Could there be a Mousavi Effect?

Wed, 06/10/2009 - 4:16pm

I'm riveted by the unfolding Iranian election campaign. Back in April, I organized a panel discussion on the election with a number of very keen observers of Iranian politics, and came away even more confused than before (not their fault!)... and I've been following the ups and downs of the debates and the energized public discourse as closely as I can. I don't know what's going to happen any more than anyone else does. But suppose that Mir Hossein Mousavi wins -- what might that do to regional politics?

Most people have quite naturally focused upon the spark it could give to U.S.-Iranian dialogue around the nuclear weapons question. This may be exaggerated -- Mousavi would likely drive as hard a bargain on the nuclear question as would Ahmedenejad, especially given the realities of the power structure in Iran, and perhaps mighte even be a more effective bargainer without the incumbent's sideshows and penchant for inflammatory rhetoric. But at least dialogue would get a jolt, and that would be a good thing.

But I wonder if the regional impact of a Mousavi victory might be something else entirely -- strengthening Iranian "soft power" in the region. The Iranian election has already captivated the Arab public sphere -- it has been all over the headlines and the TV stations. I imagine that many of the Arabs who see democracy as an important and positive issue find this Iranian election inspiring (as they did Khatemi's 1997 campaign). The Arab public may regard a Mousavi victory as the same kind of opportunity to rethink relations with Iran as Obama's victory offered for relations with the United States. Arab leaders may find it harder to mobilize opposition to Iran with the seemingly reasonable Mousavi in office than with the cheerfully inflammatory Ahmedenejad.

If a "Mousavi Effect" could open a window of opportunity for Iranian public diplomacy and soft power, the big question -- just as it was for Obama -- would be whether Iran would use that moment to reinforce existing lines of conflict or to break them down. Could direct renewed Iranian soft power towards rebuilding strained relations with Arabs and overcoming the "moderate camp vs resistance camp" narrative preferred by Ahmedenejad (and by the Bush administration and key Arab leaders such as Hosni Mubarak)? How would the Obama administration respond to such an Iranian public diplomacy offensive? In the end, that may be more important than the nuclear question for the future of the region.

Of course, if Ahmedenejad wins, the reverse effect may take hold. When George W. Bush defeated John Kerry in 2004, a very wide swathe of Arab public opinion concluded that this meant that the American people really did bear responsibility for Bush's unpopular policies. If the U.S. is really a democracy, they asked, then didn't Bush's victory mean that his war on terror and invasion of Iraq really did represent the American popular will? If Ahmedenejad wins, the same dynamic may hit Iran in the Arab world: the Iranian people had the chance to correct their policies, and chose to continue as they were. That might lead to a hardening and deepening of anti-Iranian sentiment, at least among elites and leaders.

Photo: ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images

Marc Lynch | Permalink | | Comments? Login or register


Advertisement

 

Arab views on Iran elections

by gweyman on Thu, 06/11/2009 - 8:07am

I think the angle of this argument is absolutely fascinating - the Arab world very seriously needs to understand the implications of this hotly contested election.

We're running a discussion thread on this in Arabic and English on www.Meedan.net which you can see here:

http://beta.meedan.net/index.php?page=events&post_id=276925

We'd love to hear a wide set of views. Thanks!

If we go by the Khatami

by Gregory Gause on Thu, 06/11/2009 - 12:53pm

If we go by the Khatami precedent, the Arab leaders loved the change. They dealt directly with Khatami and, at least on the Saudi side, the atmospherics of the relationship improved quite a bit. I think there is a tendency to overplay this "fear of democracy" thing in Arab-Iranian relations. The Arab leaders are going to deal with Iran on a state to state basis, not on the assumed fear that the example of Iranian democracy will somehow weaken them in their own domestic politics. Along this line, I don't accept the premise that Musavi would strengthen Iran's "soft power." It isn't soft power that has extended Iranian influence, unless we are accepting a definition of "soft power" that is everything but rolling the tanks in. Iran's ideological complementarity with groups in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine is important, but so are the "hard power" elements of money and guns. I don't know much about Musavi, but my impression is that he might be less interested in sending Iranian money and guns to Iran's Arab allies. Of course, he might not have much say on that.

