I appreciate all your reporting on the talks you attend but how should the US respond to the allegations of fraud coming out of the Hamid Karzai camp in Afghanistan? What should the public diplomacy message be regarding an ally who cheats his way to the top? Is there a precedent in the Middle East where the US came out against a cheating ally in an election? Should the US call for a recount or for a complete new set of elections? Or is the exit to call for a two man race between Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah? How will such a US stance affect the protestors in Iran? Will the Iranians dissidents who believe they were robbed of their votes be watching what the US does vis-a-vis Karzai? Will Ahmadinejad point to Afghanistan and accuse the US of double standards?
It strikes me that the US stand on Afghan elections will have big reprecussions around the Middle East as to the democracy agenda that Obama has committed himself to. Should President Obama link further troop increases to political reform in Afghanistan? Can you come up with a list of benchmarks for political reform? Should they include a recount or a re-vote? How do you assess the language specific media arms of the US public diplomacy that are directed to Afghanistan? How are they covering the fraud allegations?

Marc,

Thanks for posting that link to Walter's op ed in the LA Times. I missed that when it originally came out. Walter and others like her have not only influenced Pollack, but other American think tank writers like Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, almost all of which want U.S. troops to stay long-term in Iraq to ensure the peace.

Reading through Walter's op ed however, there are a few problems in her argument. She says there's two issues Iraq faces. 1 is the conflict trap where the civil war has only increased the problems in the country and there is no clear victor or enforceable peace settlement. This is partly true in Iraq, but not completely. I think the Shiites did have a decisive victory in Iraq. Not only that but most of the Sunnis gave up and switched sides, because they got sick of Al Qaeda in Iraq trying to take over. The part that is true is that there is no real peace agreement.

Walter continues that in these uncertain situations, the losing side usually refits during the peace and then goes back to fighting. There's no sign of the Anbar Awakening or Sons of Iraq doing that. Especially in Anbar where all the leading Sheiks are trying to turn into politicians and join with larger parties to run in the 2010 elections. Some have joined, or want to join with larger Shiite parties.

The 2nd problem Walter writes about is called the settlement problem, which is unless there is an outside peace keeping force to maintain the peace, civil wars return. She writes that after the 1st civil war is over the victors usually exploit the losers causing resentment so they eventually return to the fight. This is definitely true of Maliki's stance towards the Sons of Iraq with his arrest and intimidation. However, it's not true of the Awakening, which Maliki and the other Shiite parties have always seen as legitimate since it was Iraqis, not Americans, who created it. There is definitely the chance that some of the Sons of Iraq will go back to the fight, but as of now they seem intent on trying to get jobs or leaving the SOI to go find work on their own. They are also at an extreme disadvantage since all of their biographic information is now in the hands of the government.

Two other problems with this part of Walter's argument is that she says that Iraq has a power sharing agreement and that the Kurds were part of the civil war. There is a power sharing, ethnosectarian quota system within Iraq's government but that came about in 2005 after the U.S. handed over sovereignty, and not the result of the end of the civil war. Maliki is the one that is trying to get rid of this system, and he is threatening the other major Sunni, Shiite, Kurdish parties, but not any of the Sunnis who were in the fight like the Awakening or Sons of Iraq. Also, the Kurds were not really involved in the sectarian war per se. Their conflict with Baghdad was and is a completely different issue that has really only come to the fore because the civil war ended, and Maliki now has more power.

Walter finishes by saying that U.S. troops need to stay another 5-10 years to be peacekeepers. She says this will ensure the Sunnis and Kurds that the Shiites won't take full power, and lets Maliki know he can't do whatever he wants. This would partially be true. The Kurds and Sunni Accordance Front do want the US to stay to be a damper on Maliki's actions.

