Posted By Marc Lynch Share

Speaker of the House John Boehner recently returned from Iraq with the message that he would support keeping some U.S. troops in Iraq after December 2011.  While this surely reflects what he heard from the American officials he saw in Baghdad, it distracts attention from a more important question about the future U.S. relationship with Iraq in the primary area where Rep. Boehner could actually help:   halting short-sighted plans to slash the State Department budget which could cripple the civilian mission to Iraq at an exceptionally delicate transitional moment.

Rep. Boehner can not control whether Iraq requests a new SOFA to allow troops to stay. In fact, keeping a small number of U.S. troops in Iraq is not the most important issue for the future American role in Iraq, and the trends in Iraqi politics make it increasingly unlikely that the long-expected request to renegotiate the Status of Forces Agreement will be forthcoming regardless of what Americans want.  But Congress does have a decisive role in determining whether to support and fund the civilian mission in Iraq.    Rep. Boehner can do virtually nothing about whether or not Iraqis decide to request a renegotiation of the SOFA, but he can work to ensure that Congress funds the civilian part of American foreign policy which are so urgently needed at this historical moment. He should.  

It is understandable why the question of whether U.S. troops will stay in Iraq dominates what remains of the debate about Iraq, but it really shouldn't. I don't think that a few thousand U.S. troops remaining in Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi government would be that big a deal -- the removal of 140,000 troops would satisfy the Obama campaign's commitment to withdraw, and the clear commitment to that withdrawal has already had the necessary effect on reshaping Iraqi politics.  The Pentagon has long thought that a small residual force would be a safety blanket against a resurgence of civil war, provide necessary logistical support and training, and signal continued U.S. commitment. There's just a world of difference between a few thousand American trainers and the kind of eternal, large-scale troop presence which used to be proposed.

The U.S. assumption that eventually Iraqi politicians would step up and ask for an extension always seemed to ignore the importance of the political obstacles posed by hostile public opinion. Whatever private support for a longer-term U.S. role exists among Iraqi politicians (and I've heard a fair amount of it), that never extended to public discourse or public opinion. Electoral incentives and the importance of public opinion meant that virtually no politicians have been willing to publicly support revisiting the SOFA -- an important lesson to those trying to understand the likely effects of the changes in Egypt and the region on their foreign policy.  The growing power of public opinion and protest movements certainly won't make Iraqi politicans any more willing to broach such a controversial subject.

If the SOFA is not renegotiated, and no other workaround is found, then the U.S. will have to withdraw all of its troops from Iraq by December 31, 2011 just as promised. Frankly, I don't think that the presence of U.S. troops is really a decisive strategic factor anymore. Iraqi security forces have long-since taken the lead role, and despite the ongoing assassinations and explosions and general violence there have been few signs of a return to civil war dynamics.  Similarly, as expected, the Iraqi political system has eventually found its own balance as it has adapted to the declining American role -- not an especially attractive political balance,with many enduring issues surrounding the centralization of power and inefficient services and power-sharing and unfilled top government jobs and more, but reasonably robust (I keep hearing Iraqis jokingly brag about how they now have the most stable politics in the region). 

Iraq is slowly evolving into a position to be a player in regional politics, rather than an arena where others wage their proxy wars.  Whether that Iraq becomes an effective, independent partner of the United States or develops an alliance with Iran, and how Iraq relates to its Arab neighbors, are among the most crucial variables shaping the the future regional order in the Middle East -- as important as consolidating Egyptian democracy or the Iranian nuclear program.  There will be powerful forces pulling Iraq towards Iran, including not only religious ties but also economic interests and personal relationships.  Rising sectarianism across the region fueled by the Saudi crackdown in Bahrain risks pushing it ever further from the Arab states in the Gulf; it is alarming to see Allawi's Saudi-backed Iraqiyya list denouncing Kuwait as "an enemy of the Iraqi people and its new democratic system".  