This whole focus outside Iran

by Seth Edenbaum on Thu, 06/11/2009 - 3:18pm

This whole focus outside Iran is on self-interest. The most important thing to come out of this is the new and I hope popular understanding in the US that Iran is has a real and modernizing political culture.
We'll see what happens, but the last straw doesn't break a camel's back. Its just the one that gets credit in the popular imagination.

And Iran isn't the wild card in the middle east, israel is. And for the rest the danger comes from Saudi backed Salafists and Bin Ladinites.

"If a "Mousavi Effect" could open a window of opportunity for Iranian public diplomacy and soft power, the big question -- just as it was for Obama -- would be whether Iran would use that moment to reinforce existing lines of conflict or to break them down."
And how much money did the Saudis send to Lebanon?

You're not being clear. is 'us' vs 'them' american vs foreign, western vs non-western or supporters vs opponents of democracy?
But then all this is 'public diplomacy' being clear is not the point.

Hmmm...

by MDrew on Sun, 06/14/2009 - 6:32am

And if...?

Oh, dunno there's been much

by bb on Mon, 06/15/2009 - 8:24pm

Oh, dunno there's been much of a Mousavi effect at all while you've been away Mark?

There has definitely been a

by J Thomas on Tue, 06/23/2009 - 9:03am

There has definitely been a large Mousavi effect but it hasn't been anything like the effect people expected.

The real winner of the election is.....

by depetris@wordpr... on Tue, 06/16/2009 - 6:33pm

After months of constant campaigning between incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, the results of the Iranian presidential election appear to be in. Despite the millions of young Iranians pledging their devoted support for the reformist challenger, the Islamic Republic’s conservative president has won a landslide victory over the moderate establishment. In fact, Iran’s state-run news agency concludes that Ahmadinejad has prevailed with a resounding 2-to-1 margin over Mousavi’s campaign: a detrimental blow to Tehran’s educated elite who often brand the anti-western president as both embarrassing and incompetent.

Unfortunately, the re-election of Ahmadinejad and the resurgence of Iran’s clerical base is only a small part of the country’s looming desperation. What is more alarming to the international community is the apparent fraud that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei endorsed when the ballots were cast and eventually counted. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said it best: “I don’t think anyone anticipated this level of fraudulence…this was a selection, not an election.” Indeed, the fact that President Ahmadinejad carried close to 66 percent of the popular vote only confirms this disbelief. With so many Iranian citizens citing Mahmoud’s belligerent rhetoric and destructive handling of the national economy, how can this high figure possibly reflect the will of the Iranian electorate?

Certainly, the clerical regime’s ordering of mass fraud at the polls and the imprisonment of protesters in Tehran’s streets are a cause for concern throughout the international community. This is especially the case given that an Ahmadinejad re-election may further complicate the already tense relations between the west and the Islamic Republic (not to mention relations in the Middle Eastern region between Iran and its Arab neighbors). Yet, as young Iranians continue to voice their frustration through demonstrations and looting, this election creates an opportunity that many moderates inside the country may soon recognize. The formation of a new era in Iranian politics is fast approaching.

A widespread popular movement against the oppressive rule of Ayatollah Khamenei may very well strengthen throughout Iran itself. In particular, a feeling of anger is quickly expanding in a way that Tehran’s theocracy has yet to experience in their 30-year rule. Small businessmen/women, professors, academics, and even some officials within the Republic’s bureaucracy are beginning to question the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader. Should the constitution be changed in a way that would curtail the powers of the Ayatollah? Is it time for Iran’s moderate candidates to unite and publicly undermine the very tenants of Islamic Government? Is the democratic movement picking up steam? These are the questions that will inevitably be asked in the days and months ahead: the same questions that may generate a diverse anti-Khamenei coalition with the firm backing of ordinary voters.

These predictions may simply be personal beliefs of an optimistic American democrat. Or if these predictions come to fruition, they may be crushed by a wave of government-sponsored coercion aimed at protecting the current Iranian power structure (we have seen this use of force practiced many times in the past). Indeed, a popular overthrow of Iran’s religious autocracy seems impractical, if not downright irrational, to many scholars of Iranian politics. However, the unrest that is currently being unleashed within Tehran’s many neighborhoods lends certain credence to this view. Yes, Ahmadinejad may have won a massive victory in the face of numerous challenges. But the scenes on the ground point to a much different perspective: the public is sick and tired of the Ayatollah’s illegitimate behavior. Couple this with Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s (the head of the Council of Experts) apparent anger towards the corrupt-ridden electoral system and it may be safe to conclude that the strings of democracy within Iran have captured more and more supporters. Ironically, Khamenei may have dug his own grave and the graves of his religious backers.

