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Abu Mazen tries to regain the initiative
The political toll of his disastrous decision on the Goldstone report has led Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to roll the dice on an audacious bid to regain the political initiative. First he decided to sign the long-blocked Egyptian-brokered Palestinian reconciliation document and dare Hamas to do the same. Then he suggested that he would go ahead and call Palestinian elections for January 24, whether or not Hamas agreed. The moves have been backed by a blitz in the anti-Hamas Arab media attempting to blame Hamas for rejecting reconciliation and running away from elections. Will this help Abu Mazen and Fatah regain the initiative? To what end? At what cost?
Abu Mazen's decision to sign the Egyptian draft was fairly transparently done in order to put the onus on Hamas to say no. For months and months, the two sides have been playing a game of avoiding a deal while pinning the blame on the other. Both Hamas and Fatah have been reluctant to do the Egyptian deal, since both see potentially existential threats and few clear immediate benefits, but the Palestinian and Arab publics strongly favor some kind of reconciliation. The winning move has for a long time been to be able to blame the other side for the failure. Abu Mazen's decision to finally sign the dotted line now reflected his political weakness, and his confidence that a politically strengthened Hamas would not now sign on to a draft which most analysts think favors Fatah and the PA's interests. From this position of weakness, he's going for broke and trying to force several key issues.
Will this, along with the belated UN discussion of the Goldstone report, help Abu Mazen and the PA to regain the ground lost over the last weeks? Perhaps, but only to a limited degree. Hamas has been backed temporarily into a tactical corner, and appears to be scrambling to find a way out. But the jockeying has been going on for so long that few in the relevant Arab and Palestinian publics will be convinced by the attempt to blame Hamas for the reconciliation's failure. The current stories in the Arab media claiming that the U.S. forced Egypt to change the draft while Hamas was considering it are already muddying Fatah's preferred narrative. On its own, the story will likely have only limited effect on political perceptions.
It could have a seriously negative effect if it puts an end to serious efforts to broker a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah -- or a positive one if it brings the long-festering issues to a head and actually mobilizes momentum towards a deal. For all the intense ill-will and mistrust between the two sides, most Palestinians want to see the political reunification of the West Bank and Gaza. Most want to see an end to the blockade of Gaza. Most want to see a single, functioning Palestinian government. And most understand that only a unity government of some kind would be able to negotiate any binding, end of conflict agreement with Israel. If this is the endgame -- giving up on reaching a deal in order to pin blame on Hamas -- then all those hopes recede.
What about Abu Mazen's call for elections? Very, very few Palestinians with whom I've spoken, or who write in the Palestinian and Arab media, believe that elections absent a prior political agremeent on the ground rules will solve anything. I've advocated for holding Palestinian elections in the past, but on the premise that they would follow rather than precede a political agreement. Those Palestinian analysts who I've seen supporting the call for elections generally premise that support on their hopes that it will generate political consensus first.
With such a political agreement, then elections could provide a route towards creating a legitimate and effective government capable of both peace negotiations and institutional development. Without a political agreement, elections will either be a sham or will badly inflame intra-Palestinian conflict. The lessons of this year's Iranian, Afghan, and Lebanese elections should be taken very seriously by those weighing the merits of Abu Mazen's call for early elections without a prior political consensus.
Abbas is trying to regain some political initiative after his recent setbacks, which include not only the Goldstone fiasco but also the impact of Netanyahu's refusal of a settlement freeze on Palestinian views of a prospective peace. Palestinian views of peace talks are souring quickly, just as they are in Jordan. (The other day, the commander of the U.S.-trained Palestinian security forces dismissed Netanyahu's "economic peace" ideas as "childish talk, not befitting of adults"). There's no quick fix for this for Abbas, and hopefully the bid for a momentary tactical political advantage won't lock him -- and everyone else -- into a dangerous series of commitments. The key here is to try to turn these moves into progress instead of into a dead end.
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Writing under this pseudonym, Marc Lynch began his influential Middle East politics blog Abu Aardvark in 2002...
