Posted By Marc Lynch Share

All Iraq-watching eyes are quite naturally focused on the election results which continue to dribble in, with some hope of final results soon.   There's plenty to watch: Ayad Allawi's Iraqiyya list edging ahead of Nuri al-Maliki's State of  Law, a six vote difference between the Kurdistan Alliance and Iraqiyya in Kirkuk, escalating complaints of fraud, the taunting of prominent individuals who performed badly in the open list voting system.  We'll have to wait even longer for the final results to be processed through the complex reallocation of votes from losing lists to those over the threshold.  But in the meantime, I've been mulling over an interesting document which I just found on the forums:  A Strategic Plan to Improve the Political Position of the Islamic State of Iraq.   Call it the jihadist version of David Petraeus's FM 3-24, a counter-counterinsurgency manual and a frank lessons-learned analysis by an adaptive and resilient organization which has not given up in the face of setbacks.   How does al-Qaeda in Iraq's umbrella organization hope to rekindle the spark of jihad?

The 55 page document, published under a pseudonym, is a remarkably frank "lessons learned" analysis which does not shy away from identifying where the ISI's strategy went wrong.   It's not an "official" document, whatever that means, but it's fascinating nonetheless and demonstrates some deep thinking about the fortunes of the Islamic State in Iraq.    It explains its setbacks, which it argues came at the height of its power and influence, on what it calls two smart and effective U.S. moves in 2006-07: an effective U.S. media and psychological campaign, which convinced many that the "mujahideen" had committed atrocities against Iraqis and killed thousands of Muslims; and the Awakenings, achieved through its manipulation of the tribes and the "nationalist resistance."   The document doesn't mention the "Surge" much at all, at least not in terms of the troop escalation which most Americans have in mind.     

Building upon a lengthy post-mortem on the Awakenings and the media campaigns, the Strategic Plan sets out a detailed agenda for the coming years during and after the U.S. withdrawal.   It calls the coming war "a political and media war to the first degree", with the winner "the side that best prepares for the period following the withdrawal."  It recognizes that the Islamic State can not control all of Iraq through military force alone, and that only a wise political strategy can succeed.  It then offers a detailed five point plan, including a process to unify the ranks of the jihad, in part by reaching out to the old nationalist resistance and convincing them to return to the fold;  detailed military preparations, including recommendations to conserve men and resources until the right time; and an enhanced media operation designed to rebut the most damaging charges against the Islamic State and carefully tied to a coherent political strategy.  Perhaps its most striking concept is a detailed plan for creating "Jihadist Awakenings", mimicking the U.S. engagement of the tribes to create broader popular support.  

This is one of the more interesting documents from the Iraq-focused forums I've come across in a while -- pragmatic and analytical rather than bombastic, surprisingly frank about what went wrong, and alarmingly creative about the Iraqi jihad's way forward.   I've said often that I find a resurgence of the Sunni insurgency unlikely at this point, for many reasons, and this document does little to change that assessment.  Unifying the former insurgency is easier said than done, the Iraqi political process and state capabilities have changed dramatically, and the damage to the image of the Islamic State isn't fading.   But this is a reminder that the insurgency was adaptive and resilient, is capable of adjusting its strategy to new conditions, can learn from its mistakes, and will try to take advantage of any Sunni frustrations in the coming years.    Even if the insurgency isn't on the brink of resuming, and Iraq isn't yet unraveling, this is the sort of thing to which I hope the right people are still paying attention.   

 UPDATE (Monday):   A number of people have asked for a copy of the document. I've emailed it to those who asked over email, while others want me to post it here. I've been leery of posting or linking directly to documents from the jihadist forums since some unpleasantness a while back with people, shall we say, following the links back.    But since so many people have asked, I'll make an exception, post the link to al-Hanein, and hope I don't regret it!

 
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STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

10:50 PM ET

March 17, 2010

thanks for the heads-up, document link?

Marc, would appreciate it if you'd put a link to the document (perhaps from GW) so that FP folks could take a look themselves... instead of just being information consumers and accepting your analysis without any further examination.

Thanks,
SD

 

DMDENNIS

7:19 PM ET

March 18, 2010

Seconded.

Those who are fluent in Arabic and possess an active interest in the Iraq war enjoy being able to read over these things for their own analysis. Are you afraid of posting it publicly? It would seem you've already given it enough publicity for it not to be a secret anyways...

 

STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

5:09 AM ET

March 20, 2010

FOUND - document link

I commented above and below on the value of sharing the link to the document...

I've been busy of the last few days, but I finally got around to searching Google for the document. It only took about three minutes, but I came across the first link here

PDF version: http://www.archive.org/download/Dirasa_dawla_03/khouta.pdf
Word Doc version: http://www.archive.org/download/Dirasa_dawla_03/khouta.doc
HTML: http://www.archive.org/stream/Dirasa_dawla_03/khouta

Thanks to Internet Archive for hosting it.

