Sunday, September 13, 2009 - 1:13 PM
Rumors of movement on the Israeli-Palestinian front have been trickling out of late. A deal for the release of Gilad Shalit seems to be close (for about the seventieth time), especially after the visit of Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal to Cairo to meet with Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. George Mitchell is reportedly close to a deal with Israel on a settlement freeze after all those frustrating months. Salam Fayyad has released a blueprint for achieving a Palestinian state through institution building within two years. Palestinian and European sources have been talking up an alleged American plan for peace talks. It is widely reported that President Obama plans to sit down with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian President Abbas during the United Nations meeting in New York this month. And now Haaretz reports that Benjamin Netanyahu is promising a Palestinian state in the West Bank within two years to begin with talks on defining borders.
All of this suggests that the long-promised push for resuming Israeli-Palestinian peace talks may finally be getting underway. I hope so -- the battle over the settlements may have been necessary and appropriate, but should have been concluded months ago. Not all the pieces are in place, but they may be as positioned as they are going to get. No Hamas-Fatah deal appears to be on the horizon, but if the Shalit deal goes through there may be enough in it for Hamas (especially with regard to the blockade of Gaza and release of Hamas prisoners) to convince them to sit back for the moment and let the negotiations proceed. Netanyahu's coalition isn't going to get any solider, and there have been some noises at least about attempting to rebuild the Israeli peace camp. There have been reports that the U.S. has secured some commitments from Arab states to offer concessions on normalization with Israel, which I'll believe when I see but which may be in the appropriate pockets to play when helpful. So let's go.
How might the talks proceed? According to Haaretz, the talks will focus on first defining the borders of the West Bank and Israel. There's a good argument to be made for the "borders first" approach. If an agreement could be reached on the borders, then many of the battles over the settlements would be rendered moot. Defining the borders would also allow for the evolution of Palestinian state institutions and the removal of the many obstacles to Palestinian economic and social normality -- the checkpoints, roadblocks, and road networks which make up the "matrix of occupation." It might also then allow the discussions over refugee return to take place in a more favorable environment.
That's the favorable case. The weaknesses of "borders first" are equally apparent. By ignoring the most sensitive, core issues -- the Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem -- it could lead to widespread disenchantment with the negotiating process. If coupled with demands on the Arab states for reciprocal concessions (as expected), it could lead to their most valuable cards being given away before the core issues are addressed. Defining the borders on paper may bear little relation to reality on the ground. And the whole enterprise would remain hostage to the ability of spoilers to use violence at any moment -- while the pressures on the Palestinian side to try to prevent that could lead to an over-emphasis on security institutions and the neglect of rule of law and institutional development.
The most immediate issue raised by 'borders first' is whether it will deal with the Greater Jerusalem border. The issue here is not the Old City, the central focus of so much emotion and identity. It is the large central area of the West Bank, an area far beyond the old municipal boundaries of the city which extends deep into the central West Bank. Israel has developed huge settlements and a massive infrastructure which now almost surrounds East Jerusalem and which all but prevents any meaningful connection between the north and the south, and between the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Will the negotiated border between the West Bank and Israel deal with the Jerusalem area? If the negotiated borders ratify the Israeli settlements and infrastructure as currently configured and proposed (including the controversial E-1 area), then the supposed Palestinian state would be essentially non-viable. It's hard to imagine a government led by Netanyahu agreeing to remove existing settlements around the Greater Jerusalem area. But no Palestinian leader is likely to be able to sell a deal which ignores or ratifies the Greater Jerusalem settlement areas to his people, even if pressured to accept. If the negotiated borders ignore or defer the Jerusalem area - an idea I've heard in circulation -- then the outcome would be meaningless and counter-productive. So.... whose move?
The second major issue is Gaza. The approach for now seems to be to simply ignore Gaza and focus on the West Bank under PA control. That's a major problem, obviously, and one which everyone seems keen to pretend doesn't exist. It does.
