Professor Lynch,

There are severe problems with both the logic and coherency of your piece. In the interest of time, I will just point out the most glaring examples, which happen to be your main policy recommendations:

• Engaging Newly Empowered Publics: You state that the administration should “lay out a vision that aligns the US with the aspirations of publics in the Arab world and Iran”. Although rhetorically agreeable, this is simply not viable and a product of wishful thinking. All of these publics have differing visions for their own futures, as the conditions that have led to political instability in each state vary greatly from each other. Additionally, these “visions”, have either nothing to do with US strategic concerns or, in many cases, directly contradict American preferences for the region. Cases in point: What if a freely elected Bahraini government decides to force out the US military footprint within their territory? What if a freely elected government in the UAE no longer wants to buy weapons from US manufacturers? What if Iranian civil society really wants to be a nuclear capable state, which by the way is highly likely? These are only but a few contradictions in the overall US policy in the region, hence the continued failure of Washington to engineer a regional reality it finds acceptable.

• Focusing on Human Rights and Universal Freedoms: You argue that the US should “call” for the same universal rights and freedoms in Iran that it has echoed for the rest of the region, and also increase its agitation of human rights within Iran. Yet you overlook the fact that the same country that has brought about the Abu Ghraibs, Guantanamos, the mercenary killings in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continual drone attacks in Pakistan no longer has much credibility in pushing a human rights agenda anywhere, let alone the Mid East. What’s more, US support given to Riyadh, Sana’a, & Manama (governments whose human rights record are infinitely worse than Tehran’s) totally and categorically impeaches the United States as being a credible voice on the matter.

It is not the message, but the messenger that’s the problem. This is not lost on region’s publics.

• Communicating Iran’s Weakness: You state that the US “should launch a strategic communications campaign designed to highlight Iran’s irrelevance to the uprisings and dwindling soft power”. This statements is quite comical, for it suggests that the region’s civil societies are somehow unaware of what political forces are causing the Arab Spring, particularly odd in light of the fact that it is THEY who are producing this reality. Why would they need reminding of that? And how does that “weaken” Iran?
Moreover, in your paper, you quote a plucky Kuwaiti on the supposed inferiority of Iran’s military and the purported strength of the Persian Gulf states – both assessments of which are embedded in a naïve and incomplete picture of the military competence and effectiveness of Iran’s and the GCC’s capabilities. It is true that Iran’s military is cut off from the West, but that does not diminish its war fighting capacity or lack of access to potent weaponry, for it is deeply embedded with the Chinese, Indian, and Russian military technologies. Furthermore, the mere possession of high-tech military equipment by the Persian Gulf states does not make these countries competent on the battlefield, for there is something to be said of actual experience in war. As you know, none of these states has ever fought a war and all of them need constant US protection.
Another factor to consider is the methodology of war and of strategy in general, for while the US and the comprador Arab regimes that are aligned with the US essentially embrace the Clausewitzian paradigm of total war, Iran’s is much more the Sun-Tzu, asymmetric variety. It is the latter method of war that is most likely going to shape the manner of conflict, if such conflict arises, and for the US, asymmetric warfare is simply not its strong suit.

• Diplomacy to Shape the Future: You argue that a “negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge is unlikely in the short term” – Why is it unlikely? Although domestic resistance towards engagement persists in both countries, you miss the overarching strategic interests of both the US and Iran in finding a grand bargain that can benefit both governments. In Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Persian Gulf oil policy, and that of the Caspian Basin, a sober picture finds the strategic interests of both the US and Iran in some vague sense of unison. Obviously domestic politics in either or both states and the years of mutual acrimony can and will complicate matters, but both states have in the past superseded parochial domestic constituencies for the advancement of what they perceived as their national interest. Therefore, such a turn of events in this relationship is not implausible.
Moreover, while you are correct in recommending that Washington should continue “pursuing lower-level diplomacy and confidence-building measures designed to create possibilities for movement when conditions change”, your prior recommendations essentially make this latter point simply impossible. For instance, why would the Iranians help the US in Iraq or Afghanistan when they are being sanctioned by the US? Why would they support peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians when Washington refuses to consider Iran’s security concerns? In past instances where Washington fundamentally refashioned relations with enemy countries, such as post-war Vietnam or Mao’s China, there was reciprocal and simultaneous policy shifts on both sides. It is simply an illusion to think that somehow the Iranians would acquiesce to Washington’s concerns without some level of reciprocity.

• Watching Out for War: Not that your point is not well taken, but simply put, the US economy and its military can not wage war upon Iran, for the conflict will not be limited but would engulf the entire region. Although my confidence in Washingtonian decision and policy-making has never been high, I think there are enough cool heads, particularly in the State and Defense Departments, to at least understand this principle. Moreover, the inconclusive nature of the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libyan military interventions, compounded by the instability in Pakistan and Yemen, are also deterring factors, from both a domestic and regional level, against any war with Iran.

