Thursday, November 12, 2009 - 11:16 PM
The other day, I mentioned that I would be interested to hear what Nathan Brown thought about the current Israeli-Palestinian situation, given that a year ago he argued powerfully that there were no serious prospects for negotiations and it was time to think of a Plan B. He has obliged with an excellent Carnegie brief, and with this short commentary, which I'm calling...
OK, here we are at Plan B. Guest commentary by Nathan Brown.
The collapse of US diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian front—too obvious now for even the most starry-eyed optimist to deny—has provoked predictably partisan sniping in Washington in which the Obama administration’s critics (and actually even some of its friends) charge it with incompetence.
There have been tactical mistakes aplenty, though to be fair to the current US leaders, their predecessors could be stunningly maladroit as well. But the problem goes beyond clumsiness. The commonalties between the late Bush approach and the early Obama approach far outnumber the differences: they amount to a “West Bank first” strategy of building up the Ramallah government, pursuing Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy in support of a two-state solution, and ignoring Hamas on the assumption that allowing the impoverishment of Gaza will bring Palestinians there to their senses.
Seen this way, the Obama administration’s embarrassments of the past month have served a vital public service: they reveal that the basic US approach leads only to political decay. In a short commentary for the Carnegie Endowment, I argue that this is the time to abandon rather than tweak failed policies.
One of the long-denied realities is the deep state of institutional decay on the Palestinian side. Just as Voltaire famously described the Holy Roman Empire as “neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire,” there are reasons to describe Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestinian Authority as neither Palestinian nor an authority. It is an internationally-sponsored and partly internationally-financed protectorate administering some Palestinian towns and cities in the West Bank. Its shelf life was supposed to be five years, starting with its creation in 1994. To regard its moldy remains as the germ of a Palestinian state ignores the unhealthy dose of antibiotics that Israelis, Americans, and Palestinians themselves have administered to the Palestinian national movement over the past ten years.
Is there a way out?
No. Or at least not now. The best we can do is to make sure that things don’t get worse and begin creating the raw ingredients for fresh new approaches. This will not be easy. Elsewhere I have proposed a “Plan B” that focuses less on conflict-ending diplomacy and more on working to contain the damage and create the basis for moving to a solution in the future. I still stand behind that proposal, but I acknowledge that it has its own weaknesses and may be based on excessively optimistic hopes of what can be achieved. So for now, let me restrict myself to a few pointers. In the Carnegie commentary, I argue that whatever approach is adopted should not ignore the following realities, among others
Plan B: Acknowledging that we have a great deal more leverage with the Israelis than the Palestinians do, and using that leverage to help Israel help themselves and the US.
We, independent of the Palestinians, set forth a series of demands of the Israelis, including the removal of settlements other than the largest population centers hugging the borders, and the complete end of the occupation in all other areas, while arranging with the UN and other Arab nations to send in a UN based peace keeping force that will keep the Palestinian factions at bay, and also ensure that the IDF and settlers stay out for good and under all circumstances.
We make all financial, military, and diplomatic support conditional upon these demands, and we start to remove that support sequentially until progress is made, and threaten to progress to sanctions and embargoes if necessary. However, I seriously doubt that will be necessary, as the Israeli people have never been forced to actually FEEL the true cost of the brutal occupation and settlements, because we have been subsidizing it financially, militarily, and diplomatically. Once the understand the true cost of their misguided and internationally condemned actions, I think the majority (who have wanted to see an end to the settlements for a long time anyway) will finally prevail.
This will win us MASSIVE approval throughout the region. It will set forth a situation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem that will put pressure on the political leaders there to start building their OWN facts on the ground in the form of infrastructure as opposed to fostering further violence. We would have a DRAMATICALLY easier time financing and fostering a stable Palestinian leadership and security apparatus if it was not CONSTANTLY undermined by the daily brutalities of the IDF and the settlers, the harsh realities of the apartheid state in the occupied territories or the destruction of houses and further ethnic cleansing of Palestinians that is necessary for the settlements footprint to constantly grow, as they have for the last 40 plus years.
Israel will have little choice but to comply. Theie compliance to that point will make any FURTHER negotiations necessary to formalize relations vastly easier and more attainable.
This is in the interest of the US. It would help defuse tensions with Iran. It would remove one of Al Qeadas most potent marketing tools (the occupation and settlements and the regional perception that this is the US vision for ALL of the middle east) thereby making hte US safer from terrorist attacks in the future, and it would make relations with out other key oil providing nations in the region a great deal better.
