AfPak Debate Day

Tue, 10/06/2009 - 8:38am

 President Obama has a big AfPak day today, with much of his schedule reportedly devoted to a wide-ranging debate about the strategic options. Listening to the debate in the media, I think we can all agree that Obama should be impeached if he doesn't have daily meetings with General McChrystal before a live studio audience.  I do wonder whether that's enough though... perhaps he should also be meeting daily with the local commanders, and maybe some grunt soldiers?  And what about the civilians?  If he were truly serious about Afghanistan, he would surely be taking the time to talk to all of them.  And maybe even an Afghan or two?  Nah, let's not be silly here. 

Because the whole thing is silly.  The Obama administration is doing a surprisingly good job of taking its time to work through all aspects of a devilishly difficult foreign policy problem.  All perspectives are being heard, all considerations -- political and strategic -- are being weighed, and the results are not pre-cooked.  Nobody seriously thinks that waiting a few weeks will make a material difference.  The only ones in a rush, it seems, are those who favor the escalation decision and didn't want to see this kind of full discussion --- and that strikes me as a tell.  

 As I think I've made clear, I am skeptical of the argument for an immediate escalation.  But I can also see a strong argument for doing it now and in full force if it is to be done -- though I would point out that John Nagl, a leading advocate of escalation, said at GW yesterday that Afghanistan couldn't even absorb more than 25,000 more troops in 2010.  There are strong arguments on all sides of the debate -- not "both sides", as there are more than two options.  Oddly enough, given its prominence in the arguments of those who favor escalation, "withdrawal" is not one of the options being considered.  At the risk of repeating myself, as the debate unfolds, here are the questions I would like to see asked and answered before a decision is reached: 

  1. Governance.  COIN doctrine and common sense dictate that a legitimate, effective host government is essential for counter-insurgency to succeed.  Afghanistan has not only just gone through a massively fraudulent election which badly compromises any claims to legitimacy for the Karzai government, but also is deeply riven by corruption at all levels and faces a legacy of some thirty years of civil war, anarchy, and devolution of power to the local level.   Why should we expect COIN to work if one of its essential pillars is so deeply lacking?   This should not be a throwaway line in the last paragraph -- it should be front and center.  How will COIN-escalation work without governance, and how will it increase the odds of improved governance? 
  2. Why now?  While Gen. McChrystal and everyone else make a good case that conditions in Afghanistan are terrible, few claim that the situation is in immediate danger of collapsing.  Given the fallout of the elections and the uncertain political situation, why not wait and see how things shake out politically while beginning to implement COIN at the local level with available resources? 
  3. Why is the current request "all in"? Is there any serious reason to believe that the current requests -- whether 40,000 or some other figure -- will be adequate to the task?  From a distance, it looks like that high number may have been reached by looking around for available troops and then working backwards.  But if that's not the case, then why is this number -- and only this number -- the appropriate one for giving the highest chance of success?  And why will we not be back in one year having the same debate?
  4. What about Pakistan?  If it is true as everyone lately seems to suggest that Pakistan is the real problem, not Afghanistan, then why is COIN-escalation in Afghanistan the best way to solve the problems in Pakistan?  Are there other ways to deal with the problems in Pakistan which do not require COIN-escalation?   What are the prospects that COIN-escalation in Afghanistan will make things worse rather than better in Pakistan?
  5. Metrics.  Not just for judging success/progress, but something else.  For everyone involved in the debate -- including me -- what specific developments, metrics, or events would lead you to change your mind?  What are the things which, if observed over the next year, would lead you to support a different policy?  For me, it's perhaps the consolidation of a more legitimate Afghan political order and stronger evidence that Afghans and Pakistanis shared America's conception of interests.  For Steve Biddle yesterday, it was the opposite:  evidence that 12-18 months of sustained American efforts had not improved Afghan governance or political legitimacy.  For Nagl, it was Pakistan giving up its nuclear weapons (?). 
Yesterday John Nagl said that we shouldn't think of the Afghanistan war having gone on 8 years, since COIN was only now being tried.  Well, the debate about the Afghan war has really only been going on for a couple of months.  Let's give that some time too.  And with that, I am hitting the road for a week. 
Marc Lynch | Permalink | | Comments? Login or register


Advertisement

 

Quick Answers

by MikeDC on Tue, 10/06/2009 - 4:15pm

From my layman's perspective:

1. Escalation cannot come without using the prospect for more support to goad the Afghan government into a runoff and/or other steps to gain it legitimacy. COIN as a strategy, as I understand it, requires building those "pillars". So in short, we threaten to no escalate and not support the new government without concrete steps to bring in opposition partners, have a run-off etc.

On the ground, my understanding is that the COIN approach is to build legitimacy at the local levels by working closely with and training local forces and communities.

2. I don't disagree with this, I think it's largely the answer to Q1. However, it's obvious the strategy we plan to use needs to be agreed upon and we set the stage for implementing it (and by the way, aren't we just really talking about implementing the strategy we ginned up in March?). In general, moving quickly because the fact that the situation isn't close to immediate collapse obviously doesn't mean it's not deteriorating. You could rephrase it as "sure, things won't collapse, but they will get worse the longer we wait". And support for doing something about it will decline as the war drags on. If we're in a hole, we best stop digging deeper ASAP.

3. Can't answer this question as I'm not a general, but it seems rather intuitive that: a) there is never going to be the political support for a re-evaluation and a second escalation a year down the road, so you better ask for everything you think you might need now. b) After overcoming the technical issue of getting the troops there, I don't see an upper bound on how many would be effective.

