Posted By Marc Lynch
Thursday, October 1, 2009 - 11:04 AM
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I've been hearing two things a lot about the President's choices on Afghanistan strategy: first, that it's time to either "go all in or get out", the second that he is "dithering" in the face of an urgent decision. Both seem to me profoundly unhelpful, driven more by political positioning than by serious analysis. Sending more troops may in fact be the right call -- I'm open-minded on that question -- but the attempts to bull-rush the process are problematic on their face.
"All in or get out" is a typical false choice offered by advocates of any position who support the "all in" option in question, since it's so much easier to argue the risks of "getting out" than it is to argue against intermediate options. And as for the rush, why make such a momentous choice precisely at a moment of total political chaos in Afghanistan and the near complete absence of a legitimate partner on which to build due to the rampant fraud which eviscerated the Afghan election?
This is particularly problematic because, as the President's advisers clearly understand, there is absolutely no reason to think that Gen. McChrystal's current request is really "all in". McChrystal’s review is admirably clear and quite honest that even with such changes, the policy may not succeed.
The overwhelming odds are that if the escalation option is chosen, in a year or two we will be confronting the exact same questions. More troops will once again be needed, a new strategy will once again be demanded, we’ll still be reading about how the Taliban is out-communicating us and about how the corruption of the Karzai government poses a serious challenge. And then the exact same debate will recur… the Kagans will demand more troops, dark mutterings about tensions between the administration and the generals will roil the waters, the Washington Post editorial page will publish debates where everyone is on the same side, the smart think-tankers will agonize over the tough choices but ultimately come down on the side of escalation. Might as well have this debate now, and get it right.
I'm skeptical about the ambitious goals on offer because the odds of it succeeding on those terms are exceedingly low. If the goal is the creation of a functioning, effective, legitimate Afghan state then I would say the prospects are close to zero. Not with 40,000 troops, not with 400,000 troops, not in twelve months and not in twelve years. Afghanistan has gone through nearly thirty years of non-stop war and is as close to a functional anarchy as most anyplace on Earth. I am unmoved by arguments that there was once a decent state fifty or a hundred years ago. Thirty years of continuous war and anarchy are not so easily overcome – with or without the Afghan election fiasco. If the goal is lower than that – local level security, keeping the Taliban on the ropes, etc – then maybe this can be done for a while. More troops would help do it in more places, but I doubt it would add up to the national level.
Which brings me to a serious question: what’s so terrible with muddling through for a while, giving the new tactics a chance to work at the local level while preventing the worst-case scenarios from happening? Why choose between escalation or withdrawal at exactly the time when the political picture is at its least clear? Why not maintain a lousy Afghan government which doesn’t quite fall, keep the Taliban on the ropes without defeating it, cut deals where we can, and try to figture out a strategy to deal with the Pakistan part which all the smart set agrees is the real issue these days? Why not focus on applying the improved COIN tactics with available resources right now instead of focusing on more troops? If the American core objective in Afghanistan is to prevent its re-emergence as an al-Qaeda safe haven, or to prevent the Taliban from taking Kabul, those seem to be manageable at lower troop levels.
Good for the President's team to take the time to have a serious debate about this and not give in to the politically expedient path (in either direction). The readouts on yesterday's big Afghan strategy meeting reflect exactly what you want to see from a President making a tough call. I would urge them to set aside both of these corrosive, misleading notions -- that the choice is between "all in" or "getting out", and that the time for decision ins now. Why is this not the right time to muddle through, avoiding the worst outcomes and changing strategy at the local level where possible, while waiting for the political situation in Afghanistan to clarify? Muddling through might not make for sexy headlines, but it’s probably good enough for what the U.S. needs to accomplish in Afghanistan for now and is closer to the resources actually available.
I have sometimes adopted a bit of the all or nothing rhetoric, although I'm now leaning more towards the withdrawal side.
My big worry is the counter terrorism camp. Specifically, the idea that we can maintain the current or a slightly smaller presence but focus on the enemy rather than the population. I tend to see that as a recipe for disaster and am puzzled why people think that an enemy centric approach hasn't been experimented with already. I think the view is driven by the fact that we have horribly under resourced Afghanistan, but outside of the initial aftermath of the war and Tora Bora I don't think we've horribly neglected a traditional focus on the enemy.