As is long due, people that have supported the regime’s principles may slowly discover its central motive: suppressing the interests of the majority in order to protect the power of the few. So far, the mass resentment among Tehran’s students and scholars is a welcoming sign.

*** I encourage everyone (including the distinguished Marc Lynch) to check out my political blog at http://depetris.wordpress.com YOUR VIEWS ARE WANTED!!!

-Daniel R. DePetris

the nuclear pendulum

by Joe V on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 11:01am

No matter who wins, once the frenzy's over the international issue will still be nuclear proliferation. To me this is an opportunity to reduce weapons by having Israel disarm in exchange for a regional ban on the weapons. Would Iran agree to this? Israel should be comfortable so long as the US is there (as with Japan) to guarantee its security.

My guess is that israel would

by J Thomas on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 9:03pm

My guess is that israel would not trust any level of inspection to prove that iran was not building bombs. And they would certainly not accept the level of inspection needed to show that they aren't building more bombs.

So I expect the argument would fall on several levels.

1. Why should israel give up their nukes -- their advantage -- merely to prevent iran from getting nukes that the world shoul prevent them from having anyway?

2. Israel has both the right to nukes and an existential need for them. Iran has no right to nukes and no need for them. Israel's existence is constantly threatened but nobody threatens iran with anything at all.

3. Israel's nukes are no threat to anybody. Israel is a democracy and democracies never attack anybody who doesn't 100% deserve it. But iran's nukes would be a threat to everybody. Iranians are insane and they might attack anybody out of their religious insanity.

4. So the proper response is that the world (and specifically the USA) should do whatever it takes to stop iran from getting nukes and to destroy iran's nuclear production facilities. If necessary destroy iran. But everybody should just leave israel's nukes alone. The way it ought to be is that israel stays the only nuclear power in the middle east.

Israel and Iran's nuclear weapons

by depetris@wordpr... on Sun, 06/21/2009 - 9:51pm

Regardless of who emerges victorious after Iran's demonstrations dwindle, there is no doubt that Israel may eventually be forced into taking active steps with respect to the nuclear issue. Unless the Iranian people themselves embark on a new revolution to oust Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from his position as the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Tehran's nuclear program will continue to develop and improve in the months ahead.

This position of power (the Supreme Leader) is the key to Israel and the Arab world when confronting Tehran's nuclear ambitions. As long as Khamenei or a pro-Khamenei successor continues to rule Iran's people with an iron fist, any chances of reconciliation or negotiation on its nuclear sites will prove meaningless.

On a similar note, If Khamenei successfully crushes the democratic camps lingering within Iranian politics (as he is currently doing in the face of peaceful demonstrations), Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may find military force to be his only option in curtailing Iran's enrichment capabilities.

Historically, such a move by Israel may not be a complete failure as some analysts have predicted. After all, Israeli Defense Forces performed this very same military operation against Saddam Hussein's nuclear installations in 1981. Not only did the strike against Iraq buy Israel some time against a rising Arab power; it also created a more stable Middle East by eliminating a potential arms race by Iraq's neighbors. Who is to say that a similar approach may not work?

If Israel does choose to implement a preemptive air strike on Tehran's nuclear facilities, it would be extremely wise for the United States to stay out of the conflict. In fact, U.S. interference would not only threaten American troops with Iranian-sponsored attacks in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Such U.S. meddling could go a step further by severely damaging the already strained American image in the Middle East. At a time when President Obama is gradually mending the differences between Washington and members of the Islamic world, poor P.R. is the last thing the White House needs.

In my eyes, a Mousavi victory over Ahmadinejad would be the same thing as a re-election of Ahmadinejad himself. The two have made it publicly known that Iran's nuclear development will continue in the face of further U.N, U.S, and Israeli pressure.

Regardless of who emerges

by J Thomas on Tue, 06/23/2009 - 8:56am

Regardless of who emerges victorious after Iran's demonstrations dwindle, there is no doubt that Israel may eventually be forced into taking active steps with respect to the nuclear issue.