If those links aren't working, trying searching for - ???? ?????? ????????? ??????????? ??????? ??????? - or the English translated title, which is essentially "Islamic State of Iraq's Strategy for the Next Stage". Hopefully the Arabic script appeared properly.

SD

 

JANBEKSTER

12:55 AM ET

March 18, 2010

re-document link

We don't want Dr. Lynch to be accused of propagating illict and destructive documents, do we now Mr./Ms. SD?.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

GRANT

1:07 AM ET

March 18, 2010

Considering that instructions

Considering that instructions on how to build bombs and several different insurgency manuals can easily be found online I seriously doubt that this would make a difference. Indeed, I imagine that most Iraqi groups already have seen it.

 

STRATEGIC DISCOURSE

5:05 AM ET

March 19, 2010

I doubt there would be a problem...

@Janbekster

I doubt there would be a problem with posting the document. Such materials from Al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and other organizations are repeatedly found on websites of the MNF / USF-Iraq, SITE Intelligence Group, RAND, USMA's CTC, USMC's CAOCL, even the BBC and other news outlets from time-to-time.

Jan, I understand your concerns, though having viewed many such documents and seen their relative ubiquity on the web, I don't think it's really an issue. Surely Lynch could host the document on GWU website as an academic resource, or even a free-hosting service if they objected.

Most likely I'll just have to go find it myself... but that seems like an unnecessary use of time when someone else already has it and commented on it here at FP, which tends to serve a mix of policy wonks and other knowledgeable folks willing and able to analyze the document for themselves.

v/r,
SD

 

GRANT

1:06 AM ET

March 18, 2010

Though I seriously doubt that

Though I seriously doubt that Al Qaeda in Iraq and associated groups could manage to return to late-2005 level of power (especially in an urban nation like Iraq) I will agree with them on a single point. I do not think that the 'surge' really played as huge a role as the U.S would like to think. It probably did far more good than harm, but I feel that the real reason for our successes were primarily the actions of the Iraqis and the strategic decisions of AQI. Many vital tribal leaders sought a better deal with the Iraqi government than the one they were getting with the terrorist groups*, and Maliki's government did make some efforts to better enforce peace. On geography, AQI chose to take the fight to the cities, a disastrous choice. Urban insurgencies simply do not turn out well, even though they seem to be more bloody than rural ones.

On the article, I would be interested in reading it as well though it is possible that it has not been publicly translated into English yet.

*Honestly I have no idea how AQI thought they could really win the war. The various Sunni insurgent groups didn't have the strength necessary to defeat the Shi'a dominated state, the best they could have hoped for would be a dissolution of Iraq that still would not have ended well for them.

 

JANBEKSTER

11:00 AM ET

March 18, 2010

Not serious about Dr. Lynch.

One wasn't really being serious about what I said in the previous message. I am sure Dr. Lynch's reputation as a renouned academic is unblemished. As for the Sahawat, I think it was a matter of time even from before, that they would discover that the best interests of those whom they represent, can be pursued only through the political process. However, they discovered also, that there is a great difference between carrying an AK 47 and having the political skills to participate in the democratisation process. However, this can change in time as "democracy" takes roots in the country hopefully.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

BIBLIOJES

6:42 PM ET

March 19, 2010

So you want the original?

I'm pretty sure the original can be found here:

http://www.el-sanur.de/html/seite147.html

But where can we get a good English translation? Marc, do you know Arabic? Or did you read a translated version? If you read a translation, where can we get that?

 

BB

3:43 AM ET

March 20, 2010

Alqi reveals its true self

What is interesting about Alqi's strategy for the future is that it clearly intends to continue its sectarian war against the majority (80% arab iraq) shia "detailed military preparations, including recommendations to conserve men and resources until the right time; " and thinks it can re-harness the Baath led resistance to this end "in part by reaching out to the old nationalist resistance and convincing them to return to the fold".

Well am not sure the old Baath led resistance and its sunni fellow travellers have much appetite left after the revenge meeted out to it in 2006 by the shia militias? 80% is 80%.

Not surprising Alqi makes no mention of the surge: it would hardly wish to admit to the Iraqi/US victory enabled by the "surge" in June/July/August 2007 when the MNF and the Iraqi army drove alqi out from its operational hub in the southern outskirts of Baghdad in a series of simultaneous offensives that continued without let up until Alqi had been blasted out of its safe havens. Those who were still alive fled to Mosul. Civilian deaths in Iraq dropped by 70% immediately thereafter.

 

JANBEKSTER

10:21 AM ET

March 21, 2010

Mr. Maliki is so democratic.

Mr. Maliki is so democratic, to an extent that he is threatening; either vote recount or the return to violence and bloodshed. This a man whom still wants to run Iraq.
khairi janbek.paris/france

 

Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

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