army combat battalions required anywhere from partial to significant support from the U.S. military and its coalition partners.

"There remains a critical reliance on coalition rotary wing assets and other enablers such as intelligence and close air and logistics support during operations," the Pentagon report, titled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," said.

Full piece Here

- - - - - -

By the way, the recent "breaking news" being waved around by David Sanger, his employers at the NYT and many other media outlets regarding Pentagon denial of bunker-buster aerial bombs and other equipment to Israel is OLD news. Those facts were reported by the website worldtribune.com five months ago. See:

U.S. nixed Israel's request for bunker-busters

14 August 2008

TEL AVIV -- The United States rejected a recent Israeli request for advanced detection systems as well as bunker-busters capable of locating and destroying Iranian nuclear weapons sites.

Israeli officials said the administration was persuaded by Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that such systems could be used to facilitate an Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear weapons facilities.

Full piece Here

- - - - - -

U.S. denies Israel's request for tanker aircraft

21 August 2008

JERUSALEM -- The United States has rejected an Israeli request for advanced refueling aircraft that could be used for any mission to strike Iran nuclear sites.

Israeli officials said the Bush administration refused a request by Defense Minister Ehud Barak to purchase the KC-767 tanker transport aircraft. They said the administration did not want to be seen as helping Israel attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

....This marked the second U.S. refusal of an Israeli request for military systems in about a month. In July, the administration rejected an Israeli request for advanced bunker-busters and underground detection systems. The White House was also said to have denied Israel permission to use Iraq's air space for an attack on Iran.

Full piece Here

 

GRAND SEN-OR

9:27 PM ET

January 18, 2009

Signing a Status of Forces

Signing a Status of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part.

Does anyone really believe that substantial U.S. military and or covert U.S. forces are NOT going to remain in Iraq beyond three years from today?

No, but look at the photo! they gave a nice smiley pose to the lambs to be slaughtered;->

Grand Sen~or

 

WALKING WOUNDED

12:37 AM ET

January 19, 2009

SOFA dancing with the Tar Baby

I propose a Big Talking Texan award for Bush's Iraq war effort. Perhaps memorialized by an armadillo, sculpted from Mesopotamian sun-baked tar. We'll have lots of time to think about it.

Getting sadrists, Sunnis, ISCI and Najaf ayatollahs to agree on anything is an accomplishment, even if it's bidding us leave. Team W could afford to be bold in accepting SOFA 'disapointments'; they don't have to implement.

Status of Forces Agreement implies that we are invited guests and partners. Like troops in Guam or Wiessbaden. Maliki's own ministers are referring to the 'withdrawal agreement', which implies a 'status of occupier' on the way out.

It should have been clear to a whole lot of generals and policy wonks that any Iraqi gov't that is dependant on US occupation troops, just to hold the center of the capitol, lacks legitimacy and effectiveness, is a one-legged stool.

For the moment, Maliki appears to have it both ways, garnering a rep for independance and command of his Shiite troops. But a US cordon still secures the month-old 'sovereign' control of the 'international zone' seat of gov't. And we still guarantee separation of Sunni from Shiite neighborhoods

Aside from a predictable baseline of assasinated candidates, conduct and outcome of this months Provincial elections aren't getting much coverage. So far no one's projected when the miles of 12 ft high cement barriers might be dismantled.

MNFI intel is scrutinizing things closely, and will be forced to report to Congress, to be checked against new DoState and UN election monitors. Either the provincial offices and budget goodies get redistributed, or not. Either way, Sawa, JAM, and many other people with guns and grudges will be faced off, as the traditional 'one for you, one-two for me' divvy is made. 'Potentially explosive' is one way to describe it.

SOFA terms say we will withdraw out of Iraqi cities within the next 6 months. This will take us out of position to protect/separate Sunni and Shiite, just as armed tensions between Baghdad and Barzani's 'eretz Kurdistan' are coming to a head. Note that warlord Barzani is not risking elections in 'peaceful and prosperous' Kurdish provinces.

In the second half of 2009, the US will have to start making monthly progress towards 2010 manpower, gear and base dissassembly goals. US force reset momentum will really start to bite into our combat capability, before Maliki's run for a second PM term in national elections. Maliki's DAWA was the minority compromise between competing Hakim/ISCI and Sadrist factions, folks that never wanted him to become PM for Life- unless it's a short one. Yet no one is suggesting that Maliki isn't developing a taste for his executive office.

Like un-punching the Gaza tarbaby, hoping to get out of Iraq and Gitmo is going to be easier than the act.

 

Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

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