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Posted By Marc Lynch
Friday, November 27, 2009 - 2:50 PM
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The wise souls who run the Washington Post op-ed page have ordained that what we, the American people, most need for Thanksgiving is another op-ed by Fred and Kim Kagan about Afghanistan (at least their third since August). It's the usual: surge, surge, surge, more troops, no conditionality or timeline, and so on.
I'll leave it to others to consider their arguments about Afghanistan (you'd think the Taliban were an important factor, but they astoundingly aren't mentioned once). I was just struck by the conclusions they draw from the Iraqi experience for Afghanistan. They write:
The recent American experience in Iraq illustrates how US forces and diplomacy helped correct the behaviors of a sometimes malign government in ways that helped neutralize insurgent groups. In early 2007, many Iraqi leaders were using instruments of state to support sectarian death squads. The dysfunctional government could not secure the population, pass laws or provide services to its people. The implementation of a fully resourced counterinsurgency strategy - enabled by the deployment of nearly six additional US combat brigades - transformed Iraq's government within 18 months. Opponents of the surge argued that Iraqis would "step up" politically and militarily only if they knew that US forces would leave. Instead, before committing to the fight, political leaders and populations throughout Iraq assessed whether US forces would stay long enough to secure them. Iraqis stepped up precisely because of the absence of conditionality and time limits on US force levels...
This catechism of the Iraq surge rests on at least two telling omissions.
First, it ignores the Awakenings. Completely absent from their narrative is the Sahwa -- the Sunni turn against the Islamic State of Iraq (AQI) which began half a year before the surge was even conceptualized. While it was helped along by some enterprising American military officers, the Sunni turn had much more to do with local power-struggles, intra-insurgency factionalism, and the crushing reality of the sectarian cleansing of Baghdad. The "surge" probably helped to consolidate those gains, and to spread the initiative through the urban areas, but the turn simply can't be explained through American willpower or doctrine alone. To know whether a surge in Afghanistan might have similar effects, you would need to know not just what the U.S. is doing but whether those underlying developments among Afghans are comparable (short version: they aren't).
Second, the narrative misreads Iraqi politics. In their telling, the Americans committed to staying for the long run -- no timeline, no conditions -- thus reassuring Iraqis that they could afford to risk turning against the insurgents. That may have been a factor at certain points on the ground, but it's only part of the story. They leave out the seemingly significant fact that throughout much of that period of unconditional commitment, the Iraqis failed to make significant progress towards political accommodation.
But by the summer of 2008, Iraqis clearly saw that the American presence would more likely than not soon decline, with the likely victory of Barack Obama and his pledge to withdraw from Iraq. And they responded to this increasing likelihood of U.S. withdrawal along a reasonable timeline by, yes, stepping up. It was in this period of an impending American election and likely change of strategy that Prime Minister Maliki took a series of gambles aimed at consolidating state authority (i.e. the Basra military campaign), and engaged in hard bargaining over the SOFA / SFA which forced the Bush administration to accept an unconditional timeline for withdrawal (which it did, very much to the Bush administration's credit in those closing days). This doesn't mean that the U.S. should commit to withdrawal from Afghanistan right now -- I don't think the situations are exactly comparable -- but it does cast doubt on the idea that leverage comes from unlimited and unconditional military commitment.
It's tiresome to have to go back and rehash these old arguments. But it's hard to avoid when the supposed lessons of Iraq are then inappropriately transposed onto Afghanistan. The debate over Afghan policy continues to suffer from General McChrystal's curious decision to appoint a group of surgenik think tankers such as the Kagans, with virtually no Afghan expertise, to ghost-write a "strategy review" which has shaped so much of the subsequent public debate. But I've been pleasantly surprised by the lengthy, critical evaluation in which the Obama administration has engaged -- with many of the underlying assumptions challenged and debated, as they should be.