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What Ever Mark Lynch Predicts; Bet the Opposite
"The lessons of this year's Iranian, Afghan, and Lebanese elections should be taken very seriously by those weighing the merits of Abu Mazen's call for early elections without a prior political consensus." (Mark Lynch)
Exactly what lessons is Mr. Lynch talking about? It seems to me the clearest message from those elections is that pundits like him are wrong most of the time. Lynch thought that Hezbollah was enormously popular and that its coalition would be victorious in Lebanon; he was wrong. Lynch thought Ahmadinejad would win fair and square in Iran; he was wrong again. In Afghanistan, even though Karzai committed massive vote fraud to try to get over the 50 percent mark and avoid a run-off; he did get millions of legitimate votes. At least there will be a run-off in Afghanistan; that quite a bit better than what happened in Iran's stolen election.
The bottom line is that Lynch and his ideological soul mates need to develop a little humility. Every time they assure us that the most extremist elements in the Middle East are on the road to victory; they always seem to lose.
It seems to me that if there is a lesson to be learned from what happened in Iran and Lebanon it's this; don't trust Mark Lynch.
If Lynch thinks Hamas is popular and Fatah's popularity is waning, bet on Fatah.
History demonstrates that prognostications coming from Mark Lynch never pan out.
yes and no
it's true that Lynch is consistently wrong on his predictions. you didn't bother to note that he was flat wrong on the surge and spent a good amount of time on his old blog mocking the idea of a Sunni rising in cooperation with the U.S.. Obviously you can add those to your check list of things on which he wasn't spot on.
that said, Lynch never fails to be well informed in his commentary. so, like any social scientist the best bet is to ignore the predictions of an expert (per Malcolm Gladwell) but pay attention to the details they bring to the table. It's for the latter rather than the former that I check this blog, and I tend not to be disappointed on that front.
Obama's push for peace is at
Netanyahu wants to talk, Abbas is refusing. Did that change?
So, other than the fact that Abbas refuses to talk, and the fact that there can't be an agreement before Palestinian reconciliation, it's all Nethanyahu's fault.
I've noticed a tendency on this blog to explain away all Palestinian actions as either based on domestic political pressures, or as reactions to Israel (thereby blaming Israel for the Palestinian actions). It never seems to work the other way, even though analogous political pressures and Palestinian actions leading to Israeli reactions are present.
Out of curiosity, how
Out of curiosity, how different is Al-Jazeera Arabic from Al-Jazeera English? The websites certainly look different, and I have a strong suspicion that I'm missing out on some interesting stuff because of the language barrier.
About what? Netanyahu refuses to talk about final borders, the final-status issues, the halt of settlement growth, the status of Jerusalem, and he's even balking at the possibility of "exchange" (meaning the Palestinians getting land in Israel in exchange for Israel getting to keep the major settlement blocs). Any talks at this point would be almost worthless, particularly with a divided Palestinian government.
al Jazeera difference.
Apart from the difference in staff and each having an independent budget, al Jazeera Arabic is known for raising taboo subjects in the Arab world, and a style of reporting events different to the local individual Arab state-owned TVs. Al Jazeera English does not do that, because already the subjects which are taboo in the Arab world may not be taboo in the west, and the reproting style may well be more objective than al Jazeera Arabic; which is often criticised by Arab governments as well as public opinion in countries of the Arab world for its style of reporting events.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Thanks for the perspective. I
Thanks for the perspective. I was mainly curious as to if the major stories being reported in Al-Jazeera Arabic on the Middle East and Central Asia are drastically different from those in Al-Jazeera English.
I really need to learn Arabic, considering how much I read on the Middle East and those issues.
Brett, About what? Without
Brett,
Without engaging, one can't state definitively what Netanyahu will or won't talk about once dialogue starts.
But if one does take this tack, one can say the same thing about the rhetoric coming from both Hamas and Abbas/Fatah. Marc says this is almost entirely Netanyahu's fault, but it's not clear that it is.
This is so patently obvious that I wonder why more people don't point it out. Again, it's not clear that Obama's failure is Netanyahu's fault given that the Palestinians are basically in a cold civil war and can't deliver on any agreement, even assuming the PA would make one. And it should be noted, Hamas isn't behaving as it is now because Netanyahu is building in existing settlements. It would be behaving this way regardless.
I am of mixed feeling about engagement solely for engagement's sake, which is what talking would be now given the truth of what you say, but for now I am for it. It is encouraging to hear about conditions for Palestinians in the West Bank improving, and I think this is what talking and cooperation on selected issues could foster.