Walter goes on to say that if U.S. forces pull out by the 2011 deadline, the Shiites will push for total control, reigniting the civil war which they will win, and an authoritarian state will emerge. The problem with this is that the Shiites are not a unitary group. In fact, they are divided between Maliki and his opponents, and other internal conflicts as well such as the Sadrists vs the Supreme Council. There is then no unified Shiite group that would push for total power in Iraq. There are definitely those that are afraid of Maliki becoming a strongman, but that would be for his own personal gain, not for the Shiites in general. The fact that there's a 50-50 chance that Maliki won't even get re-elected prime minister after the 2010 elections shows some of the problems with that argument as well.

Overall, I think the major issue with Walter's piece is that she doesn't know the specifics of Iraq's current situation.

Military history teaches, that the Roman Empire founded much harder to conquer tribal societies than states. For instance it took the Romans over 200 years to conquer the Iberian tribes, while in the same period, they managed to conquer all the Eastern Mediterranean Knigdoms and sophisticated City-States. According to traditional theory, in a centralised state, once the ruling class is defeated or eliminated, it is possible to use the institutions of the state, to control the rest of society. The US in Iraq, deconstructed the artificially glued Iraqi society, and opted for the hard way; that of dealing with tribes; albeit some in Armani suits. The best solution is for the Washington administration, to create a "balance of intimidation in Iraq". Meaning, to get the Sunni neighbours of the country, to exert freely their, financial and political influence in Iraq, in order to counter-balance that of Iran, and to get Turkey to keep a check on Kurdish ambitions. Seems like a shotgun marriage?, probably yes, unless divorce is on the agenda.

I was also at that panel, and I remember you asking a similar question to the one I had.

I think there are at least two logical problems with Walter's comments. They are problems with the use of generalizations as a basis for policy advice anyway, at least the way it's usually done. The standard pattern is to make the advice one-to-one with the generalization.

The first problem with this approach is that it commits a kind of ecological fallacy: it assumes that a generalization indicates the relationship in a particular case. More mildly, it takes some probabilistic statement and applies it to a particular instance. Now, following the odds is a great way to play poker, but that's because you play enough hands to get somewhere resembling an asymptote. If, on the other hand, all you care about is what to do about Iraq, you have a single instance to work with, at incredibly high stakes.

Moreover, playing poker this way beats many alternatives because you don't have a lot of information. In Iraq we may have the reverse problem--overwhelming amounts of information that it is difficult to make sense of. What Walter proposes is that we act as though all we needed to know is this: (1) Iraq has a civil war; (2) by assumption, the relevant actors are Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, considered as monoliths. That is all the info required to apply commitment-problem theory and let it spit out a prediction and a prescription at a macro level. But it doesn't come close to the information that we have available.

Of course, we have to simplify complex reality. But there are many ways of doing so. I find Walter's way problematic, and this is my second major difficulty. Walter approaches the Iraq war in the only way that she can to allow commitment-problem theory to create a prescription at the macro level. I think this helps her theory more than it captures Iraq. It therefore is in service of the wrong thing: theory, not policy advice. It distorts Iraq in a particular way in order to even talk about it. I know that you have to distort Iraq to apply theory to it. And I think there is some value in the way Walter does it, in that fear-of-Shiite-rule is, as she suggests, a politically relevant discourse. The difficulty is in thinking that this is the only way of distorting Iraq. It is one way, not the only way. What is missing is an empirically-grounded understanding of the theory's limitations. Claims about the identities of relevant actors are empirically verifiable as well as serving as assumptions for some further theory. If Kalyvas' approach captures other aspects of reality that Walter misses—and I think it does—then there is correspondingly a warrant for his theoretical approach.

Where generalizing political scientists can help a great deal, I think, is in saying: here is something you may not have thought about, and how it may matter—so please think about it. It's up to you to respond to it—you're the expert on making policy. Thus I think Walter does a great service when she says, don't expect a peace agreement or a constitution to make Iraq work. Make provision for the need for force.

I do think that these posts are useful, but it would have been nice to have a link or two to sources for study on civil wars.

