Posted By Marc Lynch
Monday, August 10, 2009 - 1:29 PM
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My friend, CNAS colleague, and Gen. McChrystal review team member Andrew Exum has opened up Abu Muqawama for an online dialogue about the strategic rationale for the war in Afghanistan. Thus far he has posted very interesting comments from Scott Wedman, Bernard Finel, and somebody who thus far lacks a name (Ex, you should identify your contributors!). I'm glad that he's doing so, even if this is a debate which should have happened months or years ago. If you're interested in such questions, head on over there and join the fray.
I very rarely write about Afghanistan or Pakistan, primarily because it lies outside of the Arabic-speaking Middle East areas which I know well -- I don't speak the languages, I don't have fine-grained local knowledge, I don't follow the regional media. I can't help noticing that such constraints don't seem to stop anyone else, though. At any rate, I'm not going to join the new Iraq refugees and refocus on the AfPak policy debate. But since Exum has thrown open the question, Foreign Policy is launching its AfPak channel today, and I'm going to be seeing Richard Holbrooke's team at the CAP event on Wednesday, I'll throw out a few thoughts at least.
I have an open mind on these questions, want the U.S. mission to succeed, and have a great deal of confidence in the Obama national security team. I know that there have been a number of policy reviews at all levels of the government on Afghanistan strategy, and that most of the questions I can raise have already been discussed at one or the other. But at the same time, I find the strategic rationale for escalating the war in Afghanistan extremely thin, and the mismatch between avowed aims and available resources frighteningly wide. What are the strategic reasons for expanding the commitment in Afghanistan? Why should the US be committing to a project of armed state building now, in 2009?
I hope that the argument isn't that it's to prevent al-Qaeda from reconstituting itself in the Afghan safe havens. That's a fool's game. It makes sense to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda, but does that require "armed state building"?
Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things). So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasus, into Africa --- into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world? On whose budget? To his credit, McChrystal adviser Steve Biddle raises all of these questions in his excellent American Interest article from last month -- but in my view goes wrong by limiting the policy options to either full withdrawal or full commitment to COIN.
Another option which used to be on the table, as I understood it, was a much more narrowly focused policy of keeping the pressure on al-Qaeda while letting Afghan politics sort itself out. But from my distance, at least, it seems that this approach is being overwhelmed by those arguing for a much more expansive mission (as Michael Cohen has been documenting for a while under the category title "Afghanistan Mission Creep Watch"). And that worries me. I see why keeping al-Qaeda on the ropes matters. But I just don't really see why trying to build an Afghan state is a significant American national interest, or that it can be done at a price commensurate to its significance.
I fear that the escalation of the war in Afghanistan is following a dangerous path of least resistance. Given the assignment to win the war in Afghanistan, of course a military which has been reshaped by its experience in Iraq will turn to COIN doctrine. Once the decision is made to apply a COIN approach, of course the military is going to ask for more troops there, and a long commitment, since it's always been obvious that really doing COIN in Afghanistan would require vastly more troops than are currently deployed. And then, at each step of the way, there will be a strong tactical argument for expansion and a very difficult sell for any attempt to argue for restraint. Once that iron logic has been accepted, all else follows -- and it becomes extremely difficult to reverse course.
But I remain far from convinced that COIN is the right approach, especially when compared not to total U.S. withdrawal but to a more minimalist strategy. The attraction of COIN seems to derive from learning only partial lessons from Iraq -- conveniently forgetting that the "surge" and COIN were only one of a number of factors contributing to the changing conditions there, along with the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda which long predated the "surge" and the near-completion of sectarian cleansing in many urban areas, and that its long-term success in Iraq is far from guaranteed. And Afghanistan, as should be obvious, is very different from Iraq. Its advocates argue that this simply means that the approach needs to be adapted to the local conditions and the mission adequately resourced. I'm not at all convinced.
The best of the COIN-distas have generated tremendously innovative thinking about how to do COIN, and I'm confident that they will do their best to make this work. But that's a very different question from whether COIN should be done in the first place. Exum does a service by providing a forum -- at CNAS, home of some of that top COIN thinking -- to bring these questions into sharper focus. So I'll be following it with an open mind, and hope others do as well. I know what questions I'll have ready for Holbrooke's team if I get called on....
I'll check out Exum's forum, but for now note one big factor driving American policy under this administration.