Indeed, "borders first" negotiations under current conditions -- especially if Gaza is ignored and the Jersualem area either deferred or ratified -- might well lead not to a two state solution but to what I've heard described as a "five statelet" outcome: Israel, Gaza, Ramallahstan, Nablusstan in the northern West Bank and Hebronstan in the southern West Bank. Does anyone really think that this would be the foundation for an end of conflict agreement?
So if 'borders first' is going to be the approach to negotiations then I sure hope that early attention is paid to the questions of Gaza and Jerusalem. If serious spoiler violence is to be avoided, then Hamas and its constituency are going to have to be engaged. If acceptable borders are going to be drawn, they have to grapple with the realities of the Jerusalem area. And if it is meant to lead to a genuine and lasting end of conflict, then it can't just be about borders -- as Rob Malley has argued the Palestinian refugees need to be brought into the discussion.
It's high time to get these talks started, whether the approach is borders first or something else. But it's also important to get the structure of the talks right so that they aren't trapped by early decisions.
Dear Mr. Lynch, what do you make of Turkish overtures to incorporate Kurdish language and culture? How does this change Turkish relations with Iraqi Kurds? Does it change Turkey's overall role in Iraq, especially with the Arab Sunnis in Mosul? Will Arab Sunnis mistrust Turkey because it is being conciliatory with the Kurds? Should US public diplomacy get involved in encouraging Kurdish rights in Turkey or will that be seen as internal meddling?
Of course one is no Dr. Lynch, and neither has his knowledge nor qualifications, but for what's it worth, one remembers a few years back, that Turkey had started broadcasting in the languages of its minorities; Circassian, Arabic, and Kurdish on its state television. That was actually in order to conform with its applicaion to join the EU. I suspect, that allowing for the teaching in Kurdish at Mardin University; a predominantly Kurdish area in Turkey, is a further step to enhance its application to join the EU, as well as, take the sting out of the rhetoric of the terrorist Kurdish Communist Party (PKK). However, I would imagine that, it is more important for Turkey now, to follow up on the socio-economic development of its Kurdish region, so that all its' efforts do not turn out to be merely cosmetic, mind, I mean this a far cry from the days when even in the late 1980s, the Kurds were called Mountain Turks. As the Kurds are divided between Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey; in addition of course to some of the ex-Soviet republics, it will always remain a sensitive issue for all concerned, when the question of an independent Kurdistan is raised, and not only in Iraq. One is not actually thinking about Mosul, rather, about Kerkuk and its troubles status. As for US Public Diplomacy, I think it should vehemently work for the promotion of human rights in the four corners of the globe.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Excellent candidate to co-author Abu Aardvark?
Dear Mr. Janbek, thank you for the brilliant explanation. Your views are very interesting and fresh and we don't get to hear such a high level of insight and knowledge on the topics of the Middle East. Maybe Dr. Lynch should consider hosting you as a guest blogger or even expand this site by adding you as a co-author on issues such as Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Thank you again and please consider writing fulltime at this blog and I am sure Dr. Lynch will see the usefulness of hiring you.
No borders without Jerusalem border
You cannot say there is a border agreement unless it includes very specific agreements about the border line and other arrangements in Jerusalem... Just as you cannot say there's a border agreement between Syria and Israel unless you're very specific about all the details of its demarcation.
Demarcating and agreeing on borders is the sine qua non step in both cases. How can you talk about security regimes or water agreements etc unless you know exactly where the land border is?
Also, reaching agreement on the final land border deals with both the Jerusalem issue and the settlement-construction issue. The big one that remains is the refugee issue. But if you've already got most of the others falling into place you'd have built a good degree of the (currently quite absent-- on both sides; and not without reason) confidence required to adress it...
(Dream on, Helena, eh? But if they're going to do it, reaching a complete border agreement upfront is the only way to proceed.)
Gaza-Jericho First. Now, Borders First.