Right. Somebody's going to pull out the mind-control rays and force the israeli military to take active steps. ;>

As long as Khamenei or a pro-Khamenei successor continues to rule Iran's people with an iron fist, any chances of reconciliation or negotiation on its nuclear sites will prove meaningless.

Yeah, Khamenei issued a fatwa about no nukes. No hope to negotiate with him about it.

Historically, such a move by Israel may not be a complete failure as some analysts have predicted. After all, Israeli Defense Forces performed this very same military operation against Saddam Hussein's nuclear installations in 1981.

Yeah, they destroyed a civilian reactor before it was charged. They were convinced that it had military uses because the one the french made for *them* had. They were convinced there were lots of secret tunnels underneath it that had weapons stuff, because *their own* reactor had those. Captured records show that Saddam had not taken his bomb program seriously until the israelis claimed he was close to success and it would be easy for him to get nukes. Then he increased the funding 700% and actually started a serious weapons program.

Sweet. But it did get an israeli PM re-elected.

Who is to say that a similar approach may not work?

I am to say that, along with every rational analyst who's looked at the issue. Your plan is batshit insane. No, it cannot work. It is a tale told by an idiot.

If Israel does choose to implement a preemptive air strike on Tehran's nuclear facilities, it would be extremely wise for the United States to stay out of the conflict.

How could the US stay out? Would israel do it without crossing iraq? Using israeli refueling craft that the USA didn't give them? If it "succeeds" then the USA is complicit.

In fact, U.S. interference would not only threaten American troops with Iranian-sponsored attacks in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan.

Why wouldn't they do that anyway? Israel can't make that raid without US assistance and the iranians know it.

However, there is a way the USA could come out of that deal smelling like a rose. It goes like this: The raid begins. US aircraft based in iraq shoot down part of the israeli airforce, particularly some of the tankers. Not enough to stop the raid. Then when the israeli airforce comes back, the US shoots down the rest. Without the tankers the israeli planes can't make it home anyway, so it's OK if we miss a few.

Result: The iranian nuclear program is damaged and israel gets all the blame. The USA gets no blame at all from anybody who matters. US/israeli relations get a reset button and are re-established on a far more realistic basis.

Everybody wins! Israel gets to damage iranian nuclear installations at an acceptable cost, the USA gets a propaganda victory, and middle east peace comes much closer to reality.

We should do it.

Thanks for your input J. Thomas

by depetris@wordpr... on Tue, 06/23/2009 - 5:15pm

First and foremost, I believe we can have an intellectual discussion without resorting to childlike phrases such as “it is a tale told by an idiot.” Such comments convince me of nothing when it comes to your opinion about Iran’s nuclear program. You are certainly entitled to your own conclusions, but lambasting my point of view is not only arrogant, but downright narrow-minded. If we are too truly understand Israel’s options regarding Iran’s leadership, all suggestions (including yours) must be discussed in an impartial manner.

Second of all, your point that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons in the past is inconsistent with his current rhetoric. Khamenei and other high-ranking Islamic clerics have made it widely known to the international community that Iran will not sit down and negotiate a gradual drawdown of its nuclear ambitions. When looking back at the Ayatollah’s recent speeches to the Iranian people, any “rational” person (as you like to say) would find it extremely difficult to oppose such an argument. Let’s remember that it is the Supreme Leader himself that has the last say in Iranian foreign and defense policy: this includes Tehran’s unwillingness to abide by international norms when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation. If you wish to believe the words of an anti-Jewish zealot without any question or criticism, be my guest. The reality is that nuclear weapons development is, and will continue to be, a main prerogative of the Islamic Republic. Nuclear proliferation is in Tehran’s best national-interest. “Every rational analyst that has looked at the issue” confirms this belief: what better way to expand Iran’s hegemony in the Middle East than to build a large deterrent?

You suggest that an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is farfetched and irrational. If this policy is so asinine, why does the Israeli Government consider military force to be a viable alternative? Are you questioning the competency of a state that has been dealing with this same issue successfully for the past last thirty years? If so, it seems that your recommendations are far-fetched.