This is the criticism then-Sen. Obama directed throughout 2007 and 2008 at the last administration for having "taken its eye off the ball" and put the real central front on the war on terrorism in Afghanistan on the back burner while it launched a war of choice in Iraq. It is extremely difficult for any Presidential candidate to campaign on a theme for two years, win an election on it, and then abandon it as Lynch proposes Obama do here.
Now, I'm not suggesting that his proposal is wrong (it may be; I haven't decided). I just think the elephants in the room need to be acknowledged. The legacy of Obama's campaign (and for that matter the legacy of his Vice President's campaign, and his Secretary of State's) is one of them. The other is the time that has passed between the winter of 2001-02 and the summer of 2009. The objective of a stable Afghan state able to cope with internal enemies and keep al Qaeda from reestablishing its sanctuary is being pursued now because it was not pursued then. Then, there was something of a clean slate, an opportunity to establish an Afghan government the could deliver (limited) services to the population without demanding bribes, dealing drugs, and so forth. The opportunity was missed, and we now have an Afghan government that does not deliver services, that does demand bribes, deal drugs and so forth.
The question we need to ask is whether there is such a thing as a "reset button" in Afghanistan. I am personally skeptical, but we ought to recognize that the Obama admininstration's policy implicitly assumes that there is.
I think the main problem with both your take on this and Exums debate so far is that it has become an either/or debate: Either the US goes for remaking Afghan into Xanadu, OR we just as well might get the fck out. Ive been exchanging mails with some folks actually doing the work in Afghanistan under the new momentuum, and a lot of the issue now is that the ANA is *finally* having its own veteran cadres, who are (now) being introduced to pop-centric COIN ideas instead of kinetic orientation. That means that the McChrystal initiative is much more about empowering the locals while maintaining support more than it is building utopia. As far as I understand it.
So the question should be: Is it cost effective to "surge" for the next two years in order to hopefully achieve a somewhat stable Afghan capable of fighting Taleban both on the hearts and minds front as well as the battlefield? Is it possible to spend two years educating buerocrats and combatting the worst of corruption as well as achieving limited military goals? Or should we just cut and run as fast as we can? Thats a whole different framework of thought.
As far as I can tell, the critics of the Obama administration's surge into Afghanistan are not presenting the choice described here. They are raising (quite properly) the question of whether the administration has embarked on a course toward undefined objectives that will take longer to run than the American public will tolerate or than our interests in the region require. The alternative they offer is difficult to describe as "cutting and running."
Actually, that is part of the critics' problem. Their alternative is difficult to describe, period. Recognizing that the one thing America must prevent is a reestablishment of al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan, they argue that this can be done without the large army we (and NATO) have there now. We are supposed to be able to withdraw the support and protection now offered the Afghan government and tribal leaders, yet still rely on them to keep the al Qaeda types out of the country and provide intelligence for American forces -- air forces primarily, but special ground forces too -- to hit the terrorists that do appear. I have not to this point seen a convincing explanation of why the Afghans we are now supporting should eagerly accept this change.
Having said that, the people calling for us to withdraw completely from Afghanistan are still mostly those who never wanted us there in the first place.
These seem like very well-founded concerns
It is telling that in the piece, Mr. Lynch mentions the possibility of "a more minimalist strategy" but offers not a single word of description or elaboration. The number and prestige of the experts now expressing doubts about the afghan campaign is one of the most puzzling aspects of the general weariness with Obama's policies across the board that seems to be setting in in the punditry. The questions you raise - the self-motivation of Afghan forces to carry out functions we wish them to in our absence or with a declining commitment; continued tactical and intelligence support for counterterror missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan that we will certainly seek to continue in almost any scenario; the fact of U.S. abandonment of Afghans to Taliban rule - seem to be broadly unmet by those raising doubts about significant U.S. engagement in the region going forward.
Groundhog Day 'surge' in Pashtunistan
Pakistani-Deobandi resentment of the US is only trumped by the IRP prime directive to screw India. The US today is borrowing from China to fund Pakistan-only to have them shaft us yet again. The longer the war lasts, the bigger the take for the generals and their debt-encumbered country. It's co-dependency; the bad kind.
The point is that I or my congressfolk can't get a handle on our part of the hot little Af-Pak wars without some serious historical perspective on 50 years of islamic radicalization and nuclear competition with India that preceded it. The Pashtun war has deep roots in 1949 Partition, Kashmir and Bangladesh. US military sales and diplomatic cover to a proliferating A-bomb selling Pakistan during the cold war is part of that story. It continued thru Musharaf's slick decision to milk GWOT in a 'long war', with Obama's surging urge to show he's not weak on terrorists.