One does agree that, the peace negotiations should be started urgently, and one is optimistic that, the settlements issue will be resolved for the time being, perhaps in order to barely, get Mr. Abbas to sit with President Obama and Mr. Netanyahu in New York. When Oslo produced Gaza-Jericho First, the issues of borders, Jeruslam and refugees were defered to a later stage called, the final status negotiations for the creation of a Palestinian state. Now, the final status stage for creating a Palestinian state with borders has been brought forward, but the refugees and Jerusalem are still defered to a later undefined stage. The common denominator here, is defering the thorny issues to later unspecified stages. So, what about those proposed talks for creating a Palestinian state with borders?. 1) Israel will not reliquish its authority over the Jordan Valley borders with Jordan. 2) It will not remove the large settlements like Ariel and Ma'ali Adomim, and will continue building in Har Homa (Jabal abu Ghneim), thus effectively extracting the city of Jerusalem; east and west, from the west bank Arab environment all the way to Bethlehem. 3) Israel will be willing to move the separation wall few meters here and there, but ultimately, the western border of the Palestinian state is where roughly, the separation wall stands. 4) The PNA will re-define its own understanding for what constitutes Jerusalem. Perhaps Abu Dis will be an appropriate seat of government. 5) The Holy Places in the Old City, may still have the status of "Corpus Separatum" under the supervision of the Jordanian Ministry of Religious Endowments, in cooperation with the Palestinian one, in addition to the Israeli Ministry of Religions. I think the borders of the Palestinian state, sandwitched between the Israeli controlled Jordan Valley to the east, and the separation wall to the west, are the borders of the proposed Palestinian state, with or without any negotiations. As for the refugees: 1) Israel cannot accept a demographic bomb in its midst, therefore, will not take back Palestinian refugees, shifting thus the responsibility to the Arab hosting countries of Palestinian refugees. 2) This may also suit Mr. Abbas who has already lost the legitimacy of representing the Palestinians in diaspora in any case, and is expected to shift the responsibility for the Palestinian refugees to the shoulders of the neighbouring Arab leaders. This will not stop him claim any compensation though, for the Palestinian refugees. This issue is likely to create some tense moments between Jordan and Israel, and Jordan and the PNA due to its own delicate demographic balance, as well as tensions between Lebanon and the PNA, due to lebanon's also tense democraphic balance. Now, if you humor me and assume that what one is saying is the most likely scenario, then what is the point for the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations?. Well, the point now is, to fulfill the aims of Mr. Netanyahu for economic peace, and the aims of Mr. Fayyad for building Palestinian institutions. That is certainly not bad per se, because the results may profoundly change the lives of the west bankers to the better, and very possibly the lives of Gazans as well, but so long as, no one deludes himslef/herself into thinking that, economic peace is an alternative to political and real peace. As for Hamas and the PNA, well, does anyone really think that, it is possible for two negations to create a nation?. Unless those two negations, are threatened by the Arab countries with severing all relations, as well as political and economic support, if they do not get together { a possible scenario }, it will be impossible to unite them so that at least, something new may emerge from their unity.
khairi janbek.paris/france
The United Arab Kingdom Plan (UAK) of 1972.
Thank you very much Mr./Ms. Alex Tr. for your kind words. One is familiar with Marck Lynch's work, and I doubt he would be interested in the words of a "has been" more or less economic refugee austracised by his country of origin for unknown reasons to himself at least. I imagine Dr, Lynch would be more interested in fresh well plugged in opinions. I only participate as in the eternal words of Mr. Pickwick " the prerogative of a man with very little to do". Regarding a theme which has been a favourite of mine over the years, and I think is still important today; the United Arab Kingdom Plan of 1972, which emerged as a result of reinforcing the concept of the unity of the two banks of Jordan; which was re-affirmed at the Cairo Arab Leaders' Summit in 1970, late HM King Hussein of Jordan, unveiled on March 15th 1972 his united Arab Kingdom Plan (UAK). Addressing the nation at the time, the late King declared that, the unity of the two banks, which had deep roots; since Jordanians and Palestinians were one people, was the first real step on the road to total Arab unity. The plan was that, after the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied west bank, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would become the United Arab Kingdom; comprising two regions : the region of Palestine; the west bank and any other liberated Palestinian territories whose inhabitants chose to join, with east Jerusalem as its capital, and, the region of Jordan; the east bank with Amman its capital. Furthermore, Amman would be the administrative capital of both regions, the King would be the head of state, there would be a local government and a local parliament for each region, as well as a federal government and a federal parliament. There would be one supreme court and one army. The late King also added, that this is his preference, but at the same time, he intends for the Palestinians after liberation, to have the opportunity to determine their own future , and promised to respect their choice. The reaction in the Arab world was furious. late President Sadat's Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Jordan, and in order not to be upstaged, late President Assad's (the father) Syria followed suit. Then in 1974 Rabat Arab leaders' Summit, the Arab states supported the PLO's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people, as late Mr. Arafat was not prepared to accept Israel's withdrawal from the west bank in favour of Jordan fearing, that would prevent him from achieving his goal of the creation of an independent state under his leadership. The Arab countries for their own reasons, were content to dump the Palestinian problem on the shoulders of the PLO. Consequently, the Rabat Summit of 1974, 1) forced Jordan to withdraw its direct involvement in the oeace process, at a time when the attention of the whole world; including the USA, were focussed on settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. 2) the essence of the problem got totally confused, for instead of concentrating on the basic problem of Israel's occupation of Arab territories, the issues of Palestinian national rights, and the creation of an independent Palestinian state took the stage. Jordan at the time, has tried to separate the issue of Israeli withdrawal, from the issue of the national rights of the Palestinians. It aimed at ending the occupation of all Arab territories, establish peace, and then address the question of Palestinian rights within the context of inter-Arab relations. 3) late President sadat, and Dr, Kissinger exploited the PLO's position and the Asrab support for it, and manipulated events in order to enable Egypt to sign a separate peace with Israel. 4) One would say that, the Jordanian position at the time, regarding a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, confirmed by the current events, to have been the best hope for a lasting peace in the Middle East. Though plenty of water has passed under the bridge since those times, one often reflects in the belief, that UAK plan is applicable even now.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Dr. Lynch needs to find you a job pronto
Dear Mr. Janbeck, I am very concerned to hear that your expertise is not appreciated as it should be in Jordan. Intellectuals are the national treasure of any society. I hope Dr. Lynch will move mountains to find you an outlet at a US think tank or university because in the US we are lacking for such expertise. If language is the obstacle then a little editing will improve it. We need to hear the point of view of a native. As you know Middle Eastern studies are very backwards in America and it needs new blood to sustain it.
Looks like same old song and dance to me (a la Barak/Arafat at Camp David). Israel makes a few encouraging noises and the stakeholders are summoned to meet at which time Israel takes back all promises and offers a cheesy deal that, if accepted, would get any Palestinian leader lynched. At least Hamas was wised up to this.
I wouldn't necessarily call getting most of the West Bank as a contiguous state a "cheesy deal", but I agree with your opinion that it would get any Palestinian leader lynched, for a number of reasons (particularly that it would involve giving the Palestinians what they already have, and leave them defenseless before Israel).
To be honest, I'm just extremely cynical at this point about so-called "noises" of reconciliation and the "wheels in motion" talks with regards to the Israel-Palestine problem. There's been three major efforts over the past two decades, all three of which had the same sort of dialogue leading up to them - and all three deals failed or fell apart. I'll believe this time will be different when I actually see the borders inked on map between the two.
Thesaurus Definition for Mr. Netanyahu's terms.