As it becomes more of an independent actor, Iraq's foreign policy, like that of the new Egypt or of Erdogan's Turkey, will be strategic and interest-based but also responsive to public opinion.  The U.S. needs to build enduring relationships and engage across all sectors of political society if it hopes to deal effectively with this new Iraq.  The civilian side of the U.S. foreign policy machine has never been more important across the entire Middle East: understanding and engaging newly empowered publics, building connections with emergent civil society movements, partnering on economic development projects,supporting police training and rule of law development.  And that requires thinking past the military mission and devoting adequate resources to the civilian sector --- something which Secretary Gates and the U.S. military clearly understand, but which Congress still seemingly does not. If Rep. Boehner wants to help Iraq and the U.S. engagement in the broader Middle East, this is where he should turn his attention.

AFP/Getty Images

 

WEMEANTWELL

5:22 PM ET

May 6, 2011

militarization of foreign policy

During my year in Iraq as a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader I watched with some sadness as the majority of our engagement with Iraqis in the field was conducted by young Army captains. I was the lone Foreign Service Officer assigned to a full brigade and while I stayed busy and traveled out of the FOB almost daily, there was only so much of me. For most Iraqis not in the Green Zone, the only Americans they saw wore green and carried weapons.

The militarization issue was always visible at the PRTs. The Department of State struggled to field adequate numbers of qualified employees from among its own ranks, forcing the creation of an army of contractors, called 3161s after the name of the legislation that created their hiring program. The need for 3161s to live on a military base skewed hiring toward self-selecting former military, nearly self-defeating the idea of providing a civilian side to reconstruction. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) in its review of the PRTs’ first year of operation found an Army veterinarian developing agriculture programs, an Air Force aviation maintenance manager as a PRT co-leader, and advisors to Iraqi provincial governors who included a former Navy submariner, a Marine ultrasound technician, and an Army drill sergeant.

To be fair, out in the field many young Army captains did a pretty good job of engaging Iraqis. Many were smart, well-educated and generally enthusiastic about their missions of handing out supplies, reconstructing schools and government buildings and generally promoting the idea that America wanted to be best friends with Iraq.

There were also young officers uncomfortable with the hearts and minds mission, unable to switch from their game face to their happy face seventy two times a day. I can’t blame them; diplomacy is not what they were trained to do. The military does some stuff well, and diplomats do some stuff well.

However, diplomats under funded, under led, under trained and over there did not work, and the military was forced into the gap by necessity and sense of mission. If we insist on COIN wars, we need to have the people on staff who can conduct them, all phases of them.

Peter www.wemeantwell.com

 

SOCAL55

8:47 AM ET

May 7, 2011

I'm really looking forward to reading your book

Amazon has it on pre-order right now.

 

NUR AL-CUBICLE

1:10 AM ET

May 10, 2011

20 thousand say what?

20 (or even 16) thousand "embassy" employees? Honey, that ain't no embassy, that's an occupation. (Nice jobs for IR graduates that will never see the light of day.)

There is no prayer that our "diplomatic" presence in the ME will be "demilitarized" by us dirty f...ing hippies. We should just go over their in a mob, take over diplomatic activities and set them straight. Plus we can build catapults to pound the presidio (embassy) daily with teddy bears, juicy fruit and copies of Trout Fishing in America.

 

MAX SPECCY

3:54 PM ET

June 4, 2011

The Special Inspector General

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in its review of the PRTs’ first year of operation found an Army veterinarian developing agriculture programs, an stavkove kancelarie Air Force aviation maintenance manager as a PRT co-leader, and advisors to Iraqi provincial governors who included a former Navy submariner, a Marine ultrasound technician, and an Army drill sergeant.
To be fair, out in the field many young Army captains did a pretty good job of engaging Iraqis. Many were smart, well-educated and generally enthusiastic about their missions of handing out supplies, reconstructing schools and government buildings and generally promoting the idea that America wanted to be best friends with Iraq.

 

Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University.

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