The Taliban are a Pashtun component of a trans-border civil war. They started among Reagan-Andropov era refugees and orphans in Peshawar, and grew up to take over Afghanistan for Islamic Pakistan's ISI and nuclear-military oligarchy.
Ramsey Youssef was a Pakistani, who fled the '93 WTC bombing to Pakistan. In the aftermath of the African embassy bombings and run-up to 9-11, Afghan Pashtuns were repeatedly 'surged' across Pakistan into Kashmir, in partnership with terrorist Al Qaeda recruits. Former 'president for life Musharaf' made his bones harnessing fundamentalists to do wet work, against Pakistani opposition, and over in Kashmir.
At one point the generals sought bin Laden funding for assassination of sitting PM Benazir Bhutto. 9/11 was hatched in ISI sponsored camps in Afghanistan, where 'retired' Pakistani nuclear experts consulted on dirty bombs. Pakistan was the link between Iranian uranium and Korean missiles, not Libya or Iraq.
To be effective going forward, we need a S. Asian version of the Pentagon Papers, opening the books on how we got to 9/11. The problem is that our national security was mssively compromised by both parties and our security departments. The honest voices were consistently silenced. We can't expect intellectual rigor from those who's past intent was to sell propositions that enabled blindness and dishonesty in Pakistan. Too much baggage, and the magician's promise to never reveal how the trick is done.
As we saw in 2001, 2003, and 2006, strategic blindness is more often thru active need to deny the elephant's existence, than passive inexperience with large animals.
I seem to recollect that Afghanistan was not in fact a problem for the rest of the world during the 1989-98 civil war years when there was nothing close to a functioning government, and only became so after 1998 when one pre-medieval faction triumphed over all others outside the far northeast.
Should the quietly stated mission for US troops to be to prevent a Taliban takeover of Kabul and Kandahar, while keeping an Afghan army of some kind in the fight against the Pashtun Taliban? Not to "win", but merely to "hold"?
Omar's Pakistan based Pashtun faction was armed by ISI, Musharaf and the generals, who saw the Taliban as a client state, strategic depth and expendable recruits for use against India. Pakistan's nuclear sales continued after AQ Kahns retirement by Mush, even as he obstructed investigation of missing HEU and AlQ's nuclear ambitions. Mush sent key Deobandi 'weapons designers of interest' beyond Team Bush's reach, in Burma/Myanmar.
Lamenting the ISI's sponsorship of bin Laden, Omar, and AQ Kahn's nuclear sales, while excusing Pakistan's military oligarchy, ignoring the Islamic Republic's ongoing national ambition for revenge on India, is nothing short of willful strategic blindness on our part.
KLM's 2002 threat against US nuclear installations was in defense of Allah's bomb factory, Pakistan. 1/4th of KRL's packaged HEU inventory is unaccounted for, held back for nuclear blackmail.
Pakistan is islamo-terror's 'safe haven', and has been for a long time, going back to the 1993 WTC bombing, when OBL was raising sunflowers. Omar and Osama are likely in Waziristan, Beluchistan, not Afghani pashtunistan.
Occupying Afghan's mud villages and bombing insurgent pashtun fire teams is like swatting flies without covering the refuse can. We've been funding the nuclear radicals thru Pakistan's military, and continue to do so with every billion paid to drag our war goods over the mountains.
Until we understand the nature of Pakistan's sponsorship of our enemies, thinking we can achieve undefined goals by killing Pashtuns in Afghanistan is crazy, like 2002 all over again.
What was it that Cheney answered to 'why invade Iraq? 'Because it's doable.' Medieval 'surgeons' letting bad blood out had no less clue than America in Afghanistan. The primary infection is in Pakistan, and its toxic relations with India, China, and Wahabi Arabia. Follow the money, and the nuclear sales.
Exum on C-SPAN/Washington Journal
Exum's segment starts at 30 minutes, runs a half hour.
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/Media/2009/08/11/WJE/R/22018/Tuesday+August+11.aspx
The moderator primed Exum with a recent clip from fired CIA bin Laden hunter Michael Schreuer, who is pessimistic that we're not trying to win this war. I don't know how you mention Schreuer without noting that most place bin Laden in Pakistan, but they pulled it off.
Exum's one little reference to Pakistan, an oblique admission that unidentified 'elements in Pakistan' see radicals and insurgents as useful for their purposes. No real mention that those elements are integral to the nuclear armed military dominated IRP gov't.
Safe haven is the prime feature that offers success to an insurgency.
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
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