Such a magical UN force would be little more than shields for rowdy rocket rich rejectionists.
The way for the Palestinians to get a state is to go ahead and build it. If and when the institutions are there and functioning, from police and courts to a parliament, negotiations will reflect that fact.
The argument that settling the borders and removing Little Satan's troops must come first is a path to failure. For one thing, Little Satan will not and should not leave until it is clear that the West Bank can be policed by Palestinians and that the region will not be a source of terrorism, as Gaza and South Lebanon became when Little Satan left there.
No conference and no treaty can provide such a guarantee; only functioning Palestinian police forces that are already fighting and defeating terror can do so.
It would press the Arab states to help real live Palestinians in the West Bank, rather than the imaginary Palestinians--all either bold jihadists or desperate widows and orphans--whom they see on Al Jazeera.
In fact, except for occasional visits by Jordanians and Egyptians (who have peace treaties with Little Satan already), top Arab officials haven't a clue what's going on in the West Bank, for they've never been there. Not one head of state or government or foreign minister, not once.
Organize a tour; take a few princes and foreign ministers to Ramallah, Jenin and Jericho where they would find that they are neither in Somalia nor some heroic battle scene against Zionist oppressors.
As Palestine's dual d'nom'd Abbas/Mazen says: "In West Bank we have a good reality… the people are living a normal life.”
The presence of the settlers has 0 positive impact on israeli security, so they should be pulled first. But why not allow the UN/arab peace keepers to take over for the IDF as well?
It's working in lebanon. Part of their function will also be keeping the IDF and settlers OUT so that they cannot cause problems.
The settlements are illegl and should have been removed years ago. It will reduce US terrorism as well, according to the Iraq study group, the CIA, the 9/11 commission and most living presidents.
I suppose the answer is simple. The U.N does not have the political will to enforce its own decisions when it comes to Israel.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Incorrect - it's not working in Lebanon. In fact everywhere Little Satan has split - the result is more Iranian missile fans moving in and creating havoc. Like the Strip or Hiz'B'Allah's Blue Line.
UN certainly couldn't keep Hiz'B'Allah from re arming. Little to base faith on that idea in West Bank.
May be high time to re evaluate the curiously played 'illegal settlements' meme. Tough to believe that apartments, shopping malls and bookstores are weaponized, but it is awful easy to grasp the concept that states that repeatedly attack democratic members of the UN and repeatedly lose pay a price in turf lost to desperate yet victorious counterattacks.
Since WWII borders have redrawn a hundred times. Why is Palestine so magical?
Also the idea that such a NakBah free manuever would ease up terrorism has been proven historically incorrect.
Example? 1996. Great Satan convinced Little Satan to hand over Hebron to the Palestinian Authority. Result? OBL's 1st fatwa, Saudiland's stonewall of Khobar towers investigation, a massive arms cache discovered for terrorist strikes against Europa in Antwerp.
In fact - the faster the move to create Palestine the faster the spread of violent terroristic mohammedism - not decrease it.
Following the same borders argument, why is Israel so magical then?. In any case, the settlements remain illegal under international law and acknowledged as such by the UN.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Thanks for making the case janbekster! Those borders are no diff than anywhere else - except for Little Satan - then they are 'illegal or occupied'.
Careful with the UN stuff - UN also agreed to disarm Hiz'B'Allah and no movement on issues that can actually kill people - like Hiz'B'Allah rockets - by UN - so why the grief over stuff that can't hurt anybody - like apartments, bookstores and schools?
Again high time to re evaluate the entire sitch - Little Satan won that turf fair and square in several wars. Let her do with it what she will, expatriate any Palestinians to anywhere they wish in Arab League and get Egypt, Syria and Jordan to fund the move.
The fact that no one can yet, disarm Hizbullah, its rockets are no more legal than the Israeli settlements under international law, which no one seems to be able to impliment also. Your good self also should be careful about the argument of winning turf and expatriating people; in this case the Palestinians, because it is equal in logic, to Arabs whom say that the Jews should be expatriated to where they came from in all over the world; Poland, Russia, USA etc... . I don't personally subscribe to their logic, nor to yours to that effect.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Elsewhere I have proposed a “Plan B” that focuses less on conflict-ending diplomacy and more on working to contain the damage and create the basis for moving to a solution in the future.
