Thursday, October 15, 2009 - 4:40 PM
No matter what you think President Obama should decide on Afghanistan, what do you think of his decision-making process? He appeared to make a decision in March, and then indicated five months later that he hadn't, and then engaged in a very public discussion that appears to pit the White House against U.S. generals. I don't know anyone who is comfortable with how he has handled this. Do you?
Well, yeah. On the question of the overall deliberation, I would give the President extremely high marks. They know that they are making a very important, difficult decision and they are appropriately taking their time to think it through from all directions. They have solicited all points of view, and have refused to be railroaded by either the advocates of escalation or by the minimalist skeptics. This is exactly how such a deliberative process is supposed to work -- especially since nobody really claims that the situation is currently so urgent that taking a few weeks will make a material difference.
Then there's "appears to pit the White House against U.S. generals." And here, I certainly don't think the blame lies with the White House. The public debate was driven by the leak of the "secret" report written for General McChrystal by a group of think-tankers. It was inflamed by what appeared to be inappropriate public lobbying on its behalf by General McChrystal, which led to a public rebuke by the Secretary of Defense and others. I'm actually not as sure as others that McChrystal is to blame for this. The narrative of "White House against U.S. generals" has been actively advanced not by General McChrystal himself, but by escalation-advocates hoping to push the White House to decide in his favor. That the escalation advocates decided to try to play the "Generals against the White House card" doesn't reflect very well on them, but it's hard to see how the White House could have responded differently once it happened.
So, in response to Ricks I would say that I think the White House has handled this process as well as it could have. If they decide on a policy with which I disagree I will be uncomfortable but I will also be convinced that they gave all serious alternatives full consideration and that they go into it with eyes wide open. I also think that the public debate has sharpened everyone's understanding of the stakes of the decision, and of the problems with each of the approaches. Not every moment has been handled perfectly, but overall this is a model of how such decisions should be approached.
Nicely said.
Deliberation means actively engaging the options and thinking them through. That doesn't characterize the administration's process to me. Rather, it seems they're deliberating now, but that follows a lengthy and unfortunate period in which the more accurate term would be that they delayed deliberations.
Deliberation is too kind a word
We are nine months into the Obama presidency, and this was supposed to be a major policy focus of the administration - at least according to Obama's campaign claims. The problem with Obama's Afghanistan/Pakistan policy is the same as with all of his other policies: Iran, the peace process, health care, climate change, financial sector regulation, the broader economy. When everything is a strategic priority, nothing is.
One can hardly read, eg, Goldstein's LESSONS IN DISASTER and not feel that there can hardly be too much deliberation.
Especially considering the ways that Afghanistan (and Pakistan) have been moving during the past nine months. For the alternative--not just in haste, but in terms of stampeding the press/public instead of allowing the debate to play out in full view of the public--see 2002-03.
Does anyone really prefer that? Well, yes, some do. The same people who, while screaming that we need to escalate "NOW!" in Afghanistan, are at the same time screaming "WHAT'S THE RUSH?!" on health-care insurance reform.
Doesn't take an x-ray technician to see what's going on, methinks.
Incomprehensible, but amusing...
Does anyone really prefer that? Well, yes, some do. The same people who, while screaming "NOW!" on health-care insurance reform, are at the same time screaming that we need to escalate "WHAT'S THE RUSH?!" in Afghanistan.
I couldn't agree more. It's hard to have too much deliberation. On the other hand, sitting around and letting problems build up 'while screaming "NOW!" on health-care insurance reform' doesn't strike me as actual deliberation.
. . . there's been NO deliberation on health-care insurance reform?
My goodness . . .
From me, Pres. Obama gets an F (as did candidate and, earlier, Senator Obama). Why? The President chooses his advice from a narrow spectrum of advisers, most of whom are military people. He has shown such tunnel vision in other areas as well.
Candidate Obama decided very early (2002) that making war in Afghanistan was the correct response to 9/11. This decision was not informed by his work as a "community organizer", law student or law professor, Illinois senator or US Senator. If he had acquired his expertise on Af-stan, terrorism and military capabilities through independent reading, we don't know what he read, the Britannica?