I've never agreed with the widely aired opinion that Obama should just make a decision, whether it's right or wrong (as long as that decision is to escalate, presumably). I'm impressed that his team seems to have given serious thought to the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the legitimacy of the Karzai government, the lessons of the Soviet experience, how to pre-empt future demands for more troops, how to maximize leverage, and how to craft an exit strategy. It doesn't mean that they'll get the policy right -- or even that there's a right policy to find. I predicted weeks ago that the result of the strategy review would be a decision to add 30,000 or so troops, it wouldn't work, hawkish critics would give Obama no credit for the decision, and next year we could have the whole argument over again. Here's to hoping that Obama's speech next week proves me wrong.
The Most Likely Outcome for President Obama..
is to recieve flack from both sides of the argument simultaneously; supporters of surge, surge, and supporters of disengage, disengage. One humbly thinks that, no matter what the number of boys and girls to be sent to Afghanistan will be, it will not be enough for one side, and too much for the other.
If I was President Obama and thank God I am not; for myself and for others, I would eventually send troops to Afghanistan and take all the criticism with a stiff upper lip, but at the same and immediately, work on a logical process for the disengagement of the US from the conflict over there.
I would start be dropping the US support to the current Afghan president, and urge the Loya Jirga to elect another president from their ranks; whom may well have enough credibility with his peers as well as with the Taliban, to explore possibilities on how Taliban can be accomodated within the Afghan political process. Also, I would let the balance of terror and fear from each other, which governs almost all the relations between the regional stake-holders in Afghanistan, to neutralise each other's effect on the country and their proxies, while I would invest more in the human factor in intelligence work, rather than with just the "scoopy doo" stuff of supposed technology, with the essential continuation of special ops and strategic bombings of al Qaeda and its affiliates.
khairi janbek.paris/france
I would start be dropping the US support to the current Afghan president, and urge the Loya Jirga to elect another president from their ranks; whom may well have enough credibility with his peers as well as with the Taliban, to explore possibilities on how Taliban can be accomodated within the Afghan political process.
That's one possibility, but I imagine a sense of "loss-aversion" is pervasive in the US effort. While they dislike Karzai, they no doubt think he is ultimately "their man", that they understand him, and that they can push him in the right direction (also known as "their ideas on the right direction"). Dumping Karzai would probably lead to the effective death of the current Afghan regime, and a period of instability and lack of decision-making before a new one is picked - at a time when the US is trying to get some quick gains for political reasons back home.
I suppose, President Obama has the choice of following either, seeing a regime in Afghanistan that he likes to see, or dealing with the regime in Afghanistan which he already has.
I surely wish him luck in trying to convince the American people {of course if he thinks they need convincing}, in the next few days, that he is sending thousands of their spouses and children to prop up a president of a country ultimately, who is corrupt, corrupting, and tolorates corruption, with dubious legitimacy to say the least, and with no chance in hell of being capable or credible enough, to try a negotiated settlement for the problems of his own country.
khairi janbek.paris/france
"First it IGNORES the Awakenings."
This is what Prof Lynch wrote about Fred Kagan and the Awakenings in September 2007.
"Ali Hatem Ali Suleiman, 35, a leader of the Dulaim confederation, the largest tribal organization in Anbar, said that the Anbar Salvation Council would be dissolved because of growing internal dissatisfaction over its cooperation with U.S. soldiers and the behavior of the council's most prominent member, Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. Suleiman called Abu Risha a "traitor" who "sells his beliefs, his religion and his people for money.
"That's our guy. That's the pillar of America's Sunni strategy, and a key player in Fred Kagan's fantasy life."
AND
"Now Fred Kagan and the administration argue that "moderate" (read "amenable to the Americans") will win out in the intra-Sunni competition, and that the political incentives will now undermine hard-liners. The lavish financial packages mentioned during Bush's stopover in Anbar are surely meant to sweeten their hand, as are the police and military jobs. But all of this relies on an astonishing number of rosy assumptions - about economic development, about Sunni preferences and expectations, and about the passivity of hard-liners in the face of it all."
And
"I wish I could have been there as Abu Risha nodded along sagely while Bush promised to funnel large-scale American economic development funds in Anbar, perhaps offering the services of his own highly professional office in seeing to the disbursement of the funds. It's kind of humiliating to watch an American President get rolled by a two bit, corrupt petty shaykh"
And
"His (Abu Risha's) murder graphically demonstrates that the other groups threatened by the American Anbar strategy were never going to just sit back passively and allow it to succeed - an obvious strategic point which has always seemed to elude surge advocates.
