This isn't all that surprising, IMO. The inherent tension between the universalist aspirations of movements like Al Qaeda and the national orientation of their Salafi allies (and subsidiaries) has been observed for at least several years now. See Michael Scott Doran's "Somebody Else's Civil War" (Foreign Affairs Jan/Feb 2002).

This is certainly a very interesting case. Thus far, many of the reports that I have read comment extensively about the Taliban's deep relationship with Al'Qaeda militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. David Rohde's personalistic, yet compelling piece, in the New York Times is the most recent story highlighting a possible radicalization of the Taliban movement. The direct contact and pooling of resources between the Taliban and Al'Qaeda- especially in Pakistan- only reiterates this fact among many members of the national-security community.

Yet, as you point out, Al'Qaeda could once-again be laying the groundwork for their own destruction. For the terrorist organization, this online rift could not come at a worse time; their ability to influence events inside Afghanistan is already negligent in the eyes of many (thanks to a combination of U.S. tactics and lawlessness within the Pakistani tribal areas). In fact, it is a rather amazing feat to witness the suicidal-type behavior of the group in general. As in Iraq, the brutal nature of Al'Qaeda-sponsored suicide attacks- many of which kill innocent Muslims in the process- is quickly turning the ordinary population away from bin-Laden and his cronies. Engaging in indiscriminate violence against fellow Arabs is more than irrational, even for the nihilistic ambitions of Al'Qaeda terrorists.

For Americans, Afghans, Pakistanis and Arabs, we should all hope that Al'Qaeda continues on this self-destructive course. As the Iraq experience has demonstrated, forcefully imposing a quasi-Islamic State only marginalizes Islamic fundamentalism from the masses…something that would not be so bad if the vast majority of Muslims were not already hostile to fundamentalism. This is perhaps the best thing counterterrorist officials can hope for. So far, contemporary history has proven that an ideological divide between Al'Qaeda and moderate Muslims obliterates the very fabric (and capabilities) of terrorist networks. This does not even mention the favorable effects that such a rift provides for U.S. troops on the ground.

While this Taliban-Al'Qaeda rift is indeed encouraging, it would be wise for the U.S. Government to not blindly assume that an early discontent between the two groups will quickly fracture the alliance. We must remember that the Taliban and Al'Qaeda still have common objectives, whether this includes the killing of American soldiers or the wider aspiration of Sharia law. As long as these parallel goals persist, the online spat may not produce anything worthwhile for coalition forces.

However, as you have stated, perhaps the wagon is starting to fall apart.

http://depetris.wordpress.com

Just thinking aloud, the first time around, Taliban and its leadership were willing, and indeed did, sacrifice Taliban's rule over Afghanisatn for the sake of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

The question is, will the Mullah Omar, or/and his associates be willing once again, to sacrifice ruling over Afghanistan, if the opportunity arises; even through the option of sharing power?. In other words, to what extent Taliban's nationalism, or the nationalists within the movement, would be willing to exert pressure in order to, ditch Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda?. I mean, the first time around, indeed there were attempts to separate both from each other, but such attempts failed obviously, however, for the contemporary situation, we are not likely to find out the answer, unless there are efforts once again, to seperate both entities from each other.

One has heard that, a Taliban delegation had visited Saudi Arabia recently, but if I understood correctly, observers said that this delegation, was not particularly close to Mullah Omar. Is this just a matter of subterfuge, just in case talks fail and the delegation can be sacrificed politically, or are there real efforts going on to separate al-Qaeda from Taliban?, again, it is still hard to tell.

khairi janbek.paris/france

The Taliban was always a "nationalist" (Afghan) or ethnic (Pashtun) movement. Before 9/11 they were precisely that, just as they are now. Now they obviously have a similar worldview to al-Qa'ida, hence their allowing them to have bases, etc. when they were in power. But they were never the same, as is the implicit assumption in this puzzling post from Professor Lynch. The story that the Taliban are nationalist the al-Qa'ida universalist/internationalist is just a story of 'same as it ever was.' That doesn't mean they didn't happily coexist and scratch backs before, just as it doesn't mean they aren't coexisting now and won't coexist in the future.

Now the Rohde piece with its assertion that the Taliban have been transformed into an internationalist (or universalist) movement *would* be a story, if true. That said, with due deference to Rohde's experience and to a terrifically well-written piece, I don't think hanging out with a kidnapper's guards really qualifies as a foundation for talking about that sort of ideological shift. Still, it is enough to say that this is something on which to keep an eye as *that* would be a story.

While I earnestly hope this is the case I wouldn't bet too much on it. If Al Quaeda has any decent mid-level leaders left in the region they know they can't afford rumors of a split, much less a repeat of the failure in Iraq.

Many Iraqi insurgent "Sunni" groups were/are not the ideological bed fellows of al'Qaeda. Many found the alliance convenient in order to fight the US presence in Iraq for their own political reasons.

When al Qaeda tried to dominate the "Sunni" insurgency in the country; committing acts of terror against the Iraqi Sunni population in the process, the rupture occured. In any case, the "Sunni" insurgents are part of the Iraqi social fabric, and there are no permenant enemies nor permenant friends in politics.

In Afghanistan, al Qaeda does tend to be the ideological soul mate of Taliban, and its foreign Jihadis never tried to dominate Taliban inside Afghanistan, rather played second fiddle to it, and supported it in its military objectives. However, all evidence indicates at the same time, that al-Qaeda kept its independent decision- making process regarding its international terrorist operations.

But here also, Taliban is part and parcel of Afghan society, unlike al-Qaeda, but it does not mean that it has learned the lesson still from the first time around, that the price of power; or at least a share of it, will mean ditching al Qaeda. However, it remains to be seen, whether Taliban's religious dogmatic outlook is stronger than its immediate strategic interests, or, it has learned its lessons, and is willing to play a role in the development of Afghan political process, at the expense of al Qaeda.

In any case, we are not likely to find out, unless those questions can be addressed seriously. At least not for the time being.

Indeed Mullah Omar had sent a [Eid al Fitr] well wishes message after Ramadan, to Turkmenistan, pledging peaceful and fraternal relations; contrary to al-Qaeda's revolutionaty rhetoric, and, more importantly there seem to be moves for Taliban to recognise the United Nations and its institutions, in opposition to what al Thawahiri refers to frequently; as an "infidel" organisation.

khairi janbek.paris/france