As far as Israel lacking the capability of a preemptive mission (as you seem to suggest when claiming that U.S. support would be needed), such a statement could not be further from the truth. As I have cited earlier, the IDF has already performed this same mission successfully close to thirty years ago against Iraq’s nuclear instillations. In addition, Israel’s air force was fully intact after the strike. Did the United States help the Israeli’s with this success story? Certainly not. In fact, the U.S. Government fully condemned the decision. If Jerusalem was able to act independently in the past, there is no reason to believe that a technologically-improved Israel would be unable to accomplish this similar feat against the Iranian Government. The United States would not be needed for technical expertise.

But thank you J. Thomas... your comments are warranted, although your perception of the facts are sketchy.

First and foremost, I believe

by J Thomas on Wed, 06/24/2009 - 12:17am

First and foremost, I believe we can have an intellectual discussion without resorting to childlike phrases such as “it is a tale told by an idiot.” Such comments convince me of nothing

If you actually believe that story then it would be futile for me to try to convince you otherwise.

Second of all, your point that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons in the past is inconsistent with his current rhetoric. Khamenei and other high-ranking Islamic clerics have made it widely known to the international community that Iran will not sit down and negotiate a gradual drawdown of its nuclear ambitions.

Have they said they intend to make nuclear weapons? They will not sit down and negotiate away their own civilian nuclear power. This is rational on their part.

Try this fanciful analogy. Imagine it's 1936, and the USA gets a sort of ultimatum from germany, russia, and japan. They say they are concerned that the USA might use our economy to fight them, and none of them want that to happen. So as a precaution they want us to shut down every US oil refinery, and we must ship all of our oil to europe or asia to be refined, and the refined products can then be sent back to the USA. We of course would object to such an idea. Not only is it inefficient, but if there was a war enemy submarines could sink the tankers going both directions and cripple our economy, and the refineries might get bombed if those foreign nations get into a war. And the germans, russians, and japanese would of course say that this was the point -- that they would feel far more secure if they could disrupt our domestic oil supply whenever they wanted.

We already have iran under sanctions because they refuse to set up their future electricity supply in a way that would make it easy for us to interdict it.

Nuclear proliferation is in Tehran’s best national-interest.

I think it's unlikely they'll do that while Khamenei is alive. But he could die any time. Opinions differ whether it's in iran's best interest. But if it is in their best interest, are you sure it's in america's interest to stop them? We don't absolutely need them as an enemy. We're fine with india having nukes, and if we just made up with iran we could be fine with them having nukes too.

You suggest that an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is farfetched and irrational. If this policy is so asinine, why does the Israeli Government consider military force to be a viable alternative?

You wouldn't argue that israeli foreign policy is particularly sane, would you?

As I have cited earlier, the IDF has already performed this same mission successfully close to thirty years ago against Iraq’s nuclear instillations.

One small raid, against one reactor that was not yet charged. No nuclear fuel breached. No Chernobyl at all. The reactor had no defenses, it was not hardened against attack. Some of the iranian targets are more than twice as distant. Look at a map. (For a start, try google map "iran nuclear sites". Look at the distance from Dimona.)

For iran you're talking about many hardened targets that will spread radioactivity from the ruins. Some of them might very well melt down if successfully attacked. Not nearly as clean an outcome as Osirak.

Israel does not have the refueling capacity for such an attack, unless the USA gives them that capacity. The easiest path is across iraq, through US-controlled airspace.

It could be done without the USA provided that they refuel at airbases in turkey. Possibly they might refuel at airbases in ajerbaijan after crossing turkey's airspace. or possibly refuel at airbases in saudi arabia. Or UAE, or oman, after secretly crossing saudi arabia.

Actually, I guess it could be done adequately without US help, provided they could simultaneously strike from bases in turkey, turkmenistan, and saudi arabia. Would those three countries help?

Did the United States help the Israeli’s with this success story? Certainly not.

Of course the USA didn't help. It was an election-month stunt. It did no good for anybody except it helped Begin get re-elected.

The United States would not be needed for technical expertise.

The israelis asked for special US bunker-busting bombs, and the US officially refused. We'd already given them lesser bunker-busters before their latest invasion of lebanon. They surely have the technology, they have been given many US military secrets.

The USA could benefit best by such an attack if first the iranian nuclear sites are damaged and then the US destroys the israeli planes. The Bush administration announced it would shoot down israeli planes that participated in such an attack so Obama needn't take the blame, but he could take the credit. It would do a lot to restore US credibility to the world.