"The Sunni strategy as presented by surge advocates has always rested not only on a whole series of dubious claims about Iraqi Sunni politics, but also relies on a whole series of best-case scenarios in which nothing could go wrong. In Iraq, something always goes wrong."
Heartening see Prof Lynch now endorsing the surge advocates' Sunni strategy. But it appears Fred Kagan was there first and may have something to offer on Afghanistan?
Another hard decision may well be coming up.
I have just heard on al Arabiya channel, that its sources are saying, Russia has agreed to deliver the anti-aircraft missiles AS 300 to Iran. If this is true; sorry because it is of-track, I think President Obama may well be in for another session of hard decisions.
khairi janbek.paris/france
I have said this many times before, but the only way the problem in Afghanistan can be dealt with is through the correct combination of military, civilian, and diplomatic power. An influx of American troops need to be deployed in the areas most under Taliban control (i.e. the south and east of the country) rather than in areas already protected by a substantial American regiment. U.S. commanders need to forget about protecting the "green-zone" in Kabul. In fact, this is the Iraqi equivalent of sending 10,000 additional troops into the most protected areas of Baghdad, and we all know how successful that plan worked out.
Civilian reconstruction efforts need to be steadily increased, not only through monetary contributions but also through a substantial "civilian-surge" on the ground. Thankfully, the State Department has confirmed that they are sending more civilian personnel to deal with the pervasive governing problems throughout Afghanistan. But even this is a lame attempt at salvaging western objectives. Why doesn't the United States understand that Hamid Karzai is not the only problem in Afghan politics? We seem to forget that Afghan warlords practically dominate the provincial levels of government.
And lastly, American and NATO troops must co-opt the numerous tribes of Afghanistan on our side, as Marc Lynch so amply states. I would hope that the most senior officials in the Obama administration understand this. Without inducements and hope for the future, we should not expect our mission to succeed; for the people of Afghanistan will continue to view NATO as a self-interested force. Afghan villagers need an incentive to join our side of the fight, and the only way to make it happen is to show them that they will receive benefits for their cooperation. REMEMBER: MOST OF THE TALIBAN FIGHT IN THE INSURGENCY FOR FINANCIAL REASONS. The only logical response would be to bribe many of these low-level fighters into submission- as we did in Iraq.
As in Iraq, military operations are useless without cooperation from the population. I severely doubt that the surge would have worked absent the Awakening Movement. This is perhaps the one lesson we can apply to Afghanistan.
http://depetris.wordpress.com
As usual I think Prof. Lynch has this one right, but I just wanted to add one more thing. The geography and terrain of Afghanistan makes implementing another "surge" just that much more difficult. I don't really see how this war ends well.
I would hope that the U.S. military- the most technologically sophisticated and powerful in the world- could overcome the challenges put forth by geography and terrain. Either way, a surge in Afghanistan would probably take a few months to actually carry out. The one area where geography could pose a problem is transportation, such as the movement of resources into Afghanistan through Pakistan's tribal region. Thus far, the route of NATO supply lines is anything but protected, courtesy of Taliban attacks on convoys. I suspect that attacks will only increase as more equipment is hauled across the border. I am guessing that this is what you were most likely referring too..
http://depetris.wordpress.com
But by the summer of 2008, Iraqis clearly saw that the American presence would more likely than not soon decline, with the likely victory of Barack Obama and his pledge to withdraw from Iraq. And they responded to this increasing likelihood of U.S. withdrawal along a reasonable timeline by, yes, stepping up.
This strikes me as simplistic. For one thing, many of the gains were already materializing for Iraq by the time this period came around. For another, it's rather US-centric; how much did Iraqis know and actually follow in terms of US politics in this period?
That's not to say that the Kagans are right. They're rather optimistic on the Surge's gains, and they downplay the stuff that hasn't gone away (for one thing, those sectarian militias are still around).