Simple! He, Obama, is an ambitious pol. He saw that Bush bungled the pursuit of Al Quaida in Af-stan. He saw that things were getting bogged down in Iraq. Af-stan, the "right war", was a good ploy for criticizing Bush (rightly!) and still looking like a strong man rather than a dove who would advise international police cooperation and intelligence resources.
The truth is he did not know his xxx from his elbow about Af-stan or Iraq. He does not know more now. He does what he thinks is politically advantageous in the most narrow sense. He surrounds himself with generals and admirals, in uniform or in civvies. He wears blinders that he fashioned for himself. In Obama's own way, he is as bad as Bush.
As far as one is concerned, President Obama can deliberate as much as he likes, so long as, he can discover at the end,
how long will it take the Afghan troops to be ready to take the lead in the war, if ever; assuming they are not yet, since the talk is about sending more US and NATO troops. And to what extent he is willing to go, in order to expand the system of patronage of corruption, which financially supports a fraudulent president, by almost all accounts; like Mr. Karzai, and top up the already US paid salaries of the Afghan warlords; for and against President Karzai, in order not just to keep the peace, but also to take a committed active fighting role in the war against Taliban and al-Qaeda.
khairi janbek.paris/france
I can agree too:
Exit strategy (standing up Afghans so we can stand down)
Corruption
Political legitimacy
Negotiated deals with groups outside Kabul
Will sending more soldiers to Afghanistan help any of these issues and how much? Those are the questions that deserve a debate, not is COIN the right strategy and how many Americans does it need to work.
CAPTCHA: voltage Greenspan - could electro-shock therapy cure him of being a Randian?
Going by the recent precedent set in Iraq, it will take 4 to 5 years for the US/Nato to train the Afghan security forces to a standard effective enough where it can control its territory, as the Iraqi army was able to do from March 2008 onwards.
As for the corruption: is typical of undeveloped countries in the early stages of transformation to democracies. The US/Nato is consequently constrained from setting too high a bar. What it could do, with the UN, is to make the political system more accountable by introducing proportional representation, encouraging the formation of official political parties and moving to constitutionally enshrine parliamentary powers to provide checks and balances on the executive. Again, the Iraq constitution is a good model here.
It's a pity Afghanistan adopted a presidential model instead of the parliamentary model as chosen by Iraq. As we have seen in Iran and Afghanistan recently, presidential elections are far more vulnerable to rigging or even outright fabrication.
It seems to me the bigger problem is they adopted a very centralized, top-down approach in a country that couldn't possibly be effectively governed by its people in that fashion.
The reason the country is far more vulnerable to rigging is large parts of it are outside of central control and the populace is extremely poor, poorly educated, and subject to violent abuse. A proportionally representative parliament and an executive subject to a no-confidence vote won't change that. In some respects in increases the possibilities for instability.
I think a presidential model actually makes some sense in the historical context of Afghanistan where it was effectively and peacefully ruled by a king for long stretches of time. The key is the the King ruled a fairly small central government and locals frequently had significant control over their own affairs.
Moving to that sort of model, with a smaller central government and more assertive local governments seems like the most reasonable approach to me.
Afghan corruption is endemic ...
What we call "corruption" is more or less how the tribes have done business for eons. This is not a "young democracy" or any other such nonsense. The Karzai government has a tentative grasp on Kabul and almost nothing else, which makes it no different from every other centralized governing body that has sat in power there.
Iraq and Afghanistan are not comparable. Afghanistan's population is spread out over vast distances, and their culture is very different. It has been tribal for a long time, and it will remain that way. I'm afraid any scheme (parliamentary or otherwise) designed to encourage participation in a central government is doomed to failure.
As is our mission there. Bush blew his one chance at getting not only bin Laden, but most of what was then the braintrust behind al Qaida. Instead, that war grew from capturing/killing those at the top of the 9/11 AQ-driven mission to yet another disastrous attempt at nation-building. We are apparently dead-set on not learning a thing about this, yet again. The only question at this point is how much more money and blood we're willing to waste on this. The answer seems to be "more still."