Nathan, you appear to agree with Netanyahu on this.
One suggestion:
What we should do is get a firm committment from the Israeli government that they won't expand the settlement footprint during this time and have it monitored by a US-Jordanian (or some such) task force. We should make aid contingent on their reports and let everyone, especially the Arab League, know this. Steps should be taken to improve the economic situation in the West Bank.
On the other side of the coin, we need a firm committment from the Palestinians that they will present in as positive a light as possible (eg, "for the first time, we ended their encroachment on Palestinian land" vs. "we won't accept this because they are still building within existing settlements"), end talk of 'resistance', and stop the incitement (see, for example, the recent episode at the Temple Mount where PA officials were fanning the flames, all due to rumors that Jewish extremists would harm Al Aksa). They should also begin preparing their people for peace, which includes gradually introducing the reality that they won't be getting everything they want. Part of the problem is that the Palestinian leaders can never go back to their people with any sort of compromise at all because those same leaders have been telling them for so long that they will achieve everything. Will all of this be hard? Of course. Will it have to be tempered and introduced gradually. Again, of course. Due to the domestic politics it will have to be handled gingerly. However, that is different from, 'Let the Palestinians off the hook because what they have to do is difficult'.
You never step in the same river twice.
If fellow bloggers remember; or even have read one's previous messages on the subject of the Palestinians, I have termed what Dr Brown calls "managing things"; managing the status quo, his "contain danger"; as conflict prevention, and his "conflict ending diplomacy"; as conflict resoltuion. I added frequently also, that I was very reluctant to advocate such an approach, for the same weaknesses which make me criticise this "Plan B", and to which Dr. Brown himself admits to it having weaknesses.
Dr. Brown describes; if I may add aptly, the PNA as "neither Palestinian nor an authority", and an " "internationally sponsored as well as partly internationally financed protectorate". There will be no argument from me over this discription which I believe is true, but since the situation is as such, what would be the point of continuing the economic support of such an entity, under conditions of certain political vacuum, which is a legitimate question to ask when Dr. Brown himself, does not rate the success of such a policy very highly.
When it comes to "managing things" or my, managing the status quo, it will be like calling on managing stepping into the same river twice; which the ancient Greek philosopher tells it can't happen. In other words, there is no status quo, or "things to manage" because Bibi will just continue his settlements drive policies, and strengthen Israel's grab on Jerusalem, while Gaza will fall prey to more encirclement measures.
Then Dr. Brown adds, " create the basis to move into a solution in the future". But what basis?, when at the end of the day, the PNA will end up with the rump of what it has now with expanded settlements, minus Jerusalem, an Israeli controlled Jordan valley, no Gaza, or even if Hamas buckles under its own weight, the PNA will get extra 40 square Kilometers with 1.45 million Gazans in it, and if Hamas continues to survive, the only agreement that the PNA will reach with the organisation, is a concession on the right of resistance in favour of Hamas. In addition, the right of retrun will be effectively burried, before even any compensation mechanism is proposed. I suppose either Dr. brown can define what he means by creating the basis for a solution in the future, or, the only conclusion I can reach, is that at one point in the future, the Palestinians are expected to accept what have described above in terms of a state.
I confess that, for a person whom has worked for peace all his professional life; and must add that I am far from disillusioned, I must have seemed very negative on the question of Arab-Israeli peace; and specifically Palestinian- Israeli peace. I did express the belief that the Two-State solution is non-starter, the One-State or Bi-National State impossible, and here I am criticising the "B Plan", so at least there must be something positive which I can say.
Mind you, in a world of endless permutations, and in which all proposals seem incomprehensible and unimplimentable, I might as well add my own little contribution to the myriad of incomprehensible and unimplimentable solutions to the Palestinian problem. So briefly and to the point, I would suggest re-visiting a variation on the theme of the United Arab Kingbdom Plan of 1972; proposed by late HM King Hussein of Jordan for the west bank, and as far as Gaza is concerned, to reach an agreement with Egypt for a special relatinship between both of them. I mean surely Egypt with its large geography and over 70 million people, can come to an arrangement, with 40 square Kilometers, and 1.45 million Gazans.
khairi janbek.paris/france
JB could you amplify on the United Arab Kingdom plan of 1972? What was it?