Obviously this isn't what you are saying, I'd be more comfortable with some muddling through so long as we stick to COIN. My worry though is that the levels of popular support are dropping in both Afghanistan and the U.S. which will ultimately end muddling on unfavorable terms. Starting out the door early might mean we'd be in a position to provide some level of support indefinitely, unlike the post-Vietnam experience where Congress cuts off air support for fear that we'll get sucked in again (key caveat: I've got a highly cursory knowledge of the history of the Vietnam war, my summary might be wrong there).
Interesting comment. Firstly, I think it necessary to point out that COIN is NOT a strategy merely doctrine which may or may not be useful in Afghanistan. From what anybody can tell we have basically no strategic consensus in Afghanistan and sadly are likely never to have one before public opinion forces us out. The circumstances in Afghanistan/Pakistan are so unique and convoluted that it is possible that COIN tactics are actually counterproductive. Perhaps a lighter more over the horizon military effort focused less on the Taliban and more on al Qaeda may provide us actually with more bang for the buck than the U.S. military’s usual big resource efforts. One must remember that the military services are deeply embedded in their own parochial service interests and that colors their recommendations.
Good point and my method for figuring out how 'light' to go
Thanks for the correction on strategy versus doctrine. You're quite right, I'll keep that in mind.
I agree with the possibility that there may well be a point where a lighter more over the horizon effort has more bang for the buck. I'm just worried about a lot of the ground between a larger occupation using COIN doctrine and Pakistan-style primarily over the horizon effort.
For me the big question is what parts of the occupation generate the most backlash in aggregate. To what extent is it sheer presence, failure to protect civilians, or the collateral deaths of civilians? To the extent that it's the first COIN doctrine isn't the way to go.
I tend to think politics and negotiation are the most efficient way to figure out the most objectionable parts of our presence. The Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq seemed to get at this due in part to parliamentary participation.
If we don't know where we're going, any road will take us there. Is the mission to build a new democratic government in a country that has never known one, and where corruption, division and mismanagement are rife? Good luck.
What's wrong with muddling through in Afghanistan?
Five reasons (among many):
Kevin Graham
Spc. Kevin J. Graham, 27, of Benton, Ky., died Sept. 26 in Kandahar, Afghanistan, of wounds suffered when insurgents attacked his vehicle with an improvised explosive device. He was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash. photo
Matthew Martinek
Matthew Martinek had a light in his eyes. But ask the friends and family of the 20-year-old – who died last week from battle wounds suffered earlier this month in Afghanistan – to put into words what that glint looked like and all you’ll get is “it’s indescribable.” “He was just always happy,” said his stepmother, Sycamore resident Char DeGand. “... A really happy kid.” Martinek grew up in Genoa and moved to Bartlett after his freshman year of high school. Following graduation in 2007, he returned to DeKalb and briefly attended Northern Illinois University. He joined the U.S. Army in March 2008 as a paratrooper supporting Operation Enduring Freedom and was deployed from an Army base in Alaska in March. He was scheduled to come home for a visit Sunday. photo
Bryan Berky
A Melrose native was one of three U.S. troops killed Saturday during an ambush in western Afghanistan when their unit was attacked with bombs, guns and grenades. Air Force Staff Sgt. Bryan Berky, a graduate of Bradford High School in Starke, was an explosives ordnance disposal technician, tasked with disarming improvised explosive devices. It was a job he enjoyed, according to a story written by a public affairs officer at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, where Berky was stationed as part the 28th Civil Engineer Squadron. "I love deploying," he said in December. "I get back and feel like I contributed because I can immediately see the end result of my work; not everyone can say that about their job."photo
Tyler Walshe
Spc. Tyler R. Walshe leaves a wife and young daughter who will have her first birthday this Veteran’s Day. He also leaves his parents and three younger brothers behind. He was known to his friends at Tyler Vietti, or Tyler Walshe-Vietti, as he chose to identify with his stepfather’s name. He was a 2006 graduate of Central Valley High School in Shasta, California, where he was a star athelete. He was an all-league pitcher, played defensive end, and was backup quarterback for the Central Valley Falcons’ team that went on to win the Northern Section’s Division II title. Tyler’s coaches remember him as an easy going guy, who rolled with whatever came his way, even when they had differences. Central Valley football coach Matt Hunsacker remembers: “He was very honest and open, and just a great kid. He was a throwing type of quarterback and we were a running team, but he said, "Coach, just put me where ever you want me to play." He was a big, tall lanky guy and fearless. He wasn’t afraid to do whatever we asked him to do.photo