All in all, Washington's problem with Iran is symptomatic of a flawed regional policy it has pursued since the end of the Cold War, which has now completely collapsed. Until the US is willing to fully integrate the most rudimentary security concerns of all states equally, its policies will continue on a downward spiral in the region until it faces the same exit from the Middle East that the former British and French powers experienced decades ago. Only with a new security architecture that integrates all regional states at the expense of none, will sustainable peace be achieved. The longer the US waits, the less likely it will have any say or role in that final outcome.

Dr. Lynch recommends:

"A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge is unlikely in the short term, and this is not the time for a new public initiative. However, the administration should continue pursuing lower-level diplomacy and confidence-building measures designed to create possibilities for movement when conditions change."

The question is why is it not the time to negotiate with Iran at this time? If it is Congressional mandates against negotiation, then why is the US participating in the P5+1 negotiation. The only logical reason is the idiotic dependence of US foreign policy on the election cycle. President Obama will look weak if he starts talking to the Iranians.

More generally, Dr. Lynch's report ignore the fact that the 2011 US NIE has already concluded that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. It does not even say (unlike the 2007 NIE) that Iran is leaving its options open for the future development of nuclear weapons.

Like most American political analysts, Dr. Lynch stays true to the paranoia about Iran which is based on complete lies and misrepresentations, although he seems to have a more moderate position. The fact is that the sanctions on Iran were originally imposed based on totally false premises. And, now we just keep piling up antagonistic steps against Iran without any rhyme or reason. All the sanctions are unjustified and should be removed immediately and without any conditions.

US foreign policy is essentially set on automatic pilot. Once it starts in a certain direction, it just goes on without any re-examination of facts. Just as the sanctions on Cuba are totally nonsensical, all this paranoia about Iran is also unjustified. However, President Obama is too afraid to make a change. One change he could make would be to get rid of Dennis Ross who seems to give me the wrong advice about everything.

What I learned from the "Lynch report":

- Israeli security concerns are inflated and emotional, not real
- Israel is liable to react impulsively against any perceived threat
- Israeli demand to keep the military option on the table is counterproductive warmongering
- The biggest threat to the American interests in the Middle East isn't Iranian nuclear bomb but an Israeli preventive strike against Iran
- New Israeli concessions to Palestinians will make the Iranian threat go away
- Except the empty rhetoric, America should drop all forms of pressure against Iran.

This is all so wonderfully reassuring.

This is a "how-tobash-iran-without-bombing-it"-advice.

None of that will work, cause it was created in bad spirits. despite of that, the era of a moral teching USA is over. get over it, mr lynch.

best,
babazula

Moreover, in your paper, you quote a plucky Kuwaiti on the supposed inferiority of Iran’s military and the purported strength of the Persian Gulf states – both assessments of which are embedded in a naïve and incomplete stavkove kancelarie picture of the military competence and effectiveness of Iran’s and the GCC’s capabilities. It is true that Iran’s military is cut off from the West, but that does not diminish its war fighting capacity or lack of access to potent weaponry, for it is deeply embedded with the Chinese, Indian, and Russian military technologies. Furthermore, the mere possession of high-tech military equipment by the Persian Gulf states does not make these countries competent on the battlefield, for there is something to be said of actual experience in war. As you know, none of these states has ever fought a war and all of them need constant US protection.
Another factor to consider is the methodology of war and of strategy in general, stavkovanie for while the US and the comprador Arab regimes that are aligned with the US essentially embrace the Clausewitzian paradigm of total war, Iran’s is much more the Sun-Tzu, asymmetric variety. It is the latter method of war that is most likely going to shape the manner of conflict, if such conflict arises, and for the US, asymmetric warfare is simply not its strong suit.

All of these publics have differing visions for their own futures, as the conditions that have led to political instability in each state vary greatly from each other. Additionally, these “visions”, have either nothing to do with US strategic sázkové kanceláre concerns or, in many cases, directly contradict American preferences for the region. Cases in point: What if a freely elected Bahraini government decides to force out the US military footprint within their territory? What if a freely elected government in the UAE no longer wants to buy weapons from US manufacturers? What if Iranian civil society really wants to be a nuclear capable state, which by the way is highly likely? These are only but a few contradictions in the overall US policy in the region, hence the continued failure of Washington to sázkové kanceláre engineer a regional reality it finds acceptable.The fact is that the sanctions on Iran were originally imposed based on totally false premises. And, now we just keep piling up antagonistic steps against Iran without any rhyme or reason. All the sanctions are unjustified and should be removed immediately and without any conditions.