I don't personally believe that, Iraq is the correct paradigm to follow for Afghanistan. The Iraqi' Army's task is to control the geography of Iraq as well as fight the remains of terrorism, while the Afghan Army has to control a territory 1.5 times bigger than Iraq and far less hospitable in terms of physical geography, fight terrorism, and go into a full-fledged war against a well organised fighting force.
On the political level also, I'm sure that President Obama discerns between, a country which had always a strong central government since its inception; at times authoritarian and at other times dictatorial, like Iraq, and a country which actually never had a central government authority to control the country; like Afghanistan. Therefore, re-building a nation, is a totally different task to creating one from scratch.
As for corruption, well, it is practiced in the developed world as well as not so developed world, however, when it comes to Afghanistan, I was merely wondering if President Obama is willing to upgrade the current corruption, in order to tip the balance in favour of US and NATO military efforts.
khairi janbek.paris/france
To the remark..."especially since nobody really claims that the situation is currently so urgent that taking a few weeks will make a material difference". I am sorry; I think you might get a different reaction from a front line soldier. Come on, we have American soldiers dying over there.
At the very least you need to amend your statement to read, nobody minus one.
Thank you,
MJM
janbeksta ....it is enough that the Afghan security forces are capable of controlling/providing security to the areas where the bulk of the population live,not so much in the soarsely inhabited mountainous that make up so much of the Afghan terrain. On their recent experience the US must know that will take at least 4 to 5 years.
Regarding Afhganistan never having had a strong central government: this is no doubt comparatively correct. But what I have read about this country is that it was progressing on a slow, but nevethlessless gradually modernising path from 1919 until the 1979 Soviet facilitated the islamist backlash? So I feel it wrong to suggest that nation building is beyond the capability of US/Nato. But first, as in Iraq, they have to overcome the power vaccuum they created which enabled the Taleban's return and ensure security to the people.
MikeDC;
In the first instance you say that the first problem is that "they adopted a very centralized, top-down approach in a country that couldn't possibly be effectively governed by its people in that fashion."
You later go on to say you think a presidential model makes some sense in the context of Afghanistan. But the presidential model is exactly the centralised, top down approach that you feel was the problem in the first instance?
Iraq always had a centralised, top down model. But when they went with proportional representation - which is the basis of consensus democracy as opposed to majoritarian or "winner take all" (which, if you are American you are probably more familiar with),gave constitutional rights to the provinces and invested final power in the parliament - council of representatives - after various power checking tos and fros (abit like Congress) they are on the way to achieving your your preferred option - smaller central government and more assertive local goverments. With the addition that the Iraqi parliament is extremely active when it wants to exercise its constitutional powers.
Well Mr./Ms.bb 1) I don't know how US commanders must know that it will take 4-5 years to train the Afghan Army up to the required standard, when there isn't even one statement regarding a deadline for ending the training of such an army. If you have any information about how they they must know, it will be interesting for me to expand my horizons if you please. 2) Controlling the cities is not enough in the case of Afghanistan, because unlike the Iraqi Army, the Afghan Army is supposed to go the countryside and the mountains, not just the cities to fight the war against Taliban. Otherwise, the whole purpose of training them would be a self-defeating exercise, if NATO and US troops carry on fighting the war against Taliban for them. 3) Modernising efforts are one thing, but exerting central government authority is something else. You must have come across in your readings that, since the days of the monarchy in Afghanistan, there was no semblence of central authority over the country. 4) Just a correction, I ws neither making a reference to the ability of the US/NATO in nation-building or otherwise. I was saying as I believe, Iraq is the wrong paradigm for Afghanistan because, nation-rebuilding like in Iraq, is totally diffrent process to building a nation from scratch like in Afghanistan.
khairi janbek.paris/france
A presidential model need not be centralized and top-down.
I think you're mixing apples and oranges a bit. You've really got three issues here:
1. Voting rules- proportional or majority
2. Separation of powers- An constitutional independent executive vs. a chief legislator.
3. Unitary vs. federal government- Whether various governmental functions are reserved to the central authority or to local subdivisions.
Choosing a presidential executive on question 2 does not require you to chose majority rule on question 1 or unitary government on question 3.
