Posted By Marc Lynch Share


I watched Obama's speech last night with a heavy heart.  The President impressed, as always -- from the lofty rhetoric to the detailed, logical analysis (and the direct talk to the Afghan people, a nice touch also used in his big Iraq speech so many months ago).  There were few surprises after all the leaks and pre-game briefings, but it was a defining moment nonetheless.  He made the case as best as he could for the least bad of a terrible set of options.  I remain  unconvinced by each stage of the logic - the urgency of action, the connection to al-Qaeda, the likely impact of the increased troops, the mechanisms of leverage, the proposed 2011 inflection point towards drawdown.  And yet, now that the decision has made, I want the President's strategy to succeed. The best way to do that is to make sure that he follows through on his promises to keep the goals tightly focused and to avoid stumbling into open-ended occupation and an endless cycle of escalation.

Obama needed to demonstrate that Afghanistan matters enough to American vital national interests to justify the escalation.  He settled upon al-Qaeda as the reason.  This makes sense for an American audience, I suppose, though when he began talking my first tweet was "President Bush is talking about 9/11 again."  But it's not satisfying analyticvally.  Al-Qaeda is not really active in Afghanistan anymore, and it is not equivalent with the Taliban (either the Afghan or Pakistani variants).  Al-Qaeda Central still matters, but the decentralized network and ideological narrative around the world no longer depends on it.   Nothing the U.S. does or does not do in Afghanistan will defeat al-Qaeda -- the failure of that movement will happen for its own reasons, if it happens (as it already largely has in the Arab world).

The moment where Obama recognized this reality was both reassuring and terrifying:  when he mentioned Somalia and Yemen.  He understands that Afghanistan is not the only, or even the primary, location where those motivated by al-Qaeda's ideas can operate.  But  if the next move is to bring  governance and stability, and counter-terrorism and COIN, to every ungoverned space on Earth -- or even every Muslim-majority ungoverned space on Earth -- then we are truly facing bankruptcy.  Intellectually, financially, militarily, and politically.   We can't afford to do this in Afghanistan. We certainly can't afford to do it in Somalia and Yemen... even if we should, which I strongly doubt.

As for the strategy itself, well, we will see.  The best parts of his presentation were in his keen recognition of the need to prevent this from becoming the first (well, second) of an insatiable demand for more escalations down the road.  He spoke well about limiting the mission to realistic objectives, scaling back grand state-building aspirations and recognizing the limits of American resources. He talked a good game about the era of the blank check being over, about leverage, about accountability -- but how exactly is he going to get such leverage?  The logic makes sense, increased resourcing now with a clearly demarcated time limit, but will this really galvanize a sense of urgency among the key actors?  And even if it did, do they really have the capacity or desire to act in any constructive way?  

Most importantly, he spoke effectively about the logic of a clear time horizon, generating political accountability, and converting a brief military respite into lasting political gains through a clear commitment to ultimately withdraw troops.  His direct vow that the U.S. did not seek occupation or endless escalation was well said. But the problem is that such commitments are inherently non-credible.   To quote that great IR theorist Drake, we hear you talking boo but we just don't believe you. I haven't heard anybody yet say that they believed that Obama would really start drawing down in June 2011, no matter what he says.  And yet the strategy depends upon that commitment being credible, because that is what is supposed to generate the urgency for local actors to change.

I believe that Obama and his team really want things to work out this way, and have carefully thought through how to work it.   But when things don't go their way, will they really follow through on their promises to draw down?   Few people believe that.  And if they don't believe it, then the mechanism of pressure doesn't operate. So it seems to me that the best way for skeptics such as myself to help this strategy to succeed is to keep a sharp focus on the proposed mechanisms of change, demanding evidence that they are actually happening, and to hold the administration to its pledges to maintaining a clear time horizon and to avoiding the iron logic of serial escalations of a failing enterprise. 

More later.

UPDATE:  President Obama anticipated my argument today in his lunch with columnists yesterday

"If it doesn't work, said Obama: "I think there is going to be enormous interest on the part of the American people and on the part of Congress in keeping me to my word that this is not a constant escalation."

Generating domestic pressure to make his commitments on a time horizon and this not becoming an endless series of futile escalations credible will be one of the most important things which Obama's skeptical supporters can do over the next year.   And Obama clearly understands that.   Also reassuring is Secretary of Defense Gates today, telling Senators that Afghanistan and Pakistan is unique -- i.e. we aren't heading into Somalia or Yemen.  One of the great benefits of the long, transparent review process is that all of these arguments have been fully thrashed out and considered. Even if I don't agree with every decision made on strategy, I at least am confident that they thought about all of these objections and reservations in advance. 