Coincidentally, I am talking about the plan, on the birthday of late HM King Hussein. The plan said in 1972, that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, after the Israeli withdrawal from the west bank, would become the United Arab Kingdom, comprising two regions: first; the region of Palestine (ie. the west bank and any further Palestinian territories whose inhabitants would opt to join), would have Jerusalem as its capital, while the second region of Jordan, would have Amman as its capital.
Furthermore, Amman would be the administrative capital of both regions. The King would be the head of state. There would be local government and local parliament in each region, as well as, one federal government and parliament. There would be one federal supreme court and one army. The late King added that, this woild be his own preference, though he intended to give the Palestinians, after liberation, the opportunity to determine their own future, and promised to respect their choice.
The plan remained on the books for further two years until 1974, when the Arab Leaders Conference in Morocco, complied with late Mr. Arafat's wishes, that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians and their independent decision.
Of course, both the tone and the substance of the plan are relevant to the era, hence my suggestion that re-visting the plan must be in accordance with the current developments. Actually Mr./Ms. bb, Dr. Lynch in his previous posting on the Palestinian elections, gives the link "and right on cue.." which indeed it is right on cue, where the pros and cons on the lines proposed by me, are discussed inter alia.
khairi janbek.paris/france
It's not as if we didn't see Plan B coming down the pike for the last decade or so.
Edward Said said he had to endlessly repeat, justify and argue the Palestinian situation to his detractors. Today matter how many blog posts, scholarly papers, symposia, conferences, green papers, pronouncements, oratory, resolutions, royal wishes and roadmaps, the result is the same. Things get worse for the Palestinians as the Israeli sappers continue their whack job.
Thanks JB. Mygoodself has always seen an economic federation for Palestine with Jordan and Egypt as the obvious way to go, if for no other reason than it would reduce Palestine's dependence on the Israeli economy. I thought Rob Malley's commentary was excellent, particularly its section on Jordan.
But Dr Brown's Plan B! Am deeply puzzled to how an ME expert can write extensively proposing a long term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas without even mentioning the impact such a ceasefire would have on the PLO, given said ceasefire would free Hamas up to pursue its takeover of the PA and the West Bank? Does Dr Brown think that the PLO would go quietly into the night? Does he think Israel would consider its interests best served by a Hamas takeover? It is quite bizarre.
One advocated this plan in a previous life, and still advocates it now as the best option among other bad ones, for the ultimate aim of developing a "Benelux" arrangement between Jordan-west bank associated with Jordan- and Israel, so that freedom of movement of people, capital, and goods will be possible for the benefit of all.
Gaza can be integrated into this "Benelux", in association with Egypt, if and when Egypt decides to join this arrangement. Of cours depending on the future prospects of success, of the peace process between the other Arab countries and Israel, the option would remain open for anyone else in the Arab world whom wishes to join in. I suppose, this is the closest that one gets to the notion of beating swords into plough-shares.
I don't believe that plan "B" would have any chance of success, as I wrote above criticising it, because I think in essence, it accepts failure before it starts.
khairi janbek.paris/france
I always thought the Fayyad government was the first uncorrupt govt the Palestinians have had, but Dr Brown dismisses it as a "technological authoritarian govt in Ramallah". And he describes the US as "feckless" for attempting to build up a "viable Palestinian Authority for the West Bank"!
Is this typical of the advice Obama would be getting from a Dem administration? The mind boggles.
A report has been published by the Institute for Near East& Gulf Military Analysis /Dubai; entitled " Bad Times to be a US Ally in Rapidly Changing Middl East". The report says inter alia " Whether it is in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, and even parts of North Africa, Iran and its proxies seem to have the momentum with very little Washington can do to stop them". Also it said " Some US allies today, are seeking other options to secure their interests and survivial". The report goes on to say " But it remains to be seen whether other super powers like India, or China, or Russia, or EU would be able to gain from America's losses in the region".
Mind you, one personally has always lamented the fact that, the US does not award its allies, the same respect it awards its detractors.
khairi janbek.paris/france
The More I think of "B" Plan..
the more I am reaching the conclusion that, what is on the table for the Palesitnians, is to talk now to Bibi before construction starts in the settlements{current situation}, or, start talking after construction has already started if not accomplished in the settlements in 2 years {Mr. Salam Fayyad's plan for building Palesitnian institutions first}.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
Read More
(18)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE