So what now on Iran?

Posted By Marc Lynch Thursday, February 11, 2010 - 10:03 PM Share

It isn't easy to be the pessimist on Iran's Green Movement. Everyone wants to support the brave protestors and most everyone hopes to see them prevail over an increasingly thuggish regime. I do. But over the last few weeks, Washington DC seemed to have talked itself into something more -- a belief that Iranian regime change was actually nigh, and that such regime change from below was actually more likely and easier than a negotiated deal on the nuclear program. I've been skeptical in public and private...I've been watching Arab regimes survive in the face of popular dissatisfaction for decades, and have seen all too clearly that while Middle Eastern regimes aren't good at much, they're pretty darned good at staying in power. Still, over the last few weeks I've read countless articles, and been told conspiratorially by many Iran-watchers, that February 11 would be the breakthrough for the Green Movement. And now it's pretty clear that it wasn't. So what now?

Today's fizzle shouldn't have surprised anyone, even if many hoped for more. We shouldn't read too much into it, even if expectations had been raised. But the prospects for regime change have seemed to me less likely over time rather than more likely. During those chaotic first days after the "election" fiasco, there may have been the chance for a massive cascade to change things before the regime could rally itself. But it survived that (and would have, probably even more easily, has the Obama administration publicly taken a position). Since then, it has systematically repressed and divided the opposition, harrassed its leadership and members, and taken steps to shore up its instruments of control. The internet may or may not have played a decisive role in fueling the Green Movement, but either way the regime is now prepared to shut it down when necessary. The Shi'a tradition of commemorations and major national anniversaries do offer focal points for organization and mobilization, but it also tells the regime exactly where and when to expect protest activity. In short, I fully believe that the Iranian regime is more unpopular and less legitimate than ever before -- but just don't see it as especially vulnerable at the moment. 

That's why I think the Obama team has been absolutely right to refrain from "banking on a protest movement which may sputter out or be crushed." It lacks, as one might say, "the satisfying purity of indignation." But it's the right call. We need to accept the limits of American influence over events in Iran. That doesn't mean that the U.S. shouldn't push for human rights and criticize repression -- I think that the administration should support public freedoms in Iran just as it should across the Arab world (and beyond). But it shouldn't count on a regime change from below which will largely be shaped by internal Iranian dynamics and not by American posturing.

What are the alternatives? Some seem to want a grand Presidential speech declaring solidarity with the Green Movement. These are often the same people who used to mock Obama's faith in his own rhetoric, but no matter -- people change, as do circumstances.  Would such a speech help? I doubt it. This would actually be a domestically popular move...but would have real costs which Obama is wise to avoid. It may embolden the protestors, but they are already plenty motivated on their own. It would be making an implicit promise that the U.S. would protect them if they tried to do more -- a promise which almost certainly could not be redeemed. It would also make it all the easier for the regime to demonize and discredit the opposition as American pawns and puppets. I just don't see much hope that indigenous regime change, with or without overt U.S. encouragement, is going to be the magic bullet... but think it's marginally more likely if the U.S. doesn't insert itself in the middle and make itself the issue.

The growing drumbeat for war remains as irresponsible and poorly reasoned as ever. I find it reassuring that Obama's advisers describe the main goal of their strategy as avoiding war. I would be thrilled if I could never again be forced to listen to someone explain how war is the only logical choice, the costs won't be that high and the gains enormous. But then I'd have to get out of the foreign policy business, because advocates of war always make such arguments. An American or Israeli military strike would be risky, would have massive human costs, would be devastating for the rest of Obama's grand strategy, would likely lead to dramatic turn for the worse in Iraq, would have significant (if temporary) effects on the global economy, and would likely strengthen the regime rather than weaken it. It should not be considered a serious policy option.

Nor do I think that there's a grand bargain to be had at the moment. There might have been in the opening months of Obama's Presidency, had he made different choices and approached the problem with a fresher conceptual framework. There were a lot of good ideas out there early on, about putting Iran into a wider regional framework and breaking down the rigid binary oppositions of the Bush era. We'll never know whether the electoral crisis killed the chances for momentum or whether the strategy of simultaneously engaging and preparing for sanctions when engagement failed was doomed from the start. But there's no going back, and the die is cast.

So that leaves us with negotiations and sanctions... which don't seem to have great prospects right now, but at least avoid the worst outcomes of the other approaches.  The sanctions would likely work better if they remain carefully targeted and tightly linked to negotiating strategy (i.e. the White House approach) rather than being primarily expressive and driven by domestic politics (i.e. the Senate's version). Engagement should be combined with a consistent message of U.S. support for public freedoms and human rights, which could raise the international and domestic costs of the regime's repression without tarnishing the opposition movement by association. The overall focus should be on ways to build the conditions under which a negotiation strategy can work -- no easy task, but the best option available. In general, we'd all do better if we could focus public discourse less on hopes for regime change and war, and more on the less sexy but more helpful question of how to make a negotiations strategy work.

ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images

 

JANBEKSTER

11:41 PM ET

February 11, 2010

Impression.

One is getting the picture from the US official comments tonight, that the USA does not believe Iran is capable of enriching Uranium up to the level of 20%. Maybe the US experts are correct, and maybe not, but certainly it seems the current Washington administration is trying to convince itself with whatever reasons it can produce, in order not to act in a serious manner against Iran, as well as, stop others from taking serious measures againt Tehran.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

DEPETRIS@WORDPRESS.COM

2:34 AM ET

February 12, 2010

More engagement= dead end

Diplomatic engagement with Iran would be great if the United States and its allies had the ideal circumstances. That is, a fragile Iranian Government split along ideological lines, and threatened by a large-scale reformist opposition. But guess what? Such conditions are not anywhere close to reality.

Tehran is pressing on with its nuclear program despite three rounds of economic sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. A fourth round specifically targeting members of the IRGC may meet the same fate in the coming weeks.

While there are certainly Iranian citizens who feel angered by their government, there are simply not enough activists to change the political landscape. Take today's protest as an example; Iranian police and Basij militia successfully squashed any anti-regime gathering that would be remotely effective. Ahmadinejad and the IRGC continue to cement their control over economic and defense policy (and yes, I know that Khamenei technically has the final say).

What could possibly prompt the Iranians to the table? They haven't cooperated in the past five years, so why would they suddenly cooperate now? "The overall focus should be on ways to build the conditions under which a negotiation strategy can work." We have been trying this strategy, to now avail.

http://www.depetris.wordpress.com

 

EATBEES

12:16 PM ET

February 12, 2010

Work With, Not Against

Marc, thanks for the breath of reason which I always enjoy from your blog. Just one point. Despite its "increasingly thuggish" nature the Iranian system is still the most democratic in the region, outside of Turkey and maybe Lebanon. Indeed, the very strength of the opposition can be seen as a credit to the current system. I'm convinced the vast majority of Iranians, even the reformers, want to preserve and build on these gains rather than risk the chaos of revolution. So change will be incremental and largely within the current structure. Given that, shouldn't the U.S. be working with the Iranian regime rather than against it? What are we trying to punish them for anyway? They are developing nuclear power for peaceful purposes, which is their right. They are anti-Zionist, but that would be true of any democratic government in the region. Washington begins with regime change as the desired outcome, which makes us an untrustworthy partner. Maybe we should forego that and try engagement instead? For now, we are working against one of the few Middle Eastern regimes to prove its commitment to democracy, however imperfect — and that doesn't make sense.

 

ZATHRAS

12:13 AM ET

February 13, 2010

Two Minutes for Interference

I find myself still wondering how to distinguish a policy that attempts to "raise the international and domestic costs of the [Iranian] regime's repression without tarnishing the opposition movement by association" from one that accepts that regime's "commitment to democracy" -- now being demonstrated through mass arrests, massive censorship, and random executions of political opponents -- and seeks to engage only with the government, not with the opposition.

The Iranian regime, following and expanding on a practice in use for decades now, already accuses opposition figures of being American agents, British agents, and Israeli agents. It will continue to do so. Its most zealous supporters will continue to believe what it tells them. How, exactly, does the United States avoid "tarnishing" an opposition already being subjected daily to accusations of this kind without going silent on human rights altogether?

We can tell ourselves that speaking up about human rights in Iran and interfering in Iran's internal affairs are two different things until we are blue in the face. That won't make it true. To the Iranian government, any statements that so much as imply that it has no right to do what it feels it needs to do to maintain its position amount to interference in Iran's internal affairs. To its supporters, statements that Iranians being rounded up or beaten for denouncing the government don't deserve the treatment they are getting are bound to be offensive; they believe opponents of the government deserve to be rounded up and beaten. And whether we choose to say so publicly or not, there can't be any question that the domestic troubles of a regime hostile to the United States represent an opportunity we should exploit without cavil or hesitation.