4. The approach in Afghanistan has to be to make them better off enough to want to independently kick out/not live with/fight off the Talibs and AQ who will eventually come back from Pakistan. It seems to me that even if Pakistan is a bigger problem, in some way it's not a solvable problem, whereas setting up Afghanistan to be resistant to caving in as a safe-haven is. When we do solve the Pakistan problem, if we haven't solved the Afghan problem, we'll have simply replaced the former with a new version of the latter.

5. I want to see Afghans fighting each other less and being able to independently fight off the Talibs and AQ.

Pakistan.

by janbekster on Wed, 10/07/2009 - 7:20am

I think it would be correct to say, that Pakistan is currently the bigger problem. But then again, all the billions poured into the country went into the Pakistani military coffers and their hardware requirements, leaving very little; if anything tangible at all, to support the economy of a country which is governed by an incompetent and corrupt government, whose practices are seen by many international credible experts, as contributing to the increased Talibanisation of Pakistan.

But there is another dimension also, which rarely seems to get the headlines, and that is the ambiguity surrounding the many stakeholders in the situation of Afghanistan. One would would maintain that, it is in the ineterests of the Pakistani High Command-ISI (pakistani Intelligence), to continue finding it convenient, to keep relations with Taliban-Afghanistan, because they believe, it serves the interests of Pakistan.

For a start, Pakistan accuses India of fomenting Baluch separatism in Afghanistan to affect instability in Pakistan, therefore, Islamabad feels the need to check Indian expanding influence by maintaining bi-lateral relations with Taliban-Afghanistan. The relations with Taliban play also an important role with Chinese-Pakistani relations, especially nowadays that Beijing is sensitive about the possible Talibanisation of its own Uighur problem, and needs the "mediation" of Pakistan in this respect.

For both, Saudi Arabia and Iran, influence in Afghanistan is a zero-sum game. Therefore, Saudia hopes that its good relations with Pakistan will work for its own purposes against Iran's influence in the country; here Taliban comes into inter-play also. Tajikistan has also its serious Talibanisation problem, and needs Pakistan's influence to stem the tide, and not only in Tajikistan but also in the Fergana Valley on the borders of Uzbekistan. Not to mention of course, Russia and its own internal security problems in the caucasus, in addition to having Islamic extremisim on its borders.

At the end of the day, all those stakeholders in Afghanistan have their own concerns, which are independent of the concerns of the USA as well as at times, run contrary to the concerns of the USA, but all their roads lead to Islamabad. Consequently, one really does not see, how President Obama can ignore the idea of an international conference on Afghanistan, given the fatc that, there are so many non-Afghan stakeholders in the country, willing to undermine the US influence; directly or indirectly through Pakistan.

khairi janbek.paris/france

Civil-Military Relations

by depetris@wordpr... on Thu, 10/08/2009 - 1:41pm

http://depetris.wordpress.com

First and foremost, I would like to say that I am indeed a supporter of an enhanced U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan. I firmly believe, like many others, than an American defeat in Afghanistan would be severely detrimental to U.S. national security...not because the Taliban would threaten the United States with direct force, but because of the symbolic effect a U.S. defeat would have for Islamic jihadists throughout the globe. Whether or not Al'Qaeda is a major problem for U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan is irrelevant at this point. What is relevant is the fact that Al'Qaeda militants will certainly exploit a Taliban victory to their advantage.

Citing yet another defeat of a superpower in Afghanistan (Great Britain in the 19th Century and the Soviet Union in the 20th) would only increase the recruitment ability of anti-American groups...regardless of ideological affiliation. We must remember that weakened resolve will not only translate into benefits for Al'Qaeda; it will also give a much-needed boost to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and Palestinian rejectionists in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Interestingly enough, President Obama's decision to weight all options- while necessary and understandable- may have a similar effect. Floundering for the next few weeks may very well give the United States a weak image internationally...a development that may not be so terrible if terrorist organizations were not spreading at unprecedented speed. Yet, as reality dictates, this could not be further from the truth. At the same time U.S. soldiers are engaged in Afghanistan, Al'Qaeda proxies are gaining strength in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and (of course) Pakistan. With all of these developments, is waiting really the best option for the United States?

There is one more point I would like to bring up. It appears that Civil-Military relations have hit a significant roadblock, with National Security Advisor James Jones virtually telling General McChrystal to shut-up and keep his opinions to himself. Of course, discussing the war-effort and contradicting the President in public should be frowned upon...especially during a period of contention. Yet, at the same time, the U.S. Military is not entirely at fault. The White House response could have been much more constructive than the harsh rhetoric that was emanated just last week.

Again, I cannot help but wonder if this strained Civil-Military relationship will result in devastating consequences for American interests in the immediate future. What White House officials see as a minor rut, terrorists and Islamic militants view as a divided U.S. Government unable to unite in the face of a common threat.

Nagl said what?

by Jason Sigger on Thu, 10/08/2009 - 10:02am

"What are the things which, if observed over the next year, would lead you to support a different policy? ... For Nagl, it was Pakistan giving up its nuclear weapons (?).

Yesterday John Nagl said that we shouldn't think of the Afghanistan war having gone on 8 years, since COIN was only now being tried. "

I am still trying to wrap my mind around those two things. If Pakistan gave up its nukes, he would reconsider how we are fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. That's just so insane on so many levels, but not nearly as crazy as saying "hey, let's ignore the 800 dead and thousands of injured Americans and billions of dollars spent for the last eight years, because there's a new team now. Mulligan..."

Just unbelievable that such a man is in charge of a major influential think tank.

Afghan Taliban Deny Transnational Goals

by IbnSiqilli on Tue, 10/13/2009 - 5:19pm

Afghan Taliban Deny Allegations that They Have Transnational Goals, Claim Nationalist Resistance to Occupation