Chris Fowlkes
Lance Cpl. Chris Fowlkes, the U.S. Marine from Gaffney who battled for his life for a week after being critically injured by a roadside bomb in Afghanistan, died Thursday morning at an American hospital in Germany, his family said. Fowlkes, 20, died about 9:30 a.m. U.S. Eastern Standard Time at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center because of complications from the injuries he sustained in battle Sept. 3 in Helmand province, Afghanistan, according to a statement released by the family. Fowlkes’ parents, Steve and Donna, were in Germany and by their son’s side when he died, said LeighAnn Turner, a close family friend and longtime neighbor who also has a son in the Marines. "Chris fought a long, hard battle and is a true American hero," the statement said. "We are a family of deep faith, and through our pain and loss we are steadfast in God’s love and plans." Ruth Fowlkes, Chris’ grandmother, said: "Right now we’ve got a real hero in this family. I always figured he was one anyway, but we just love him. And now, too, he’s home. He’s got his leg back; he can see real good, and God is with him."photo
If we back off then all soldiers who paid the ultimate price & those injured in this war on Terror, will have done so in Vain. I believe if we, as Americans not there say enough of our men & women have been killed, lets not forget why we are there, the Taliban ARE Al' Queda. they were just as responsible as Osama, Iraq was daddys unfinished business, but Afghanistan is All of Americas business, Lets get real folks, I know I dont want anymore attacks here on American soil,& I dont think too many of us do either. forget about the public for a min & think about the soldiers over there needing the help of the American people. If we choose not to send them backup, no one is gonna want to sign up and keep our military the best in the world,considering that the American people bail when it gets to be too much. looking back at the numbers we have done well. I know that sounds bad but how many did we lose in Korea, vietnam, Kosavo, ww1 & ww2? Realisticly the American people want it now & want it fast. And if it isnt fast like fastfood then they leave. thats what I hear from all this and thats my 2 cents. I was given the honor of being in the armed forces, but my wife is there now, putting her life on the line so that America can lolygag over wether to back her up or not. Military advisors to a President who, correct me if I'm wrong, has no military experience should be listened to by that President. If he is not going to do as they say, he should not have stated that we would finish the job, she should have said, "maybe we should muddle in Afghanistan til my healthcatch gets pushed through." NOT!
thanks for reading my comment & I await..
One is neither an American nor a soldier Mr.CCrandell. However I know little about politics, and little also about the region which is the subject matter. Though a soldier has a function in peace time, yet his/her main function is in war time, and this function in democratic societies, is subservient to the will of the political-civilian masters; as your good self knows being a former American soldier, all the way up the pyramid of military hierarchy.
Does the US need to deploy more troops in Afghanistan?, well, in the humble assessment of your sincerely, indeed it does, perhaps all what it has in Iraq and more, just to be able to have a semblence of control on a vast inhospitable territory, and where the difference between friend and foe can be murky to say the least. Al Qaeda is not Taliban really. They may well be close allies, yet the former does not belong to the country, while the latter is part and parcel of the social fabric of Afghanistan.
The question for the politician is not just how many American boys and girls to send to Afghanistan, rather, what if the job lasts long and still cannot be done, assuming of course the nature of the job is clear and unlatered in the mind of the politicians. An unpopular war does not necessarily mean the military top brass losing their jobs, but almost certainly means, the civilian top brass will lose their jobs. Ultimately, this is the major arbiter, what to do in order not to lose elections and popularity, when the Afghan war beomes more protracted and more unpopular.
khairi janbek.paris/france
The way one sees the situation, is that it doesn't take a genius to say, the only objective of the Washington administration should be to get out of Afghanistan as soon as possible.
