How did the Gaza war affect Palestinian public opinion?

Fri, 02/06/2009 - 4:14am

I've just seen the first public opinion survey carried out in the West Bank and Gaza since the war, and the results are about what you'd expect:  Hamas has gained politically and Fatah has declined.  Since I haven't seen it reported anywhere yet, here are the main findings of the survey carried out by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center between January 29-31:

  •  Who won?  9.8% said Israel, 46.7% said Hamas, and 37.4% said neither.  Interesting: Gazans were more likely to say "neither" (48.4%) and West Bankers more likely to say "Hamas" (53.3%)
  •  Were Palestinians convinced by the Israeli argument that Palestinian civilians were killed because Hamas was hiding among them? No. Only 5.1% in the West Bank and 5.9% overall agreed with that, while 72% blamed Israel for targeting civilians.
  • Who is to blame?  76.8% say that Israel was planning to launch the war, and that Palestinians could not have avoided it.
  • What about America's role?  2.8% were satisfied, within the 3% margin of error.   
  • Will Obama make a difference? 28.1% are more optimistic since the inauguration, 18.9% more pessimistic, and 48.2% say it will make no difference.
  • The winners in inter-Arab politics: Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood. The most popular Arab actor by far was Qatar:  68.3% were satisfied with its role.  Iran, by comparison, satisfied only 55.9% -- and did better in the West Bank (64.4%) than in Gaza (41.4%), while Turkey satisfied 89.6% (consistent with the pro-Erdogan demonstrations in Gaza the other day). 57.6% were satisfied with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.   
  • The less winners in inter-Arab politics: Egypt and Jordan (and presumably Saudi Arabia). 35.1% were satisfied and 64% were dissatisfied with Egypt's role;  41.7% were satisfied with Jordan's role. Amazingly, the survey did not report findings about satisfaction with Saudi Arabia for reasons which may be self-evident but are all the more worth speculating about.
  • Palestinian winners and losers?  Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas didn't fare well:  13.2% very satisfied, 49.9% very dissatisfied;  adding in the "somewhat" responses gives Mahmoud Abbas a rating of 33.6% satisfaction.  Gazans were marginally more satisfied than West Bankers (39.7% to 30%).  Isma'il Haniya of Hamas is now the most trusted figure in Palestinian politics, with 21.1%, followed by Abbas with 13.4%. But perhaps the main tell:  "Don't trust anyone" is the runaway winner with 31.1%. If Parliamentary elections were held today, Hamas now enjoys a slim lead over Fatah, 28.6% to 27.9%.  Hamas support is up from 19.3% last April.   
  • And of course, the violence.  Support for using locally-made rockets has increased from 39.3% in April to 50.8%, and support for military operations against Israeli targets is up from 49.5% to 53.5%. 41% now oppose peace negotiations, compared to 34.7% last year. 
Arguments may now proceed along predictable lines as to the validity of the survey research in such a difficult environment, its importance, and the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


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Reflection of Palestinian History

The author notes: "perhaps the main tell: "Don't trust anyone" is the runaway winner with 31.1%.". I believe this is a reflection of Palestinian history.

If you note, Palestinians have lived under various types of foreign rule for many years even preceding the current Occupation. Overtime, their language as a reflection of their history and culture, has come to reflect the distrust of others. In response to the rough conditions of the Ottoman and British rule period, an expression has developed that is still used today. It is something like, "Hammihey harramiyeh." It means the one that "protects" you is the one that harms you.

Too much of the conflicts perpetuation derives in relations to the misunderstanding of each ones history and how that impels the actions of their enemy.

Not quite the first poll, Mark!

PCPO and An-Najah both released polls over the last few days, with broadly similar results though interesting variations...

caveats and February surprises

...and NEC released an earlier poll. The PCPO poll has very different results from the JMCC one, although PCPO's polling is so weak that no one should pay any attention to it.

One also needs to account for response biases in reading poll results. This is especially true in Gaza, where Fateh supporters are being kneecapped in some cases for merely voicing support for Fateh, and where one might expect telephone polls to undercount Fateh support (or over-count Hamas support) by 5-10%. Similarly, polls in the West Bank tend to undercount Hamas support.

I would be surprised if Hamas has gained in Gaza--I suspect they've taken a bit of a hit, actually. Fateh has certainly lost in the West Bank.

While there's been a lot of focus on the "race to reconstruct" in Gaza and its political implications, I believe that these are overblown. Historically, donor aid has only marginal direct effects on Palestinian public opinion.

The real wild cards are an agreement that opens the Gaza border in some significant way, and is a Shalit/prisoner release. Opening the borders would allow Hamas to claim a real political victory from the war, something it has had trouble doing in Gaza. A prisoners release would also be a huge political gain (which is why Fateh seems to be lobbying against it!).

A prisoner release that includes Barghouti, however, would be a bit of a phyrric victory for Hamas--most polls show they would lose badly against him as Fateh leader. It would also be very bad news for Abbas (although given that he didn't want to be President to begin with, perhaps it gives him a way of exiting).

Finally, it is hard to see how a national unity government would function, given the unparalleled degree of hatred (not too strong a word) between Hamas and Fateh cadres at the moment. It would only likely function if it was a pro forma technocratic fig-leaf under which the current de facto regional division of power remained in place.