I suspect that P.M. Maliki was probably surveying the U.S. political scene quite frequently during that period. After all, his legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people- not to mention his government's entire bankroll- was a project designed, funded and eventually executed by Americans in Washington. In fact, his reputation as a man tough on internal security would have been a joke without an increased U.S. Military commitment. With this reality, it would only be natural for him to watch U.S. politics closely, especially when the election's main focal point was U.S. foreign-policy (i.e. the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). Obviously, this is only my two-cents.
I agree in large part with what you said about Iraq's gains in 2008, namely your point that "many of the gains were already materialized for Iraq by the time this period came around." Security-wise, you are correct. But upon looking at the political scene, a number of outstanding issues were still dividing Iraq's sectarian groups. The city of Kirkuk, oil revenues, and election laws to name a few. Perhaps Maliki was concerned that these political issues would translate into another spout of violence if the U.S. left (which thankfully, we did not). Again, just another observation... no one knows for sure.
http://depetris.wordpress.com
One has always been sceptical about comparing and contrasting situations, and more so when it comes to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Therefore I find myself in agreement with General Petraeous, whom said in his lecture in April 2009 in Harvard; JFK School of Government, "there is enormous difference between Iraq and Afghanistan. For example Afghanistan lacks Iraq's large oil reveniews and its muscle memory of strong central government institutions". He added that there are also culturtal differences, which require a different approach to conducting counterinsurgency operations, " You have to apply [them] in a way that is culturally appropriate for Afghanistan. For example a key strategy shift that accompanied the troops surge in Iraq, in which US troops lived within the Iraqi communities they helped to rescue, won't necessarily work in Afghanistan. You don't move into a village in Afghanistan the way that we were able to move into neighbourhoods in Iraq. You have to move on the edge of it, or just near it, but you still have to have persistent security presence".
What I found interesting is some conclusions of Genral Petraeous. 1- "It will be be difficult, and you won't see the dramatic turnaround that we have seen in Iraq", and
2- " The Americans have to recognize that, this represents a vital interest to our country".
khairi janbek.paris/france
After reading it again, I’m convinced that this is the first iteration of what is intended as a generic op-ed that can be quickly tailored to any conflict. They can pull it up on their word processor, quickly substitute the name of the country of the moment (Yemen, Somalia, New Jersey — take your pick) for Afghanistan and have another piece ready to send to the editor.
I’m curious: do either of the Kagans have a long-term body of work (i.e., a few things that were written before Afghanistan became a front burner topic) that qualifies them as experts on Afghanistan or it’s people? Personally, I have a problem with “defense intellectuals” who think about war but have never done war, who are defense celebrities not because of what they’ve done but solely because of what they’ve said, whose answer to every question in every situation is “add more troops,” and who have no area expertise.
For a much better critique of this whole military-think tank complex than I could ever possibly write, I heartily recommend the new national security blog The Security Crank.
How to succeed in Afghanistan...
A surge of troops in Afghanistan will not succeed in Iraq unless we completely change our strategy. Hamid Karzai stands in the way of American victory just as much as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. My simple argument that if we are to preempt requests for requests for more troops and have a true exit strategy we must develop Afghanistan. Careful diplomatic relations with the Karzai administration, training for Afghan forces and grassroots development of its people are musts. But none of this will work without stabilizing a country that has been at war for virtually the last thirty years. For more on my reasons for arguing for a surge and focusing on human development, check out: http://www.songofsibyl.com/2009/11/17/to-surge-or-not-to-surge/ .
jb - You missed out on Petraeus' most important conclusion: "you still have to have persistent security presence"."
Securing the people is the basis of the COIN strategy and the whole justification for the Surge, as it was in Iraq. I'm sure the good professor made a pre-emptive strike against Kagan in order to fudge the reality that Obama has accepted the surge/advocates/Bush strategy for Afhganistan, as well as the general (Petraeus) who Bush helpfully appointed to the top command position just before he left office.
It's not the hawkish critics who are going to be Obama's problem once he has committed to the Surge and COIN, it is the Democratic Left he will have to wory about, as am sure Prof Lynch knows full well.