At the peril of boring everybody, I shall repeat what I had already written on various occasion before, especially since the situation in Afghanistan has not changed to warrant a new set of exegisies. 1) At the height of its involvement in Vietnam, the US troops level peaked at 500,000. At the height of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, the Soviet troops peaked at 100,000. Afghanistan is almost four times the size of Vietnam. So is it really reasonable to expect, that the current levels of US and NATO troops, will allow for controlling the geography of Afghanistan without spreading themselves thin, and subsequently into oblivion?. This is no conventional war as we all know, and the only way to have a chance at winning it is to control the whole country. The NATO and US troops may well be qualitatively better trained and better equipped than before, but all that will go to waste, or is actually going to waste, without controlling the territory.
2) All the countries in the region of Afghanistan as well as, a few beyond, have their proxies in the country which do their bidding for them and maintain their interests. Therefore, in as much as the Afghan situation is that of a prepetual internal crisis, it is also in reality, a consequence of external crisis also. One cannot but continue advocating the need, for the US to sponsor an international conference on Afghanistan; not like the ones for developing Afghanistan or re-building it, where handsome contracts are spread around for various companies, rather, in order to attempt achieving a balance of power between all those external competing interests, to pressurise their own respective proxies inside the country, to accept a political compromise. Without making the external players, cease from fanning the flames, unfortunately very little can be achieved internally.
3) Despite the fact that Osama bin Laden gave his allegiance to Mullah Omar and Taliban; meaning that al Qaeda will fight alongside Taliban and under its leadership, it is highly unlikely that, Mullah Omar has any say on what terroristic acts al Qaeda undertakes. Therefore, both al Qaeda and Taliban are two different entities. In other words, once the US realises that, there is no point in pursuing any longer, the ludicrous idea that a liberal democratic system is possible in Afghanistan [if it is sensible], it can work on re-creating and re-invigurating the "Loya Jirga" to elect a president from its own ranks, so that he can negotiate on their behalf, a power-sharing arrangement with Taliban. But at the same time, the US must demand from countries with cultural affinity towards Afghanistan; Arab and Islamic, to contribure in military terms to the fight against al Qaeda , and for the capture of Osama bin Laden.
Whatever, the strategy of the Obama administration in Afghanistan is going to be, I just hope that it will be based on an exit strategy.
khairi janbek.paris/france
This has got to be the worst idea I've heard in a while. Muddling through MAY - and I would advise against it - be an acceptable means of delaying until another strategy can be put in place. But it isn't a strategy in its own right: that's what's wrong with it. You are not achieving any objectives, yet you are incurring terrible costs. Are you saying that you think Obama needs more time? Fine, that may be, put to make virtue of indecision is just... contrived, and even shockingly so given the costs and stakes involved.
"muddling through" is NOT an option when you're spending $6-10 billion a month and suffering hundreds of lives dead or crippled. There are only a few options - either go "all in" for making Afghanistan something like Pakistan's level of society, get the hell out, or reduce the activity to just maintaining a force in Afghanistan that keeps the govt in charge and allows for a base to hit AQ in Pakistan. Pick one.
McChrystal's still thinking that the idea is to stabilize the government, and if you think you're right, that it cannot be done, then you are left with two goals - getting out or reducing the footprint. the gutsy thing to do would be to pull out and let Karzai twist in the wind, and then contain the AQ every time they venture out of a cave. But our govt is too stupid for that, so we're going to "muddle through" with a reduced footprint. that's my bet.
I can't say personally, to what extent this reflects the truth of the situation about the war in Afghanistan, or that the circumstances of the war have changed, since the time Mr. Krauthammer wrote in the Washington Post on October 12th.2001; saying : " We are fighting because the bastards killed 5000 of our people, and if we don't kill them, they are going to kill us again. This is a war of revenge and deterence....The liberationist talk must therefore be for foreign consumption".
khairi janbek.paris/france
Britain, Italy, France and Spain and even Turkey are begging and pleading with the US to broker a solution along the lines of that mentioned by our esteemed commenter, khairi. Their domestic populations will not support a commitment into oblivion together with carpet bombing, strategic hamlets, hot pursuit, body counts, nocturnal fire-fights, house-to-house fighting, kidnapping etc. (Yes, Vietnam still sticks in their craw).