If there is an idea floating around the American foreign policy community that some large, crucial segment of the Iranian public is awaiting persuasion as to whether the Iranian opposition is made up of patriots or Anglo-American-Zionist enemies of God, I'd like to ask where it comes from. I suspect it mostly comes from fear -- fear of being accused of the same things America has been accused of by every repressive government it has ever tangled with.

The matter is really not difficult. The Iranian opposition has objected to its government's violations of law and of human rights; the United States has objected to the Iranian government's violations of law and of human rights. The ground for the Tehran government to associate the opposition with the United States has already been prepared. Unless the Obama administration is prepared to embrace Ahmedinejad and repudiate all it has ever said about Iranian law and human rights, this will continue. This is why I found the administration's "deer-in-the-headlights" response to the event of last June so frustrating. It seemed more concerned about persuading itself that it didn't deserve to be accused of the things it was being accused of anyway than it was about taking advantage of a valuable opportunity to exploit a hostile government's discomfiture. Frankly, it still does.

Finally, I am aware that there are many people in the United States and elsewhere who remain wedded to apocalyptic thinking with respect to Iran. Regime change, transformation, revolution: all the things that are so exciting to witness from a distance. The Obama administration is not wrong to keep itself far away from this kind of talk. I would prefer that its senior officials had the self-confidence to confront it more directly. Not unlike the Iranian government, those who believe most deeply in the direct application of American force to transform Iran are bound to despise President Obama no matter what he does. There is nothing to be gained by tip-toeing around them.

 

JANBEKSTER

5:39 PM ET

February 13, 2010

US finding Excuses not to act seriously.

One wrote in the previous message above, that one has got the impression that the Washington administration is trying its best to find excuses, in order not to take serious measures against the Iranian regime. Now, if the rumors are to be believed, which various Iranian websites; some affiliated with the opposition, and some just agree with the Iranian opposition's views,
have been talking about today, to the effect that, President AhmadiNejad has been negotiating with US officials for some time, with his brother in Law whom happens to be the director of his bureau as the conduit with the Americans.

Actually some of those Iranian websites, have gone as far as saying that, the Iranian conduit has even met with Sec.Clinton in Europe. Maybe we'll get to distinguish between the wheat and the chaf at one point soon.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

NUR AL-CUBICLE

10:42 PM ET

February 15, 2010

Hillary

Just who advises Hillary Clinton and why is she going on about this "military dictatorship" business? Are we back to Ye Olde Policys of Ye Bush Years?

 

NUR AL-CUBICLE

3:52 PM ET

February 16, 2010

Mahmoud al-Mabhouh

This relates to and earlier post by Prof. Lynch: Corriere della Sera (Milan) reports that Dubai police confirm that Mahmoud al-Mabhouh was assassinated by an 11-man Israeli team operating with forged Irish (Gail Folliard and Kevin Daveron), German (Michael Bodhenheimer) and French (Peter Elvinger) passports, among other nationalities.

 

JANBEKSTER

11:50 AM ET

February 22, 2010

Mabhouh assasination

Well, it looks like many sides from the countries whose passports have been used, have been actually in the know; at least their intelligence services have been in the know and seem to have provided the nod if not, clear acceptance of the assassination. The world of cloak and dagger is usually covered with mist and fog, and what happens within at many occasions does not get to the political decision makers. Maybe it is time and excuse to have some heads rolling (proverbially of course) in this affair.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

ONHANNAH

11:29 PM ET

February 16, 2010

Re

On this site only people have to see great data corresponding with this good topic. With the help of you the good features of our service are apparent. People think that after this was really easy to receaive well composed free custom essay from the essays writing firm.

 

JANBEKSTER

11:44 AM ET

February 22, 2010

hamas-hizbullah

It is rather peculiar that, the USA has acepted the coalition of Hizbullah within the Lebanese government structure; at least the Lebanese government is not in any sense or way boycotted by the Washington administration. In contrast, to the Hamas situation, well, for all intents and purposes, the policy of the USA remains to be against the reconciliation betzeen Hamas and the PNA. In fact, the talk in the region is that, if Hamas joins the Palestinian government , the USA will boycott that government. Basically, well, Hizbullah did not relniquish its weapons, and still believes in armed struggle, so does Hamas, therefore, is really Hamas more threatening than Hizbullah for Israel?. Mybe the intelligent ones whom are in the know can actually shed some light on this.

 

Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

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