The problem...
is that Mr. Netanyahu wants peace talks without any reference to the outstanding political problems, between the two sides, while Mr. Abbas, wants a political refernce for the talks. Personally, I agree that the peace talks should re-start irrespective, because I always thought that, it is in Abu Mazen's interest to pursue the talks, at least to strengthen his position for the next elections, but it seems actually the opposite; Abu Mazen seems to think its best if the peace talks do not start for the PNA's election prospects.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Without engaging, one can't
That's technically true, but there's nothing stopping Netanyahu from actually defining some clear things he wants to talk about beforehand.
It applies in the case of Hamas, but Abbas and his ilk have basically said they want to talk about everything under the sun related to the issue, including "final status" stuff.
...but Abbas and his ilk have
If you are aware of the declarations that came out of Abbas' Fatah conference, you realize that he has also rejected considering/negotiating some issues. This is what I was referring to.
It also gets back to the sticking point - you point out how much Abbas wants to discuss, yet he is the one refusing to sit down with the other side. His reason isn't what you are offering up, it is the fact that Israel won't enact a total freeze in existing settlements.
re-Abu Mazen regaining the initiative.
I think we tend to fall into collective amnesia, when we do not recall that, Hamas was actually created and nurtured to replace the PLO. Now that it has reached the potential strength of actually seeing itself as a viable alternative to even the PNA, all what is left for the organisation, is to get Arab and international recognition; as a matter of fact, one of the pre-conditions which Hamas added to the Palestinian reconciliation document, is Arab and International guarantees of recognition, if Hamas wins the next Palestinian elections; thus, enabling it to govern the Palestinians without having to comply with the Quartet's demans, of renouncing violence, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, and respect former Palestinian-Israeli agreements.
While had Hamas signed the reconciliation document as drafted by Egypt, without any such pre-conditions, it would have had plenty to lose, because, it would have meant that it actually recognises Mr. Abbas' stance and that of the PNA, on the questions fo the right of Israel's existence, and on the peace process irrespective of whether the process takes of or not. In otherwords, its political position would not be distinguishable officially, from that of the PNA.
While for Abu Mazen, why shouldn't he sign the document eagerly. After all, even if he doesn't gain any extra advantages; more than the ones which stop Hamas signing the document, he will be recognised at least, as the one whom has united the Palestinian people once again, and worthy of represnting them all.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Who Will Pay the Price?.
With the revelations of nuclear talks, between Israel and Iran, the likely agreement between the 5+1 countries with Tehran over it's nuclear programme also, and Turkey's distinctively more assertive role in the affairs of the Middle East, as well as Saudi Arabia-Syria reconciliation; a possible response?, make one wonder if we are not seeing the contours of the old triangle; Turkey-Iran-Israel, which had governed the affairs of the region before, re-emerging.
Too early to tell?, perhaps, but the recipe is certainly there, and more importantly, there will be some sides whom will have to pay the price in the region as a result. Who are the likely candidates on the losing side?. I guess that remains to be seen.
khairi janbek.paris/france
elections and peace
Yes, "elections could provide a route towards creating a legitimate and effective government" -- assuming the Palestinian people vote the way the US and Israel wants them to vote. Do you not remember what happened after the last--democratically held and internationally supervised-- election in which Hamas won? Just to refresh memories: Israel promptly set up a blockade around Gaza, broke a cease fire agreement with Hamas, and invaded Gaza. The cost of that election was 1400 dead, a Gaza reduced to rubble, and a continuing blockade of food,medicine, and building materials. But don't expect to hear about this in the mainstream press. We'll only be notified if another rocket goes off in Sderot--but we won't be told that those rockets were retaliation against the blockade and the Occupation.
re-elections and peace.
Though one agrees in principle, that elections are certainly a good thing, yet, if Abu Mazen declares them on Sunday; to take place next January, and Hamas rejects them, well, that will mean almost 1.45 million Palestinians on the west bank, will be able to particpate, while almost the same number of 1.45 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, will be disenfranchised.
Precisely this would mean, two different political systems in both regions, which will certainly require a new arrangement; regional as well as international, for dealing with the situation. Of course, this is another matter for another discussion, and it is perhaps best not to jump the gun so to speak.
khairi janbek.paris/france
assuming the Palestinian
More accurately, this should be stated as - "...As long as the Palestinian government accepts conditions to which it had agreed when it accepted the Roadmap laid out by the US, and the EU, Russia and the UN." (The US, EU, Russia and UN are the "Quartet".)