I think the US should back Karzai and his alliance with Hizb-al-Islami then hire a few informants down in the souk to keep their ears to the ground. If the most seductive arrangement for the neglected masses in human history, communism, did not un-Islamize Afghanistan, it will certainly not be the Israel-loving USA. A pity the communists did not win.
BTW, do we honestly think that the Saudis will ever let grubby Westerners get their hands on a prince of the blood, whatever his crime? I think not.
Actually Mr./Ms. Nur al-Cubicle, prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Saudi Chief of Intelligence at the time; a member of the Royal family, flew to Afghanistan and met Mullah Omar secretly [no longer a secret], and asked him to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US authorities, in the hope of staving of the looming US assault on the country. Mullah Omar refused.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Impressed by the notion advanced by janbekster that all will be solved if an Afghanistan president negotiates a "power sharing" arrangement with the Taliban. When you think about it that Taliban have long shown that they love sharing power. Why hasn't anybody thought of this before?
Author supports argument for "getting out."
What really disturbs this average U.S. citizen is that the esteemed Mark Lynch fails to comment on the consequences of any action other than complete ground troop withdrawal. Its effect is not only on the families and friends of the service personnel killed or maimed, but with that of the collective psyche of U.S. citizens. I am 52 years old and some war has been in effect for the majority of those 52 years directly involving US soldiers somewhere in the world. So, we are a warrior culture by nature or by politics and when it comes to wars of late, it appears to be too difficult to get out and cut losses. All this inappropriate straw man argument about death in vain of we leave now (implying we have yet to succeed) fails to address the point that staying or escalating ensures more people will die and in so called vain if the correct decision pending for Mr. Obama is not reached. The goal of any war should be to end it quickly and decisively and the original goal for the war in Afghanistan was to rid it of Al-Qaeda. By all reports, Al-Qaeda is effectively impotent in Afghanistan.
So why are we still finding reasons to be there. Bush should have stated up front the goal was to oust Al-Qaeda AND then forever keep them out of Afghanistan. This may be convoluted but this is tantamount to getting rid of drug gangs or prostitution from neighborhoods by pushing them into someone else’s neighborhood. The problem maybe out of sight but the problem still exists. Remaining in Afghanistan does not eliminate the Al-Qaeda problem. It just relocates it. But than what are we supposed to do now? Be a one country anti Al-Qaeda police force for the entire planet by pushing them from country to country? Impossible and ridiculous.
This entire war was poorly planned and executed. Hell we were there within 1 month of 9/11/2001-how much planning could have taken place? Had we committed to the Powell doctrine and decimated all Al-Qaeda strongholds in blistering fashion, this problem would be nearly gone. Instead we recommitted to another country and dropped the ball and took our eyes off the prize.
To further support a logical rationale for getting out comes directly from Mr. Lynch himself who states emphatically:
“If the goal is the creation of a functioning, effective, legitimate Afghan state then I would say the prospects are close to zero. Not with 40,000 troops, not with 400,000 troops, not in twelve months and not in twelve years. Afghanistan has gone through nearly thirty years of non-stop war and is as close to a functional anarchy as most anyplace on Earth.”
Since the goal for Afghanistan should be to self govern and keep their Taliban problem in check, then it is obvious no amount of troops from us or any coalition will produce this effect, at least according to the author. Therefore, the logical response must be to extricate ourselves from Afghanistan and let them be unoccupied and begin to grow from within and on their own. The Taliban are in effect a result of our initial involvement there in attempting to defeat the Russians by arming the Mujahideen who later evolved into the “Students of Islam.” Here we are now fighting our own creation. Better to have never gotten involved via Charlie Wilson’s war in the first place.
War is certainly dirty business and our business should be to get out. Better to spend money then lives. With no official government, corruption in every corner, we no longer have any business there and it is time to leave.
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
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