 

JANBEKSTER

5:06 PM ET

December 2, 2009

President Obama Decided.

When the US President spoke, it was 2am over here, therefore, if there are errors in judgement on one's behalf, please put it down to sleep deprivation, and NO, the speech wasn't enlightening enough to get me out of my stupor. Anyway, President Obama didn't say, that the surge of 30,000 troops has brought the number of US personell in Afghanistan to 100,00; if I am not mistaken. Without calling upon omens, that was actually the number reached by the Soviets before they withdrew from Afghanistan.

Then, the US President didn't say that there is a civil war going on in Afghanistan, probably because everyone knows that already, between a dispicably corrupt regime, and equally dispicable extreme organisation. Since President Obama said bluntly that, the surge is to stop al Qaeda returning into the country; meaning that it is no longer there, then one can only conclude that, the US President intends to align his country with the dispicable corrupt regime, to fight the dispicable extremist organisation, so that he can prop up the former and bend rather than break the latter, in order to achieve eventually, a power-sharing arrangement between two dispicable partners. The common-denominator word here, is, dispicable. Of course one is not using the term in regrad to President Obama's decision; perish the thought.

I don't recall the Presidnet saying how he intends to finance the war, remember I was in a state of stupor, but since he said that it is not only an American war, could he be thinking of passing the hat, among his friends and allies outside NATO, to dip their hands deeper into their pockets?. It would actually make sense. If there is more, well, one is no Marc Lynch.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

5:19 PM ET

December 2, 2009

successes and blunders

Key Accomplishments in Obama’s Afghan Policy Review:

1) The President told the American people why we are in Afghanistan: With flagging domestic support for the war, it was especially important for the President to stress the reasons why American soldiers are in Afghanistan in the first place. Obama mentioned the tragedy of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as the basis for his argument, as well as the valuable role Afghanistan played in Al’Qaeda’s capabilities. Considering the fact that many American citizens have become confused over the Afghan conflict, detailing the Taliban-Al’Qaeda connection was a fresh reminder for the increasingly skeptical American public. The 9/11 reference gives the public a key message; the U.S. is in Afghanistan for justifiable objectives.

2)Outlined Strategy: The new strategy for Afghanistan calls for an increased military, civilian, and diplomatic commitment. The plan follows several basic guidelines;
1)30,000 additional U.S. troops to the fight

2)A revamped civilian strategy concentrating on
reconstruction and development

3)An enhanced effort to draw low-level Taliban
fighters onto the Afghan Government’s

4)More cooperation with Pakistan in its battle
against Islamic extremism

3)Why the New Strategy Will Work: As expected, lawmakers and the general public expected President Obama to explain why his new counterinsurgency approach would work. Thankfully, he answered this question with accuracy and conviction. Not only will the “Afghanistan rollout” keep pressure on Al’Qaeda…it will also lay the foundation for the quick improvement in Afghan institutions. Reversing Taliban gains were also discussed.

4)Points He Addressed: Afghanistan’s corruption must be tamed, and NATO must be willing to take a greater share of the burden- both in soldiers and in dollars.

Despite all of the successes in his speech overall, he neglected to persuade me on some other issues. Here are a few of (what I view as) blunders in the address.

5)Established A Concrete Timeline: To the surprise of many in the U.S. Congress and in the U.S. Military establishment, the President announced that all American combat troops would be out of the country by July of 2011. This withdrawal date is not only impractical- boosting the Afghan Security Forces and reforming Afghan institutions will take much longer than 18 months- but it gives the Taliban insurgency a new blueprint for success. All the Taliban essentially needs to do now is keep the insurgency running until the summer of 2011, in which American forces will inevitably have to withdraw with their tales between their legs. Symbolically, creating an official benchmark provides Islamic extremists in the region with a reason to celebrate; they can now add the United States in their list of superpower defeats (after Great Britain in the 19th century and the Soviet Union in the 20th century).

The President’s timeline may also conflict with his goal to increase Pakistani cooperation against Al’Qaeda and the Taliban. If American troops are departing from the scene within a period of 18 months, the Pakistani Government simply has no alternative to aid the U.S. Military in counterterrorism operations. With a Taliban takeover of Kabul imminent after a U.S. withdrawal, the Pakistani Military may find it worthwhile to look after their futures by backing the winning side. After all, the Pakistanis have not necessarily viewed the Afghan Taliban in a threatening light to begin with.