One is truly flattered Mr./Ms. Alex thank you very much. Indeed there is a song and dance in the case of Mr. Netanyahu, the only difference with the past Israeli songs and dances though, is his attempts to find the right words for a bad musical score, and the proper choreography for a bad dance. To explain that, I humbly believe that, we have to look up the thesaurus to understand Mr. Netanyahu's defintions which are not meant to offend either the Arabs or the international community. For instance, his willingness to freeze the building of settlements excluding the 3000 odd housing units already underway, and excluding Jerusalem, translate into Thesaurus definition : Jerusalem will be isolated from its Arab surroundings totally, and the Israelification of the city will continue. Its future is non-negotiable. His proposal to freeze the building of settlements for a period of 9 months-one year in order to give a chance for the peace negotiations to start; thesaurus definition : He expects that after this period, anything newly built, will be in any case on Israeli territory. Then of course, the Jewish Character of Israel, after all, Arab countris call themselves Arab. Thesaurus definition : Simply, any Jewish person can come amd live in Israel, but no right of return for the Palestinian refugees. What is Mr. Netanyahu offering in return?. The recognition of a Palestinian state, living side by side with Israel, in economic peace. Thesaurus definition : A Bantustan without Jerusalem, turned into a pool of cheap labour in the service of the Israeli economy and totally dependent on it. However, having said all that, I wish to say that, Mr. Abbas should make a cameo appearnce with President Obama and Mr. Netanyahu in New York, because it makes good politics first of all, and because secondly President Obama's peace efforts should not be thwarted.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Perhaps some compromise can be reached ultimately; if only to make Mr. Mitchell's long trip to the Middle East at his age seem worthwhile. I suppose a settlements freeze for one year may save both, Abu Mazen and Mr. Netanyahu the lynching. Come to think about it, if the whole international community; including the USA are behind Mr. Abbas over the issue of the settlements, and Mr. Netanyahu is not budging, then shouldn't there really be; at least, threats of some international measures to be taken against Israel?. If this is unlikely, then isn't it high time that some more creative solutions should be sought in order to solve this ongoing problem?. I mean looking at the situation as it stands now, why should Mr. Netanyahu make any concessions really?. For him [Mr. Netanyahu] if Mr. Abbas talks, its fine because what is on offer in any case, is a pool of cheap labour bantustan, totally dependent, and in the service of the Israeli economy to call a Palestinian state, But if Abu Mazen doesn't talk, it is very clear that the PNA will be still talking to the Israeli government about economic issues, at least to improve the lot of the westbankers and possibly the Gazans. This is what Mr. Netanyahu calls in the first place; economic peace. Therefore, whether Mr. Abbas talks or he doesn't, for Mr. Netanyahu it is a win-win scenario. Will the US pressure manage ultimately to alter this scenario?. Doesn't seem to be apparent.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Not just a matter of rhetorical florish on my part, but unless President Obama comes down like a ton of bricks on Mr. Netanyahu; declaring openly the manner in which the USA expects the process of the creation of a Palestinian state evolves, within a time-span accompanied with threats and ultimatums to Israel, otherwise if not, whether Mr. Abbas sits with President Obama and Mr. Netanyahu in New York,or not, is really irrelevant, because in this short period Mr. Abbas would have slipped into irrelevance anyway, reconciling himself to the role of a village elder, issuing work permits for the Palestinians to work in Israel, and sending between now then, one or two of his minions to Israel to talk about economic difficulties as the occasion arises. So wll Mr. netanyahu come down like a ton of bricks on Mr. Netanyahu?, and even if he does, will he carry Congress with him?. What can the Arab world do?. Funny really, but do what?. It was the Arab leaders which were happy to dump the Palestinian problem on the shoulders of the "then" Palestinian leadership, in the midst of claps and cheers by the Palestinians in Rabat 1974, and against the wishes of Jordan then.
khairi janbek.paris/france
21 Sept 2009 via Le Monde
L’échec de l’émissaire américain George Mitchell sur la colonisation (il est reparti le 18 septembre d’Israël sans avoir pu conclure d’accord avec les Israéliens)...
Mr. Abbas is irrelevant; the countdown?.
Under the current circumstances, the failure of Mr. Mitchell's missions will only strengthen the hand of Mr. Netanyahu, whom already as I wrote before, is in a win-win situation. I suppose Mr. Netanyahu; without the prospects of peace talks, can proceed in changing the facts on the ground in the occupied territories, knowing at the same time that, Palestinian officials will still have to talk to his government for economic reasons; what he calls economic peace. Unless again, President Obama comes down like a ton of bricks on Mr. Netanyahu with real pressures, I think the clock has started ticking fast, for Mr. Abbas' political irrelevancy. Maybe there is a solution from within the Arab world.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
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