Hamas the political party did not make the agreement, but if they break agreements made by previous Palestinian governments, they should realize that those with whom the agreements were might react to that with pressure...and they did.
To refresh memories - these were economic sanctions placed on Hamas by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN) and Israel, to be lifted when the following conditions were met:
-Renunciation of violence,
-Recognition of Israel by the Hamas government (as had the PLO), and
-Acceptance of previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority. (Wikipedia)
After Hamas' violent coup (question: when you stage a violent coup, are you still considered the democratically elected government?) in 2007, the sanctions were eased in the West Bank in order to boost Abbas and at the same time a more severe blockade was put in place against Hamas/Gaza by Israel and Egypt.
This doesn't stand up to examination. The rockets were being fired during the time after Israel left Gaza and before the blockade was enacted.
More accurately, this should
Hamas was more or less ejected from the positions they had in the Palestinian government after their 2006 electoral success was ignored by the US and Israel, so I don't see why they should be rushing to accept these conditions as the very basis for starting negotiations when they have no guarantee that those same states won't just reject their leadership again.
What do you mean? Who
What do you mean? Who exactly got ejected and who did the ejecting?
Sanctions weren't placed on the PNA because they were "Hamas". They were placed there by the Quartet becasue of specific actions of Hamas (as the PNA). Are you suggesting that if Hamas embraced the conditions outlined in the Roadmap they would have still had sanctions placed on them?
Eject and Ejected.
I cannot claim to know what Mr./ Ms. Brett means, but Hamas government was ejected by Mr. Abbas. So technically I suppose, Hamas was the ejected party, since it's government was replaced by the; still, caretaker government of Mr. Fayyad, and the ejecting party is Mr. Abbas; president of the PNA.
Personally, I would imagine if there was no difference between Hamas and the PNA over the Quartet's demands, I think Hamas would get Arab and international recognition. I mean the PLO got that recognition after it had renounced violence and accepted the right of Israel to exist. So why not Hamas?. I think they would have then even a better advantage than the PNA; all things being equal. At least they tend to be less corrupt.
khairi janbek.paris/france
In any case.
All this has become academic as far as one is concerned; especially that, Abu Mazen has declared the 24th of January as the date for the Palestinian presidential and legislative elections, in the west bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. The imnmediate response of Hamas has been rejecting the elections, as Mr. Abu Marzouq; the Deputy of Mr. Khalid Misha'al said tonight, that Gaza will not participate without Palestinian reonciliation first, and in all likelihood, Mr. Netanyahu will reject Jerusalem being a constituency in the Palesitnian elections.
It looks like, the whole international community; including the Arab world and Israel, are faced with a new challenge/opportunity to react to. But one thing for sure, in my humble opinion, the prevailant mind-set all round currently, is most likely to turn the current Palestinian situation into a challenge rather than an opportunity. I think clearly, we all need to subject ourselves to a new paradigm shift; compatable with the new developments.
khairi janbek.paris/france
"election in which Hamas won?
"election in which Hamas won? Just to refresh memories: Israel promptly set up a blockade around Gaza, broke a cease fire agreement with Hamas, and invaded Gaza. The cost of that election was 1400 dead, a Gaza reduced to rubble, "
er ... something is missing from this chronicle ... ie ..
After the election PA and Hamas negotiated an agreement for a unity government brokered by Egypt.
Just as agreement had been reached and the parties were supposedly ready to sign it ...
Hamas tunnelled into Israel itself, killed two IDF soldiers on Israeli soil and kidnapped a third, a certain Mr Gilad Shalit and held him hostage.
Upon which "Israel promptly set up a blockade around Gaza, broke a cease fire agreement with Hamas, and invaded Gaza. The cost of that election was 1400 dead, a Gaza reduced to rubble .." ETC ETC...
And goodbye unity government, as Hamas intended.
One year later the Saudis negotiated another unity government under the Mecca agreement, signed with much fanfare.
This time Hamas broke the agreemnt by chucking the PA out of Gaza, throwing members of the PA security forces off high rise buildings and assuming military rule for itself.
That was the point where Palestine became Pakistan and BanglaDesh. Hamas ain't gonna be giving up its Gaza fiefdom in a hurry - all its got left now.