There is one more development that is worth nothing in the President’s address. For some reason in which I have yet to understand, the President decided to briefly discuss nuclear nonproliferation, as if this was a major step in pacifying Afghanistan’s tumultuous environment. Why he included preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is beyond me, but I suppose this may have been a direct reference to Iran’s increasingly defiant stance on the nuclear issue. In fact, with Iran’s nuclear program rising on the world’s agenda, President Obama may have found it necessary to use a nationally-publicized forum to bolster his case for more sanctions. But again, this has nothing to do with sending 30,000 soldiers to Afghanistan. Does anyone else have any plausible ideas?

http://depetris.wordpress.com

 

HKEIRC

6:09 PM ET

December 2, 2009

A Skept

Generating domestic pressure to make his commitments on a time horizon and this not becoming an endless series of futile escalations credible will be one of the most important things which Obama's skeptical supporters can do over the next year.

I accept your call.

 

DAN KERVICK

5:11 AM ET

December 3, 2009

Is it Cynicism or Desperation?

Generating domestic pressure to make his commitments on a time horizon and this not becoming an endless series of futile escalations credible will be one of the most important things which Obama's skeptical supporters can do over the next year. And Obama clearly understands that.

Wow. If Obama really does "understand that", then one has to worry that there is an extremely cynical and criminally creepy political strategy behind this move. The cynical interpretation: Obama dearly wants to get out of Afghanistan, but doesn't have the political guts to do it now. So he has pooch-punted the ball 20 months down the field, and hopes to win a battle of political field position. He has designed a phony-baloney quickie surge that he doesn't expect will work, and is betting that after 20 more months of ambivalent results, the war-exhausted American public - including many more Republicans than now - will be positively demanding he get out of the country. That will give him the political cover he needs to get out without being accused of cutting and running.

One can only hope that this is not his thinking. Because if it is, the only conclusion to be drawn is that Obama is a feckless and amoral pol, and that a substantial number of American troops will die between now and July 2011 because our president is too much of a coward to tell the American people the hard truths that they need to hear now.

The less cynical interpretation: Obama's generals have assured him they can turn Afghanistan around in 20 months. So he has given them that amount of time to prove it. In the interim, he sincerely hopes to put together some workable coalition force with more troops from other countries and a rapidly stood-up Afghan security force that will allow the US to begin drawing down without undermining whatever security gains have been achieved in 20 months.

In any case, I don't believe Obama has yet succeeded in explaining to the American people what "success" or "victory" is supposed to look like, and how we will know whether it has been achieved.

 

BUDDYK

5:52 PM ET

December 4, 2009

Excellent Analysis

Unfortunately, I have to concur with this analysis. The relatively limited number of troops being sent and the short time limit given for them to achieve a success the U.S. has been unable to achieve over the past eight years strikes me as a political compromise. Unfortunately, the President's compromise means that more U.S. soldiers and Marines will die defending a corrupt Afghan government and more misery will be inflicted on the long-suffering people of Afghanistan.

 

BB

7:58 AM ET

December 3, 2009

Not heading into Yemen and

Not heading into Yemen and Somalia once AlQ is driven out of Afpak?

You gotta be kidding.

Still, probably won't be Obama's problem but the next CoC's.

 

JANBEKSTER

12:35 PM ET

December 3, 2009

Courage or Folly?.

It takes either great courage, or great folly, to expect to turn the situation around by the next US presidnetial elections.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

SURESH SHETH

4:08 PM ET

December 6, 2009

Absurdity of US administration

It is a height of sheer absurdity for US government to claim that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are in danger of falling in to the hands of Islamic extremists if Taliban insurgency wins in Afghanistan when Pakistan’s current democratic as well as previous military governments are sheltering and protecting the leaders of that very Taliban Afghan insurgency in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan.

General McChrystal clearly laid out in his assessment to President Obama that:
1. Most insurgent fighters in Afghanistan are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan that work through an alternative political infrastructure in Afghanistan.
2. The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) based in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, is the No. 1 threat to US/NATO mission in Afghanistan. At the operational level, the Quetta Shura conducts a formal campaign review each winter, after which Mullah Mohammed Omar (Afghan Taliban Chief) announces his guidance and intent for the coming year.
3. Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups (QST, HQN and HiG) are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI. Al Qaeda and associated movements (AQAM) based in Pakistan channel foreign fighters, suicide bombers, and technical assistance into Afghanistan, and offer ideological motivation, training, and financial support.

Pakistan is sheltering and protecting these Afghan insurgent groups to reestablish its writ in Afghanistan as and when US leaves.

As Times of London reported on 9/28/09, Pakistani government started to relocate Afghan Taliban’s QST leaders to Karachi to protect them from impending US drone attacks on Quetta after the submittal of General McChrystal’s assessment.

With an ally like Pakistan, US has NO chance of winning in Afghanistan no matter how much military efforts or aid US pours there.

 

Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

Read More