I haven't missed out on security, because it only stands to reason that without security there can be no stability. The jist of my argument remains the same; and I apologise for putting in business terms now, but you just don't throw good money after bad money when it comes to any enterprize.
In order to save an enterprize from bankrupcy; and I think the regime in Afghanistan is already bankrupt, the first thing that happens is that, it gets re-structured from top top to bottom, in order to make it worthy of survivial. After all, the Americans et al are paying with blood as well as with money.
Since I have always advocated an international conference about Afghanistan; albeit sponsored by the US, I am glad that the British will be hosting one at the end of December as it seems.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Bad arguments never die, they just go to Afghanistan
Even if President Obama was to be able to convince the world about the need for the troop surge in Afghanistan, US mission is doomed to fail unless US goes after the supporters of Taliban now sheltered in Pakistan.
Bush’s buddy Musharraf while pretending to join US fight against same Taliban, gave sanctuary to Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Afghan Taliban in province of Baluchistan after US threw them out from Afghanistan in 2001. As General McChrystal observed in his assessment to President Obama:
1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan.
2. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year.
3. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.
While mounting South Waziristan offensive, Pakistani establishment continues to deny the existence of Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) located in Baluchistan. Besides sheltering Hekmatyar’s and Haqqani’s groups and Mullah Mohammed Omar’s Afghan Taliban, democratic government of Pakistan continues to sign peace deals with Pakistani Taliban groups like the ones led by Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir, allowing them to continue to terrorize Afghanistan so long as those groups do not terrorize Pakistan.
Afterall Pakistan is sheltering these Afghan groups since 2001 for a reason - to reestablish Pakistan’s writ in Afghanistan as and when US leaves.
So Obama’s billions are going to follow Bush’s billions in that bottomless pit called ‘terrorist heaven of Pakistan’ unless US stops coddling Pakistan and US starts using its aid leverage to force Pakistan to crack down on not just select few in border areas but ALL Taliban/Al Qaeda factions within entire Pakistan, US mission has NO chance of succeeding in Afghanistan.
Though one has no personal sympathy with Mr. Zardari, yet the US support for Pakistan is not out of luxury, rather, out of necessity, unless the US decides that, it can put up with another 4-5 Afghanistans if Pakistan disintegrates; not to mention of course the issue of the country's nuclear weapons.
khairi janbek.paris/france
Yes, a surge in U.S troops will complicate the already complex situation in Afghanistan.
1. How ill U.S provide the logistical support to the extra troops when the current one in place through Pakistan is facing mounting attacks from Taliban in FATA?
2. Also, what did Gen McChrystal & his NATO troops achieve in Northern & Western Afghanistan, which were relatively peaceful till a year ago?
3. If at all a troop surge is required, then it is from Pakistani side and that too in Northern Waziristan and FATA area, where all the Taliban & Al-Qaeda sanctuaries are located. I don't think Pakistan is going to oblige U.S or NATO on that score.
If U.S is still hell bent on troops surge, then it is better to for U.S to recruit elite Ex- Gurkha soldiers of U.K, who will be able to adjust much better to the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and need much less funds to support.
The real problem is nothing will work. There is simply no way to accomplish anything meaningful with two countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both countries are corrupt beyond our comprehension. The leaders of both countries are weak and corrupt and this will continue regardless of how many American troops are sent.
Another real problem is the American people will turn against this war in droves as time marches on. The anti-war group is already organized and feeling betrayed. The students are already beginning to organize, and by spring the anti-war movement will be dominating the news cycle.
No matter what Obama says or thinks, the war will go badly and more so beginning in March. Americans don't support wars that can't be won in a few months with few casualties. Remember, Bush was popular for a short time after the Iraq war started. Then it dragged on endlessly with few if any real results and the nation, even Republicans, turned against our involvement.
Democrats see their dreams evaporating and the real threat to their own job as mid-terms draw closer. I believe that even health care will go down. Oh they might pass something, but it won't be close to the democratic dream. The Afgan war may be a necessity, but politically it will be a disaster.
Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.
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