It has become a common practice, for Prime Minister Maliki and his spokesperson, to accuse everyone for the atrocities committed in Iraq, except the fact that, neither himself nor his government are capable of governing Iraq or exerting even a semblence of control. It was his decision to remove the protective barriers from the streets of Baghdad 48 hours prior to the recent atrocities, and it was the complicity of his security forces which made it possible for those atrocities to be committed; in the words of his Foreign Minister Mr. Zibari. Mr. Maliki does have good relations with his Shiite brethren in Iran, but with the Sunni Jordanian neighbour Jordan, relations can be at best defined, in terms of "cordial suspicion"; cordial from the Jordanian side, while suspicious from the Iraqi. With the Sunni Saudi Arabian neighbour, relations are outrightly hostile, and the same goes for relations with secular Syria. With Sunni Kuwait, problems from the Saddam invasion of Kuwait still linger on seriously, while relations with the secular neighbour Turkey; are businesslike until of course, the future developments in Iraq-Kurdistan unfold in general, and the fate of Kerkuk is determined in particular. The truth of the matter, is that the longer Mr. maliki continues to be a Prime Minister in Iraq, the longer Iraq's problems will continue to haunt the Iraqis and their neighbours.

Khairi Janbek

One still believes that, Dr. Eyyad Allawi is the best option as a prime minister for Iraq. Though a Shi'ite himself, his secular and non-sectarian views may well prove in the future, to be inclusive of all sectors of Iraqi society in the re-building of Iraq, rather than as the case now, to the exclusion of some sectors of Iraqi society. Also, he is very well known to hold the view, that the Sunni neighbours of Iraq, should be more actively involved in trying to re-dress the balance of Iranian influence, and more involved in bringing peace and security to the country.

Khairi Janbek

Allawi only got 4.6% of the vote in the 2009 elections.

No Iraqi politician or alliance is going to get a majority in the 2010 vote. The way parties are currently aligned, no one is even going to get a plurality.

One can only speculate, basing one's humble opinion on the premis that, someone with the qualities of Dr. Allawi; ie. a Shi'ite with a secular outlook stands a far better chance of healing the wounds of the Iraqi people, much more than the odd assortement of current sectarian Iraqi politicians more interested in dividing their own society and bleeding the wounds of their own people. As far as one can see, primarily Iraqis from the same religion and origin hate each other, as much as they hate Iraqis from other religions and origins. Jordan and Saudi Arabia have never been supporters of terror and terrorism, but to the contrary, they have been both victims of terror and terrorism, specifically Zarqawi terrorism in Jordan; with the bombings of the three hotels in Amman a few years ago. Zarqawi was a terrorist wanted by the Jordanian authorities. I don't know about the loves and hates of the Iraqi peoples' regional preferences, but Jordan; a country with meagre resources and a population of just over 6 million, hosts currently between 500,000 to 750,000 Iraqis from various religions and origins; not to mention the ones emigrating to third countries from Jordanian territory. Ultimately, a stable Iraq which is not under the influence of Tehran, is in the best interest of Jordan, Saudi Arabia as well as the whole neighbourhood. Not only that Iraq is a major exporter of oil to Jordan, and its main trading partner, but also its natural geostrategic depth. While for saudi Arabia, an Iraq under the influence of Tehran, will constitute in the immediate future, a major threat for the oill rich Saudi eastern provinces with a sizeable Shi'ite minority. However, in the final analysis, if the Iraqi people are hell-bent on destroying each other, by electing sectarian politicians whom will inevitably filfill this desire, then not Jordan neither Saudi Arabia, nor the USA to the effect, can do much in terms of an electoral process.

Khairi Janbek.Paris/France

One, is actually the same person your good self is refering to, though as a minor corection Sir/Madam, my former boss was actually HRH Prince el Hassan bin Talal, and I did have the pleasure also of working few times with Prince Rashid during my service. The relationship between Price Hassan and Dr. Chalabi, personal friendship, goes back to the days when the latter was living in Jordan in exile away from the Ba'ath regime in Iraq. Prince el-Hassan never actually made any remarks; neither in public nor in private about preferences regarding Iraqi politicians.

"Jordan and Saudi Arabia have never been supporters of terror and terrorism"

Just to confine this to Iraq, but the Saudis were one of the largest supporters of the Iraqi insurgency.

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2009/04/saudi-role-in-iraqi-insurgency.html

There is an enormous difference between, accusing a country of terrorism supported by the state, and accusing it of not doing enough, or not having the required ability of stemming the flow of extremists and the funneling of funds to them. Saudi Arabia remains a very close ally of the USA, and the US Government does discern very well between all those differences.

Khairi Janbek/Paris.France

I am not aware of HRH Prince el-Hassan ever expressing views on the politics of Dr. Chalabi, and I don't think he has ever met Dr. Allawi. But if I can hazard a guess from past experience, I would say that His Royal Highness would favour any Iraqi political personality, with an inclusive vision concerning all sectors of Iraqi society's participation in the political process of their own country.

One's information is limited to around the year 2005-2006, but Basra seems to have undergone a systematic "Iranisation" process. There are Iranian Revolutionary Guards in the Governorate, Iranian political structures firmly established, and even some Iraqis claim that, Persian is the first language in the city of Basra rather than Arabic. I wonder what the Baghdad government can do about it, let alone Saudi Arabia.

Khairi Janbek.Paris/France

One feels obliged to clarify a few points with your good self Mr./Ms. JWing. 1) I did state bluntly that my informed knowledge about Basra is limited to 2005-2006. Prime Minister Maliki's "Sawlat al Fursan" operation in Basra took place in 2008, which is a good 2 years after my informed knowledge. The sketchy information which I have on the Iraqi government's operations in Basra (Terrorism Focus; Vol.5, No.14) is that, Iran's policy of habitually "Running with the hare and hunting with hounds" so to speak had supported the comepeting various Shi'a groups in Basra Governorate, and though the military operations of the Iraqi Aramy took the militias out of the streets, it neither diminished the Iranian political structures in the area, nor influenced the linguistic matter. If Iran's influence is apparent on the whole of geographical Iraq, doesn't it seem obvious that it would be more so in an area strategically important and oil rich right on it's border?. 2) My information was not, and is not based on Sunni fears or euphorias, rather on international journalists accounts inter alia. 3) Ironically, the same terrorists whom your good self is quoting, have also said; (transcripts exist), that they had receieved financial support from Iran, and at times also, from Syria. Not to mention the fact that, the sophisticated weaponry used in their acts of terror, have been almost exclusively found to be of Iranian origin. 4) I really find it strange that, the US government is still in a close alliance with a country like Saudi Arabia, when supposedly as your good self seem to say, it is conducting a proxy war against US aims and objectives in Iraq. Unless the US is in complicity with Saudi Arabia against its own interests and objectives in Iraq, then I find this argument a little surreal if you forgive me.

Khairi Janbek.Paris/France

mr. Janbeck, but your sentence is in the present tense. Is Persian (more accurate to call it Farsi) really the first language of Basra? Do you mean that official provincial correspondence is conducted in Farsi? That in less than five years the entire population of Basra, numbering several million I think have learnt enough Farsi to conduct their affairs in the language, or did they always speak Farso and hid it? This is an astonishing revelation and I would like to hear more evidence for it because if it is true then we are merely months away from the annexation of Basra by Iran which would change the energy balances of the world making Iran the world's largest oil depositry. You have revealed something fascinating that could change the world forever so please share the rest of your inside knoweledge on the topic.

I did not say that Presian (Farisi) is an official language in Basra, though its usage in the city and in the Governorate on the streets, has surpassed Arabic (Arabic and Kurdish being the official languages of Iraq). This fact is no more a reason to have Basra being annexed by Iran, than the fact that many of the leadership of "al Dawa Party" and the "Council for the Revolution", are of Persian origin and Persian (Farisi) speakers; even the revered and much respected Ayattullah Sistani; as the name indicates, is not a reason for the Shi'a of Iran to follow Qom. What one is saying, is neither a revelation; as it has already been revealed by many observers, and ceratinly not an insider knowledge; especially that one is actually a distant outsider. However, having an insider knowledge would indicate that one has an official position of sorts; and one has neither an official nor unofficial position, which would have meant that, I couldn't devulge insider knowledge.

I've never read anything that said that Basrans speak Farsi more than Arabic and again would say this is based upon fears of Sunni Arab countries' of Iranian influence in Iraq than actual reporting.

Also I think you're getting the Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias mixed up when you say they've gotten most of their equipment from Iran.

Lastly, why wouldn't the U.S. call out the Saudis? They actually have in top level meetings with Saudi officials in Aug. 2008 & Aug. 2007.

This from the NY Times

July 27, 2007
Saudis’ Role in Iraq Frustrates U.S. Officials
By HELENE COOPER

WASHINGTON, July 26 — During a high-level meeting in Riyadh in January, Saudi officials confronted a top American envoy with documents that seemed to suggest that Iraq’s prime minister could not be trusted.

One purported to be an early alert from the prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, to the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr warning him to lie low during the coming American troop increase, which was aimed in part at Mr. Sadr’s militia. Another document purported to offer proof that Mr. Maliki was an agent of Iran.

The American envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, immediately protested to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, contending that the documents were forged. But, said administration officials who provided an account of the exchange, the Saudis remained skeptical, adding to the deep rift between America’s most powerful Sunni Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, and its Shiite-run neighbor, Iraq.

Now, Bush administration officials are voicing increasing anger at what they say has been Saudi Arabia’s counterproductive role in the Iraq war. They say that beyond regarding Mr. Maliki as an Iranian agent, the Saudis have offered financial support to Sunni groups in Iraq. Of an estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters who enter Iraq each month, American military and intelligence officials say that nearly half are coming from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudis have not done enough to stem the flow.

One senior administration official says he has seen evidence that Saudi Arabia is providing financial support to opponents of Mr. Maliki. He declined to say whether that support was going to Sunni insurgents because, he said, “That would get into disagreements over who is an insurgent and who is not.”

Senior Bush administration officials said the American concerns would be raised next week when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates make a rare joint visit to Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

Officials in Washington have long resisted blaming Saudi Arabia for the chaos and sectarian strife in Iraq, choosing instead to pin blame on Iran and Syria. Even now, military officials rarely talk publicly about the role of Saudi fighters among the insurgents in Iraq.

The accounts of American concerns came from interviews with several senior administration officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they believed that openly criticizing Saudi Arabia would further alienate the Saudi royal family at a time when the United States is still trying to enlist Saudi support for Mr. Maliki and the Iraqi government, and for other American foreign policy goals in the Middle East, including an Arab-Israeli peace plan.

In agreeing to interviews in advance of the joint trip to Saudi Arabia, the officials were nevertheless clearly intent on sending a pointed signal to a top American ally. They expressed deep frustration that more private American appeals to the Saudis had failed to produce a change in course.

The American officials said they had no doubt that the documents shown to Mr. Khalilzad were forgeries, though the Saudis said they had obtained them from sources in Iraq. “Maliki wouldn’t be stupid enough to put that on a piece of paper,” one senior Bush administration official said. He said Mr. Maliki later assured American officials that the documents were forgeries.

The Bush administration’s frustration with the Saudi government has increased in recent months because it appears that Saudi Arabia has stepped up efforts to undermine the Maliki government and to pursue a different course in Iraq from what the administration has charted. Saudi Arabia has also stymied a number of other American foreign policy initiatives, including a hoped-for Saudi embrace of Israel.

Of course, the Saudi government has hardly masked its intention to prop up Sunni groups in Iraq and has for the past two years explicitly told senior Bush administration officials of the need to counterbalance the influence Iran has there. Last fall, King Abdullah warned Vice President Dick Cheney that Saudi Arabia might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulled its troops out of Iraq, American and Arab diplomats said.

Several officials interviewed for this article said they believed that Saudi Arabia’s direct support to Sunni tribesmen increased this year as the Saudis lost faith in the Maliki government and felt they must bolster Sunni groups in the eventuality of a widespread civil war.

Saudi Arabia months ago made a pitch to enlist other Persian Gulf countries to take a direct role in supporting Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, said one former American ambassador with close ties to officials in the Middle East. The former ambassador, Edward W. Gnehm, who has served in Kuwait and Jordan, said that during a recent trip to the region he was told that Saudi Arabia had pressed other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council — which includes Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman — to give financial support to Sunnis in Iraq. The Saudis made this effort last December, Mr. Gnehm said.

The closest the administration has come to public criticism was an Op-Ed page article about Iraq in The New York Times last week by Mr. Khalilzad, now the United States ambassador to the United Nations. “Several of Iraq’s neighbors — not only Syria and Iran but also some friends of the United States — are pursuing destabilizing policies,” Mr. Khalilzad wrote. Administration officials said Mr. Khalilzad was referring specifically to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

My reference is to Sunni terrorists' claims in various transcripts about recieving money from Iran, and most of the weaponry caught by the US troops in Sunni terrorists hands are of Iranian make. I am extremely and highly unlikely to confuse Shi'a and Sunnis, moreover, terrorists of both brands. Undoubtedly, saudi Arabia is concerned about the spread of Shi'ism something I said before; especially due to the presence of a large Sh'a minority in its eastern province. When Riyad supports Sunni tribes, it merely redresses the balance of Iranian influence in Iraq, and the Sunni tribes can hardly be construed as terrorists. Also, I did point out clearly, that there is an enormous difference between not doing enough about terrorists infiltration, and actually state supporting terrorism, which Saudi Arabia does not. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the USA is that of an alliance, but that doesn't translate into agreeing with what it sees, as a US foreign policy shortcoming in Iraq. Something which will be hopefully ratified by the current President Obama administration. Finally what your good self reads or doesn't is really your prerogative.

Khairi janbek.paris/france

Sorry Ms./Mr. walking wounded, for I have just seen your good self's message. One is really not looking at the situation from a religious or denominational angle because I don't think in terms of angels and demons, but rather from a purely political dimension. The position of Jordan is somewhat different to that of either Saudi Arabia or Syria. Iraq, for Jordan represents an important economic partner, and even more importantly, a strategic depth. Therefore for Jordan stability in Iraq is essential. For Saudi Arabia, there are serious legitimate concerns regarding the situation in Iraq. There is a sizeable Shi'ite minority in the oil-rich eastern regions of the country. And any potential domination of Iraq by Iran; playing the Shi'a card, constitutes an existential threat to Saudi Arabia. For Syria, the aim remains, to become the major player in the Middle East, therefore, conducting a war of proxies against the USA, and Saudi Arabia in Iraq, and in alliance with Iran fits in well with the image it is trying to promote. As for the Iraqi refugees, in fairness to both Jordan and Syria, they tend to be from all sectors of the religious and ethnic spectrum of Iraq. One remembers from some time ago, that both, the UNHCR and the Iraqi authorities, have requested repeatedly from both governments of Jordan and Syria, not to repatriate the Iraqi refugees before better times in Iraq, facilitate such a repatriation.

khairi janbek.paris/france

Mr Janbek, thank you for the reply.

I'm still struggling with Syria - Iraq, how Assad's gov't relates to Iraq's new Shiite gov't and Iranian alliances. The US press and recent statements by Maliki's gov't puts the surviving Baathist insurgent command in Syria. Syria's minority Shiite oligarchy would seem to gain strategic depth from a Shiite dominance in Iraq, and easier access to Iranian support for their project of dominating Lebanon, and their desire of regaining the Golan. However Arabia-Iran fighting a proxy war in Anbar would seem destabilizing to Syria.

I'm also trying to understand what 'strategic depth in Iraq' means to the Kingdom of Jordan. Is this primarily economic, or is Jordan looking to keep Iranian influence far away from its borders?

Vis Jordan's relations with Isreal, Saddam's regime seemed to put Jordan in the middle of conflict, thru support for Palestinian martyrs, and the Scud attacks that threatened to pull Israeli reprisals across Jordan's airspace.

I have just heard from 3 Iraqis who actually live in Basra and they too say that your claim that Farsi is the dominant language there is false.

As your good self may realise Mr./Ms/ Walking Wounded, issues in the Middle East, like many other places, tend to be inter-linked. Of course in this context, the ultimate prize for Syria is the return of the Golan Heights and peace with Israel. However, Syria realises that the USA will not pay for what it can get for free from Syria's compliant attitude to Washington's demands, therefore, it is trying to attract the attention of the USA where it hurts most; ie in Iraq. For the regime in Syria, the return of the Golan Heights and a major powerful role in the region are very important for President Assad's regime staying power. Syria is in the strong strategic position of being a link, between the pro-Iranian Shi'a groups in Iraq and Hizbullah in Lebanon, as well as Hamas in Gaza. It has managed to place itself also at a half-way distance between Turkey and Iran. So the message to Washington is that, nothing can be achieved in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, or even in playing a role of mediation between Iran and the USA, without having the Americans to come to the talking table with Syria; and on Syria's terms. Though President Assad is the descendant of the ancient religious Alawite Sect (Branche of Shi'i Islam, but differs with the mainstream over the question of the Imamate)the regime is secular and moreover very pragmatic. Its pragmatism; and I am not digressing here I hope, is shown by its willingness to drop two out of three of the Ba'ath slogans, and its willingness to drop the third when the time is right. It has dropped socialism for the privatisation policies in its economy, and dropped Arab unity for an alliance with Iran and a strategic alliance with Turkey, and waits to drop the third slogan of freedom, once it has peace with Israel. But the question of peace cannot be achieved if the regime is to have any reason to monopolise power in Syria after having shed all its principles, without a major role in the affairs of the Middle East, and the important Amercian backing and blessing. It continues to conduct a proxy war against the USA, as well as against Saudia, with any available means, because the fate of the Iraqi leader is totally unimportant for Syria, since he is in any case neither well-disposed towards Damascus or Iran, and as an added bonus, he seems to be an American favourite. So long as Syria can cause troubles for both the US and Saudia in Iraq, and to Egypt in Palestine through Hamas it will continue to do so as part of its greater startegy explained above. Of course, this does not come with a policy of guaranteed success, but so long as it's policies seem successful, why should it stop pursuing them?. Since Damascus has nothing in common politically with either Hamas or Hizbullah, it is not expected to have anything in common with any terroristic or otherwise groups it hosts on its territories. If those groups serve the interests of its foreign policy then fine, if not, it seems to think that it has the power of reserving the right to continue supporting those groups. For Jordan, the situation is different. Iraq is a major economic and trade partner, and is an important strategic depth to Jordan, bacause simply, Jordan feels that if the terror and instability continue to be the norm in Iraqi affairs, then in the long run, that might have negative effect on the security and stability of Jordan. I hope, this is helpfull in minefield of the
"Muddle" East.

khairi janbek.paris/france

I suppose Mr./Ms. JWing, we are encolsed in an amicable circle of claims and counter-claims.

khairi janbek.paris/france.

a