Historically, at least, the US, for example, has always had a president, and always had majority voting, but reserved significant rights and independence to the States.
--------------
Now, as to the Iraqi experience, I second the motion of devolving significant powers to regional authorities, and I think that's a good model to follow in Afghanistan (while keeping in mind the particulars of their situation).
That does not, however, necessitate a parliamentary central government. In the Iraqi case, I think it might have made sense for a couple reasons. First, simply the experience of Saddam as president probably made repeating that system a non-starting. Second, the three predominant ethnic groups create a relatively obvious set of voting blocks that could, in theory, create a stable set of voting interests there. A majority rule system with an independent executive, on the other hand, would be manifestly problematic from that perspective.
Conditions in Afghanistan are different, however. The third question has the same answer in Iraq, but I'm not sure the first two do. With respect to the parliamentary vs. Presidential federal governance, the Afghans had almost the opposite experience as the Iraqis. They had relatively stable rule under a king - an independent executive and nationally unifying figure combined with a devolved, federal power structure. This is what we might expect from a "nation" of tribes. On the other hand, the parliamentary model led to frequent destabilization in a land of splintered loyalties in Afghanistan's more recent history. The minority subgroups in Afghanistan, as compared to Iraq, are more varied, have fewer common connections and greater language differences. Generally speaking, these sorts of things can lead to instability in even well functioning parliamentary and proportional voting systems.
Hence, my overriding preference would be for an independent executive that, properly structured, could act as a unifying figure to a disparate nation, but presiding over a relatively small federal government that leaves most affairs to the regions.
jb - it took 4 - 5 years for US to train Iraqi army from scratch. That's the time frame the US military would be working on. They wouldn't necessarily be publising it, but this is the basis of the whole debate going on in Washington. Will the US commit to that (minimum) time frame?
Also, if at some future date the Taleban is isolated in the mountains that would be a considerable improvement on the current situation, which is soley the result of Nato having allowed a power vaccuum to develop.
btw, the history of Afghanistan up until 1978 suggests that the US/Nato would not be building a nation from scratch but rather restoring a nation that existed prior to Soviet invasion. Indeed it could be said that Afghanistan was certainly a "nation" under the Taleban?
mdc, you make some very good points. But if Afghanistan is to become a modern nation it has to have a modern political infrastructure. At the moment it doesn't even have official political parties to contest elections, everybody stands as an individual. Rectifying this by using its powers of persuasion is what the UN should be doing, imo.
Unfortunately the Afghans have been stuck with the top down "strongman" model, like Iraq endured. But if the UN coaxes them towards a legislature elected via proportional representation with defined constituional powers, then political parties will develop in the wake. There could, for example, be a President/Prime Minister model?
1) The fact that the US Army had issued time lines on various occasions for the training of the Iraqi Army, and none regarding the Afghan Army, indicates to say the least, that they are not taking Iraq as a paradigm in their planning operations in Afghanistan.
2) One has no clue about the deliberations in the White House, but if indeed those deliberating are sensible; as they are expected to be, highest on their agenda should be, what if pushing the Taliban to the mountains doesn't work.
3) Indeed, Taliban did impose its authoriy over almsot 80% of Afghanistan, but least on its mind was nation or nation-building. It went into war against the Tajiks, Uzbeks and the Hazara. In Afghan term, their rule was year zero, and they destroyed whatever was attempted before which was unsuccessful in the first place.
4) In my opinion, a western model to rule Afghanistan is really just a triumphalist illusion. Afghanisatn can only be ruled through a re-invigurated "Loya Jirga" which includes all the ethnic and religious representatives of all the constituent segments of Afghanistan, to elect a president from its own ranks and act itself as the parliament for the country. Then we can talk about the process of nation-building which remains till now a pipe dream.
khairi janbek.paris/france
On the matter of "generals vs. the White House" I am reminded of the news reports suggesting that Hillary Clinton was undermining Obama's campaign. Much as I hate to say it, I find it harder and harder to trust most newspapers on major issues. Ironically the press might come to be worthless here not because of an authoritarian government but because of public apathy and simplicity.
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Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
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